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32e1c994412051cc19dfa37f8cac4834d64538f6
29
Commits
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 jack
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32e1c99441 | Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into harden/radio-metadata | ||
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jackandClaude Opus 5
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399cdf95ab |
Stop broadcasting the adjacency graph and the authorship marker
Two radio-layer metadata leaks that need no cross-platform agreement, because both only change what this device chooses to emit. **Announces no longer carry the neighbour list.** The TLV held up to ten 8-byte peer IDs, so a *single* passive receiver could reconstruct the local adjacency graph — who is standing next to whom — with no need for several receivers or RSSI trilateration. In a crowd that is the most sensitive thing the radio layer gives away, and unlike the identity keys it is not required for the protocol to work. Backward compatible in both directions: an empty list omits the TLV entirely rather than emitting a zero-length one, the decoder already treats its absence as "no topology offered", and lists from other peers are still parsed so a mixed network behaves sensibly. The cost is source routing. MeshTopologyTracker builds its adjacency map from these lists, so with everyone silent there are no routes to compute and directed traffic floods instead — which is already the documented fallback whenever a route fails. More airtime for directed sends in dense meshes; no correctness change. Left as a TransportConfig constant rather than a user setting because it is a protocol trade-off, not a preference, and flipping it back is one line. **Public broadcasts no longer always originate at the maximum TTL.** `ttl == messageTTLDefault` was a reliable "this device wrote it" marker to any direct listener, which discloses authorship rather than mere presence. Origin TTL is now drawn from 5...7: in a dense graph relays already clamp broadcasts to 5, so an origin emitting 5 is indistinguishable from relayed traffic, and in a sparse chain a 6 could be an origin or one hop from a 7. Signature-safe and needs no agreement: TTL is excluded from the signed bytes (toBinaryDataForSigning zeroes it so relays can decrement), so a peer on any version just sees a smaller starting TTL and relays it normally. The floor is not below the dense-graph clamp, since lower would cost reach without buying ambiguity that clamp does not already provide. Announces deliberately keep the fixed TTL: three link-binding paths read a maximum-TTL announce as "direct link", and an announce's sender ID already identifies the device, so there is nothing to hide and something to break. **Not done here: padding.** Extending padding beyond Noise frames, and fixing the gap where a frame needing over 255 bytes of padding is emitted unpadded, both looked unilateral but are not. `toBinaryDataForSigning` encodes with padding enabled, so the padding bytes are inside the signed material for every signed packet — changing the algorithm changes the signed byte stream and breaks signature verification against any peer that has not changed it identically. That makes it a coordinated wire change; recorded in the privacy assessment and in #1487's open questions rather than attempted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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132120a88e |
Close the three holes the #1486 review found (#1488)
* Fix the three follow-ups from the #1486 review Three defects shipped with the censorship-resilience merge, all confirmed against main: 1. Source-manifest verification silently accepted added files. shasum -c checks only the files the manifest lists, and the Xcode project compiles every source file present in the tree — so a hostile mirror could pass verification by adding a file rather than modifying one. The manifest header and VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md now require the completeness check (git status --porcelain, or a path diff for tarballs) alongside the hash check. 2. A relay removed while Tor was bootstrapping reconnected anyway. dropRelays never subtracted from pendingTorConnectionURLs, and a custom relay passes the allow-list filter, so draining the pending queue resurrected a relay someone had explicitly deleted. 3. Turning Tor off mid-bootstrap read as 'network may be blocking tor'. shutdownCompletely left the detached 75s poll loop running, which then stamped bootstrapDidStall over the clean shutdown state; and the stall handler guarded on torEnforced, which is compile-time true in release, instead of the runtime preference. The poll loop is now generation-fenced (shutdown, dormancy, and restart each invalidate it) and the handler consults persistedTorPreference(). Both app-side fixes carry regression tests proven to fail pre-fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Address Codex review: ignored files and manifest placement git status --porcelain omits ignored paths, and .gitignore covers build/ — a planted bitchat/build/Evil.swift would compile via the synchronized group while the documented check stayed silent. The checkout check now uses --ignored. The downloaded manifest also has to live outside the tree, or it trips the completeness checks itself; the doc now says so and references it at /tmp throughout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c1ce9029d8 |
Keep working when the network is hostile, and make the app verifiable (#1486)
Tier 3 of a protest-hardening review. The BLE mesh is already properly fenced off from network reachability and needs nothing here; every gap is on the internet side, or in how someone gets a build they can trust. Say when Tor is blocked. The bootstrap poll loop simply ended at its 75-second deadline, leaving isStarting true with no further state, so a network that blocks Tor was indistinguishable from a slow one and the UI said "starting tor…" indefinitely. TorManager now exposes bootstrapDidStall and posts .TorBootstrapDidStall, and the app reports that mesh messaging still works while internet delivery is paused. It is cleared on each new start or restart, so a later attempt can report again. Let relays be added by hand. The four built-in relays are well-known clearnet hostnames, which is four names for a censor to block and no recourse short of a new build. NostrRelaySettings persists up to eight additional relays, normalized, .onion accepted, with a settings editor. They join the same target set as the built-ins and are subject to the same activation policy. Removal reconciles against the previous set: the teardown path iterates the current targets, so without that a removed relay's socket and queued sends would linger — covered by a test that fails without it. The merged list is cached rather than recomputed, because allowedRelayList consults it once per candidate URL and would otherwise read UserDefaults inside that loop. Stop stranding people who denied location. The activation gate required location permission or a mutual favorite, but teleporting into a geohash requires neither, so someone with no permission and no favorites could sit in a channel that never connected while Tor and the relays stayed suppressed and nothing said why. Being in a location channel is now a third arm of the gate, in both the activation service and the relay manager's copy of the policy, and leaving the channel closes it again. Stop burning the Tor timeout when Tor is off. GeoRelayDirectory awaited Tor readiness unconditionally, but with the preference off TorManager has been shut down, so every refresh spent the full bootstrap deadline and the directory froze on its cached copy. It now keys on the preference, not on live readiness: Tor wanted but unavailable must still skip the fetch rather than fall back to clearnet. Say what turning Tor off costs. The toggle's copy described it as hiding your IP "for location channels", understating both scope and consequence. It now names private messages too, and while the toggle is off the settings screen states that every relay can see the device IP. Make builds verifiable. There was no release verification of any kind: no signatures, no checksums, no documented procedure. Post-takedown that is the acute gap, because mirrors appear and people install whatever they can find during a shutdown. source-manifest.yml publishes a per-tag SHA-256 manifest with a provenance attestation, self-checking before it publishes, and docs/VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md explains how to verify source and states plainly that compiled builds from anywhere but the App Store cannot be verified. It also records the gaps honestly: no published signing key, no reproducible build, no non-GitHub mirror. docs/TOR-INTEGRATION.md was substantially stale — it documented a torrc, SOCKSPort and ControlPort that the in-process Arti client does not use, and claimed there are no user-visible settings — so it is rewritten, including the deferred gap below. Deferred: no Tor bridges or pluggable transports. arti-client is built without pt-client or bridge-client and bootstraps from stock config, so in a country that blocks Tor outright there is still no circumvention path — only a clear report that there isn't. Closing it needs the Rust features, bridge config through the FFI, and an xcframework rebuild under the pinned toolchain with a provenance update, which is its own change. Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c079d2ab5d |
Harden what a locked or seized device gives away (#1484)
* Harden what a locked or seized device gives away The realistic compromise for many of the people this app is built for is not interception but a phone taken, and often unlocked under coercion. Content encryption is in good shape; these are the gaps around it. Hide notification previews, by default. Notification content is rendered by the system on the lock screen, so it was readable without unlocking: DM alerts carried the sender's nickname and the full message body, and geohash alerts put the geohash in the title. Alerts now state that a DM, mention, or location-channel activity arrived and withhold the rest until the app is opened. userInfo still carries the routing peer ID and deep link, neither of which the system displays, so taps land where they did. A settings toggle restores full previews for anyone who wants them. Default-on is the deliberate part: a phone face-up on a table should not narrate conversations, and someone who wants previews can say so. Cover the window on willResignActive, so the snapshot iOS stores for the app switcher shows a placeholder rather than an open conversation. Opaque rather than blurred, because blurred large text stays partly legible and the snapshot goes to disk. Added synchronously from a UIKit notification with queue: nil, since the capture follows shortly after and an OperationQueue hop or a SwiftUI state change can lose that race. Panic wipe already deleted snapshots already on disk; this stops new ones from being worth deleting. Bound media by age as well as size. The 100 MB quota only ever considered incoming files, so outgoing media had no lifetime at all and a received photo could outlive its conversation indefinitely. A launch-time sweep now deletes managed media older than seven days, incoming and outgoing, with the same exemptions quota eviction honors: in-flight live captures and files reserved by a delivery or deletion in progress. Make /clear tell the truth on the mesh timeline. It recorded an echo watermark and left the gossip archive on disk for up to 6 hours, so someone who cleared before a police stop had deleted nothing. Clearing now erases the archive too. The watermark still matters: it suppresses pre-clear messages this device hears again from peers. The cost is that the device stops serving recent public backlog until it hears fresh traffic, which is a fair reading of what clearing a timeline means. Documented in PRIVACY_POLICY.md and the privacy assessment, including a new section on what is deliberately NOT addressed: there is still no duress mechanism of any kind (no decoy passphrase, no wipe-on-failed-auth, no app lock), macOS gets no file-protection classes, and media is not sealed at the app layer. The duress question is a product decision as much as an engineering one, since in some jurisdictions destroying data on demand is itself an offence and hiding may protect someone better than destroying, so it is called out rather than guessed at. Three findings from the audit that prompted this work turned out to be already fixed on main and are not included: keychain accessibility is AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly with a retrying migration, the panic media wipe uses a two-location durable marker transaction, and panic already discards staged share-extension content. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Inject the previews preference instead of reading shared defaults CI caught a real problem this introduced. `NotificationServiceTests` already asserted the full-preview title and body, and both it and the new redaction tests read `NotificationPrivacySettings` from `UserDefaults.standard` in the same process. Whichever ran second depended on the other's cleanup, so it passed locally and failed in CI: XCTAssertEqual failed: ("🔒 new dm") is not equal to ("🔒 DM from Alice") Fixed at the source rather than by ordering or serialization. `NotificationService` now takes a `hidePreviewsProvider`, defaulting to the real preference, so each test states which behavior it asserts. The pre-existing test asks for previews shown and gains a redacted counterpart; the redaction tests no longer touch the shared store. `NotificationPrivacySettings` also gained store-injecting accessors so the default-value and round-trip assertions can use an isolated suite rather than mutating preferences other tests read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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229a41557e |
docs: correct inaccurate privacy and metadata claims (#1485)
* docs: correct inaccurate privacy and metadata claims Several documented guarantees did not match the implementation. These matter more than ordinary doc drift: someone deciding whether to carry this phone to a protest reads these sentences as the threat model. - Peer IDs were described as "short ephemeral IDs derived per session" that "rotate periodically" and "prevent tracking". They are the first 8 bytes of the Noise static key fingerprint, stable across sessions and reboots, and replaced only by a panic wipe. Corrected in the whitepaper (§3, §8), IdentityModels, and BitchatProtocol, whose header notes claimed "no persistent identifiers in protocol headers" while every header carries exactly one. - "No plaintext message content is ever written to disk" was false for accepted media, which is stored unsealed under the platform's data-protection class. Narrowed to what actually holds. - Padding was described as applying to all packets but fragments. Only noiseEncrypted and noiseHandshake frames are padded; the pad bytes equal the pad length rather than being random; and because that length must fit one byte, a frame needing over 255 bytes of padding is emitted unpadded. Documented in the whitepaper (§4.1) and MessagePadding. - The gossip archive window is 6 hours in production, not the 15 minutes claimed in PRIVACY_POLICY.md and the privacy assessment. The 15-minute figure is the struct default that BLEService overrides. - The privacy assessment credited iOS BLE address randomization without noting that stable app-layer identifiers defeat it. The whitepaper's future-work list now names the changes these corrections imply: rotating on-air identity, padding for non-Noise types, and making the announce neighbor list optional. No behavior change; comments and documentation only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: correct the same claims in the README The README repeats two of the claims corrected elsewhere in this PR, and it is the document people actually read before deciding to trust the app. - "no persistent identifiers" is the inverse of what the mesh does; it now points at the whitepaper's identity and metadata sections. - "end-to-end encryption with forward secrecy" holds for live Noise sessions but not for sealed store-and-forward mail, which the whitepaper already flags as its main cryptographic trade-off. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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jackandGitHub
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fb451bc6d0 |
Persist authenticated private-media delivery receipts (#1466)
Adds a durable receiver-side ledger (BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore) mapping a deterministic private-media message ID — hash-bound to sender, recipient, and entropy-bearing filename — to the stored file before UI delivery and before the Noise-encrypted delivery ACK, so sender retries and relaunches cannot create duplicate bubbles or files. Receipts are unforgeable without the Noise session; capability bit 9 rides the existing announce bitfield (no wire-format change; rolling upgrade safe both directions). Includes review fixes: corrupt receipt records are quarantined per-record (bytes preserved at <id>.json.corrupt, only that ID fail-closed — previously one bad record silently disabled ALL inbound private media forever); the panic reset now reaches BLEService's own store instance via completePanicReset with a production-wiring test; and both content.delivery.reason.* strings ship with full 30-locale coverage. |
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jackandGitHub
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e9275cb3d8 |
Relabel private Nostr envelopes honestly in docs; harden legacy envelope validation (#1480)
Split-out safe half of #1437 (the kind-1402 wire migration stays held for Android coordination). Docs (README/WHITEPAPER/PRIVACY_POLICY/privacy-assessment) now describe the actual proprietary DM construction — kind 1059 gift wrap carrying XChaCha20-Poly1305 with a 24-byte nonce, base64url v2: framing, and an HKDF that borrows the nip44-v2 info label but is not the NIP-44 key schedule — instead of claiming NIP-17/44/59. Hardens the existing legacy inbound path: 64 KiB ciphertext cap before decode (~46x the largest producible legacy envelope), outer kind/recipient-tag/signature binding, tagless kind-13 seal binding, unsigned kind-14 inner binding, inner tags restricted to the two shapes deployed clients emit (verified against every historical iOS release and a fixture frozen from Android production), SecRandomCopyBytes failure now throws, non-UTF-8 plaintext now throws instead of returning empty. Adds frozen cross-platform fixtures with hash-pinned generators; interop-reviewed with no rejection surface for deployed clients. |
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jackandGitHub
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2d96fd99a1 |
Encrypt private media before BLE fragmentation (#1434)
Closes the last cleartext private-content path over BLE: private DM images/voice were sent as plaintext signed fileTransfer packets, TTL-relayed across the mesh, so every relay saw the full bytes. Now the complete BitchatFilePacket is encrypted as a single Noise AEAD message (inner type 0x20, matching Android) and the opaque ciphertext is fragmented. Adds an authenticated in-session capability proof (0x21 TLV: capabilities + Ed25519 key), TOFU-style downgrade pinning, a per-send consent dialog for the signed-cleartext fallback to legacy peers, and a cancellation/admission registry so cancel/delete cannot race a deferred cleartext send. Android wire constants (0x20 / 0x21 / capability bit 8) confirmed shipping. The 256-fragment preflight cap applies only to the directed fileTransfer migration fallback; encrypted media to capable peers uses the full receiver ceiling. Rebased over #1428/#1349: identity reads go through BLELocalIdentityStateStore; the session-bound authenticated signing-key check and the announce-path TOFU pin are kept as complementary checks. Full local suite green (1744+197 tests). |
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cd727c6867 |
Make panic wipe deterministic and device-bound (#1431)
* Make panic wipe deterministic and device-bound * Scope install markers to iOS * Harden panic recovery and service shutdown * Invalidate queued BLE ingress during panic * Harden panic keychain and media cleanup --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: jack <jack@deck.local> |
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jackandGitHub
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820c933958 |
Harden PTT audio and the 1.7.1 release (#1423)
Centralize PTT and voice audio-session ownership, harden courier/bridge/outbox delivery and recovery, correct location and delivery-state races, add privacy/release metadata, and ship reproducible universal Arti slices with Release CI coverage. Validated by the full iOS suite, repeated audio/fragment/performance regressions, BitFoundation tests, strict lint and dead-code analysis, universal iOS Release builds, and iOS/macOS archives. |
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78a291ab77 |
Public-mesh push-to-talk: signed live voice bursts in the mesh channel (#1406)
* Live push-to-talk voice for DMs: stream while you talk, voice note as fallback Holding the mic in a DM now streams AAC frames live over the Noise session (walkie-talkie style, ~0.5s mouth-to-ear at one hop) while recording the same audio as a normal voice note. On release the note ships through the existing fileTransfer pipeline; receivers that heard the live stream absorb it silently into the same bubble (matched by the burst ID embedded in the file name), so reliability comes for free and nobody sees duplicates. Protocol: - NoisePayloadType.voiceFrame = 0x08 carrying VoiceBurstPacket (burstID + seq + START/data/END/CANCELED, length-prefixed AAC frames) - 210-byte burst-content budget keeps each Noise packet inside the 256-byte padding bucket: one BLE frame, never the fragment scheduler - fire-and-forget: frames are dropped (never queued) without an established session; live is only offered when the peer is mesh-reachable Receive: - ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator assembles bursts (jitter-ordered, 0.5s gap skip, 3s idle end, flood/size caps), persists progressively as ADTS .aac so even a partial burst is a replayable bubble - live autoplay only when the conversation is on screen, app active, and the new app-info "live voice messages" toggle is on (also gates live sending) - one-playback-at-a-time via a shared ExclusivePlayback slot Capture: - PTTCaptureEngine taps AVAudioEngine, dual-encodes: live AAC frames + the finalized .m4a (same 16kHz/mono/16kbps settings as VoiceRecorder) - VoiceRecordingViewModel now drives a pluggable VoiceCaptureSession; the composer HUD shows a pulsing LIVE treatment when streaming Includes the push-to-talk design doc, 6 new localization keys across all 29 locales, and unit tests for framing, packetizer budget, ADTS output, codec round-trip, and the assembly/absorb lifecycle. Public-mesh PTT (MessageType 0x29) lands separately on top of this. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Public-mesh push-to-talk: signed live voice bursts in the mesh channel Extends live PTT from DMs to the public mesh timeline. Holding the mic in the mesh channel now broadcasts the burst live as signed voiceFrame packets (MessageType 0x29) while the finalized voice note still ships on release — new clients hear you as you speak and absorb the note silently into the live bubble; old clients (and late joiners) keep receiving the note exactly as before, so mixed-version meshes lose nothing. Wire/relay: - MessageType.voiceFrame = 0x29: ephemeral signed broadcast, never gossip-synced (SyncTypeFlags maps it to no bit), never padded (padding to the 512 block would push every ~490-byte signed packet into fragmentation) - RelayController treats voiceFrame like media fragments: dense-graph TTL clamp contains the sustained ~15 pkt/s per-talker stream, tight 8-25 ms jitter keeps multi-hop latency inside the receiver's 350 ms jitter buffer - inbound gate mirrors public messages: broadcast-only, 30 s freshness cap, packet signature verified against the claimed sender's announce before any audio reaches the UI App: - ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator gains burst scopes: public bubbles land in the mesh timeline, autoplay only while that timeline is on screen, and the finalized-note absorb is scope-bound (a public note can't replace a DM burst or vice versa) - floor courtesy: while someone talks live in the public channel the composer mic tints red and pulses, with an accessibility value naming the talker ("%@ is speaking", localized in all 29 locales); holding still works — a decentralized mesh has no floor arbiter, the tint just discourages talk-over Tests: relay policy (sparse cap + dense clamp), public bubble + talker indicator lifecycle, note absorption into the mesh store, and scope-binding rejection; full suite green (1382 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * PTT follow-ups from review + field test: peer-ID normalization, toggle gates inbound, drop-path diagnostics Codex review fixes (#1403): - makeVoiceCaptureSession normalizes the selected peer with toShort() before the reachability/session checks and binds the send target to that same routing ID — a conversation selected under the stable 64-hex Noise key no longer silently falls back to a classic note while the short-ID session is established - the live-voice toggle now gates inbound bursts too: off means classic-notes-only in both directions (no live bubble, partial file, or early notification; the finalized note still arrives), with a test Field-test diagnostics (first device run: DM frames decrypted but no bubble appeared, with no log evidence of which guard dropped them): - coordinator logs undecodable frames (size + hex prefix) and blocked drops - makeAssembly logs directory/file-handle failures instead of returning nil silently - PTTLiveVoiceSession logs capture start and finish (packet/frame/duration counts); PTTCaptureEngine logs engine start success/failure with the input format; BLEService.sendVoiceFrame logs no-session drops Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix iPhone live-capture failure: dead input unit (AURemoteIO -10851, 0 Hz) Field testing showed the phone's live capture failing at mic enable with AURemoteIO -10851 and an input format of 0 Hz / 2 ch — an input unit bound to an earlier (playback-only or settling) audio session. The Mac, which has no session lifecycle, captured fine, which is why public bursts from the Mac worked while phone-side sends degraded from working (first hold) to sporadic to dead across holds. Three layers of defense: - PTTCaptureEngine recreates its AVAudioEngine on every start(), after the session is configured, so the input unit binds to the session that is active now; a dead input (0 Hz or 0 channels) is now a distinct, logged error instead of a silent setup failure - PTTLiveVoiceSession retries the capture start once after a 150 ms route-settle pause - VoiceRecordingViewModel falls back to the classic VoiceRecorder within the same hold if the live engine still cannot start — a route glitch now costs the live stream, never the voice note Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Blue mic when the hold will stream live The mic button now shows readiness at a glance — and doubles as a build marker for device testing: - blue: holding will stream live (DM peer reachable with an established Noise session, or the public mesh channel) - accent (orange in DMs): holding records a classic voice note (no session yet, peer unreachable, or live voice toggled off) - red states unchanged (recording, floor busy) Refactors capture-backend selection into a single liveVoiceTarget() so the indicator and makeVoiceCaptureSession can never disagree. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Revert the blue live-ready mic to the normal accent color The build-verification marker did its job; idle mic color goes back to the accent. The LIVE recording HUD remains the signal for whether a hold is streaming. Keeps the liveVoiceTarget() refactor so backend selection stays in one place. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Leave a trace on every mic press and every inbound-frame drop Field testing read "tap does nothing" as breakage: the mic start is async (permission check + engine spin-up), so releasing before recording begins has always been a silent cancel — for classic voice notes too. Every press now logs which backend it chose and, for quick presses, that it released before recording started. Also logs the two remaining silent drops: inbound voice frames rejected by the live-voice toggle (the one unlogged guard left in the receive path) and the classic-note fallback now includes the toggle state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix mic hold dying instantly in DMs: sheet swipe gesture starved the composer Field logs showed every DM mic hold ending 3-10 ms after it began, on both platforms, while public-channel holds worked — the private sheet wraps its entire content (composer included) in a high-priority swipe-right-to-leave DragGesture, and a high-priority ancestor drag cancels the mic button's press-and-hold within milliseconds. Same starvation mechanism as the DM image-reveal bug (#1402), hitting a drag instead of a tap. The swipe-to-leave gesture now lives on the message list only, so the composer's gestures (mic hold, text field, buttons) are out of its reach and the swipe still works where users actually swipe. Also stops touching the capture engine when a hold cancels before the engine ever started: probing inputNode on a never-started engine instantiates its input unit against whatever session is active and spams benign-but-alarming AURemoteIO -10851 errors into field logs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Reorder app info sheet: usage first, then settings, then reference New section order: HOW TO USE, then the adjustable bits (appearance, voice, network), then the reference material (features, privacy, symbols legend). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * App info: flow HOW TO USE into one paragraph; "list" and "person" wording The six how-to-use bullets now read as a single comma-separated paragraph (same instruction strings, legacy bullet prefix stripped at render). Two wording updates across all 29 locales: the people icon opens the "list" (not "sidebar"), and you tap a "person's" name (not a "peer's") to start a DM. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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eacd8f0750 |
Live push-to-talk voice for DMs (streams while you talk, voice note as fallback) (#1403)
* Live push-to-talk voice for DMs: stream while you talk, voice note as fallback Holding the mic in a DM now streams AAC frames live over the Noise session (walkie-talkie style, ~0.5s mouth-to-ear at one hop) while recording the same audio as a normal voice note. On release the note ships through the existing fileTransfer pipeline; receivers that heard the live stream absorb it silently into the same bubble (matched by the burst ID embedded in the file name), so reliability comes for free and nobody sees duplicates. Protocol: - NoisePayloadType.voiceFrame = 0x08 carrying VoiceBurstPacket (burstID + seq + START/data/END/CANCELED, length-prefixed AAC frames) - 210-byte burst-content budget keeps each Noise packet inside the 256-byte padding bucket: one BLE frame, never the fragment scheduler - fire-and-forget: frames are dropped (never queued) without an established session; live is only offered when the peer is mesh-reachable Receive: - ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator assembles bursts (jitter-ordered, 0.5s gap skip, 3s idle end, flood/size caps), persists progressively as ADTS .aac so even a partial burst is a replayable bubble - live autoplay only when the conversation is on screen, app active, and the new app-info "live voice messages" toggle is on (also gates live sending) - one-playback-at-a-time via a shared ExclusivePlayback slot Capture: - PTTCaptureEngine taps AVAudioEngine, dual-encodes: live AAC frames + the finalized .m4a (same 16kHz/mono/16kbps settings as VoiceRecorder) - VoiceRecordingViewModel now drives a pluggable VoiceCaptureSession; the composer HUD shows a pulsing LIVE treatment when streaming Includes the push-to-talk design doc, 6 new localization keys across all 29 locales, and unit tests for framing, packetizer budget, ADTS output, codec round-trip, and the assembly/absorb lifecycle. Public-mesh PTT (MessageType 0x29) lands separately on top of this. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * PTT follow-ups from review + field test: peer-ID normalization, toggle gates inbound, drop-path diagnostics Codex review fixes (#1403): - makeVoiceCaptureSession normalizes the selected peer with toShort() before the reachability/session checks and binds the send target to that same routing ID — a conversation selected under the stable 64-hex Noise key no longer silently falls back to a classic note while the short-ID session is established - the live-voice toggle now gates inbound bursts too: off means classic-notes-only in both directions (no live bubble, partial file, or early notification; the finalized note still arrives), with a test Field-test diagnostics (first device run: DM frames decrypted but no bubble appeared, with no log evidence of which guard dropped them): - coordinator logs undecodable frames (size + hex prefix) and blocked drops - makeAssembly logs directory/file-handle failures instead of returning nil silently - PTTLiveVoiceSession logs capture start and finish (packet/frame/duration counts); PTTCaptureEngine logs engine start success/failure with the input format; BLEService.sendVoiceFrame logs no-session drops Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix iPhone live-capture failure: dead input unit (AURemoteIO -10851, 0 Hz) Field testing showed the phone's live capture failing at mic enable with AURemoteIO -10851 and an input format of 0 Hz / 2 ch — an input unit bound to an earlier (playback-only or settling) audio session. The Mac, which has no session lifecycle, captured fine, which is why public bursts from the Mac worked while phone-side sends degraded from working (first hold) to sporadic to dead across holds. Three layers of defense: - PTTCaptureEngine recreates its AVAudioEngine on every start(), after the session is configured, so the input unit binds to the session that is active now; a dead input (0 Hz or 0 channels) is now a distinct, logged error instead of a silent setup failure - PTTLiveVoiceSession retries the capture start once after a 150 ms route-settle pause - VoiceRecordingViewModel falls back to the classic VoiceRecorder within the same hold if the live engine still cannot start — a route glitch now costs the live stream, never the voice note Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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70229f0be1 |
Originate v2 source routes and wire fragmentIdFilter targeted resync (#1378)
* Originate v2 source routes and wire fragmentIdFilter targeted resync Part A — source-route origination policy: - Gate route application (BLESourceRouteOriginationPolicy): only packets we author, directed at a single peer, with TTL headroom, whose recipient is not directly connected. Relays no longer attach routes to (and re-sign) packets they merely forward. - Version-gate paths: MeshTopologyTracker records the highest protocol version observed per peer; BFS routes require every intermediate hop and the recipient to be v2-observed, capped at 4 intermediate hops. - Degrade on failure: BLESourceRouteFailureCache marks a routed send that sees no inbound traffic from the recipient within 10s as failed and floods for 60s before retrying routes. Part B — REQUEST_SYNC fragmentIdFilter (TLV 0x06): - Requester: BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer reports stalled broadcast reassemblies (no new fragment for 5s, retried at most every 10s); the maintenance pass sends a types=fragment REQUEST_SYNC naming the stalled 8-byte fragment stream IDs to each connected peer. - Responder: GossipSyncManager restricts the fragment diff to exactly the named streams, bypassing the since-cursor while the GCS filter still excludes pieces the requester holds; RSR/TTL-0/rate-limit semantics unchanged and REQUEST_SYNC stays link-local. - Bounds: at most 60 IDs per request (60*17-1 = 1019 bytes <= the 1024-byte decoder cap); oversized 0x06 values are ignored, not fatal. Docs: SOURCE_ROUTING.md gains the iOS origination policy (§8); REQUEST_SYNC_MANAGER.md documents 0x05/0x06 as implemented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix stall-clock refresh on duplicates and overflow suppression in fragment resync Two fixes to stalledBroadcastFragmentIDs bookkeeping in BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer: - Duplicate fragments no longer reset the stall clock. Fragment packets bypass the packet deduplicator, so relayed duplicates of an already-held index arriving every few seconds kept lastFragmentAt fresh and suppressed the targeted REQUEST_SYNC indefinitely. Now lastFragmentAt only updates when the index is new (actual progress). - Only the streams that will actually be encoded on the wire are rate-limited. Previously every stalled candidate got lastResyncRequestAt set, but encodeFragmentIdFilter serializes at most RequestSyncPacket.maxFragmentIdFilterCount (60) IDs, so overflow streams were suppressed for retryAfter without ever being requested. Selection now caps at that shared constant, oldest stall first, so overflow stays eligible and rotates fairly on the next pass. Tests: duplicates arriving periodically still trigger the stall report; 70 stalled streams yield the 60 oldest on the first pass and the remaining 10 on the next. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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jackandClaude Fable 5
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38331e62f1 |
Cut views over to ConversationStore; delete legacy store, bridge, resolver
Feature models observe per-conversation objects directly: PublicChatModel forwards the active Conversation's objectWillChange, PrivateInboxModel republishes only for the selected peer's conversation - background appends no longer invalidate foreground views. LegacyConversationStore, the coalescing bridge, and IdentityResolver are deleted (resolver canonicalization proved display-invisible: nothing enumerates direct conversations, lookups are by exact peer ID, and raw keying is strictly more robust - documented as a design deviation). Selection state moves into the store. ChatViewModel.messages/privateChats survive as derived read views for coordinators that genuinely need them; hot paths use a new store-direct privateMessages(for:) witness. Final numbers vs pre-migration baselines: pipeline.privateIngest 9.7k -> 24.0k msg/s (2.5x) pipeline.publicIngest 6.8k -> 13.7k msg/s (2.0x) delivery updates 38k -> 117-133k/s Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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jackandClaude Fable 5
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7fb1f4a219 |
Route delivery status through the store; delete the location index
ConversationStore maintains an exact messageID -> Set<ConversationID> map at every mutation point (append/upsert/remove/migrate/trim/clear), so delivery updates are ID-only lookups that fan out to mirrored ephemeral/stable copies. ChatDeliveryCoordinator shrinks 327 -> 119 lines: the positional location index, its growth-detection/rebuild machinery, and the duplicate no-downgrade check are deleted - the rule now lives in exactly one place. The middle-insertion regression tests are rewritten against the store since stale positional locations are structurally impossible now. delivery updates: 38k -> 262k/s (~6.9x); ingest pipelines unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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jackandClaude Fable 5
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99d1d1dccd |
Cut public message path over to ConversationStore; delete PublicTimelineStore
Mesh and geohash timelines are now store conversations. All public mutation sites flow through store intents; PublicMessagePipeline keeps its 80ms UI batching but commits batches via store appends with each buffered entry carrying its destination conversation (a mid-batch channel switch now flushes instead of dropping the buffer). ChatViewModel.messages becomes a cached get-only view of the active conversation, invalidated through the change subject. The mesh late-insert threshold is consciously removed: it only ever ordered the non-rendered messages copy, so strict timestamp insertion makes the working set agree with rendered order. PublicTimelineStore and the per-message full-array legacy sync are deleted; the coalescing bridge mirrors public conversations for the remaining legacy readers. pipeline.publicIngest: 6.6k -> 9.5k msg/s (+45%); private steady; store.append 237k/s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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jackandClaude Fable 5
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45650854e7 |
Add conversation-store design doc and end-to-end ingest baselines
docs/CONVERSATION-STORE-DESIGN.md records the approved design: a single-writer ConversationStore of per-conversation ObservableObjects (per-conversation publishing, incremental ID index, folded caps, typed change subject) replacing today's four-store/three-bridge topology, with a five-step migration plan and explicit deletions/non-goals. New pipeline benchmarks measure the CURRENT architecture end-to-end so every migration step is judged against real before-numbers: pipeline.privateIngest ~9.7k msg/s, pipeline.publicIngest ~6.8k msg/s (200-message passes, stable within 1.5%). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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jackandClaude Fable 5
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4093ee6733 |
Rebuild Arti from audited source with enforced provenance
Vendored arti.xcframework rebuilt from source (Rust 1.96.0, normalized archive metadata for reproducible hashes). New ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE.md records toolchain, rebuild steps, and a SHA256 manifest for every file in the xcframework. A new CI workflow turns that policy into a gate: PRs must keep the binary matching the manifest, and binary changes must ship with source/lockfile/build-script evidence. Also raises TorManager.awaitReady's default timeout from 25s to 75s to match the bootstrap monitor deadline - a shorter wait reported "not ready" while Arti was still legitimately bootstrapping, silently stranding queued relay work. Privacy policy, Tor integration doc, and privacy assessment updated to match the current implementation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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df36b19afe |
[codex] Refine BLE ingress fanout (#1280)
* Refactor BLE transport event handling * Make image output paths unique * Keep queued Nostr read receipts alive * Refine BLE ingress fanout * Rediscover BLE service after invalidation * Extract BLE notification retry buffer * Extract BLE inbound write buffer * Extract BLE fragment assembly buffer * Tidy secure log handling from device run * Allow self-authored RSR ingress replies * Harden read receipt queue test timing --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> |
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ab0da61533 |
[codex] Refactor BLE transport event handling (#1266)
* Refactor BLE transport event handling * Make image output paths unique * Keep queued Nostr read receipts alive * Allow self-authored RSR ingress replies --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> |
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764f016d17 |
[codex] Refactor app runtime and ownership architecture (#1104)
* Refactor app runtime and view model architecture * Move app ownership into stores and coordinators * Fix smoke test environment injection * Stabilize fragmentation package tests * Fix coordinator build warnings * Clean up chat view model warnings * Fix Nostr relay startup coalescing --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> |
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3fc64f6168 |
feat: Implement Request Sync Manager (V2 Sync) (#965)
* feat: Implement Request Sync Manager (V2 Sync) - Add RequestSyncManager to track and attribute sync requests - Update BitchatPacket and BinaryProtocol to support IS_RSR flag (0x10) - Update RequestSyncPacket with new TLV fields (sinceTimestamp, fragmentIdFilter) - Update GossipSyncManager to use unicast sync requests and mark responses as RSR - Update BLEService to enforce timestamp validation for normal packets and exempt valid RSRs - Add documentation for the new sync manager mechanism * fix: Resolve compilation errors in V2 Sync implementation - Remove duplicate restartGossipManager in BLEService - Add missing TransportConfig constants for sync - Add 'sync' log category to BitLogger - Add missing BitLogger import in GossipSyncManager * fix: Update tests for V2 Sync changes - Add requestSyncManager parameter to GossipSyncManager init in tests - Implement getConnectedPeers stub in RecordingDelegate - Remove unused variable warning in SubscriptionRateLimitTests --------- Co-authored-by: a1denvalu3 <> Co-authored-by: jack <212554440+jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> |
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jackandGitHub
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10b7c1fd80 | Merge branch 'main' into source-routing-packet-format | ||
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callebtc
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9404c03477 | fix doc | ||
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callebtc
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0f5299a0f5 | announce and read presence | ||
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callebtc
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eb3bbfd861 | source routing v2 | ||
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5f44af19da |
tor by default, small (#564)
* feat(tor): Tor-by-default scaffold and integration - Add TorManager with static/dlopen start, torrc generation, SOCKS probe - Add TorURLSession; route Nostr/Web fetches via SOCKS proxy - Add chat system messages for Tor status; show progress (macOS) and ready - Disable ControlPort bootstrap monitor on iOS; keep it on macOS - Make Tor waits non-blocking; avoid main-actor stalls on startup - Queue & flush Nostr subscriptions on relay connect; skip duplicates - Always rewrite torrc at launch to fix iOS container path mismatches - Link libz; add project wiring for tor-nolzma.xcframework - Minor fixes: SOCKS probe resumeOnce guard, entitlement for network.server (macOS) * iOS: deterministic Tor recovery + 100% gating; BLE-first; session rebuild - Restart/wake Tor on foreground via ControlPort (ACTIVE/SHUTDOWN), avoid restarts during bootstrap; add NWPathMonitor to trigger checks - Use NWConnection control polling for GETINFO; remove blocking CFStream readers to avoid QoS inversions; compute readiness from SOCKS + 100% - Rebuild TorURLSession on resume; reset Nostr connections to rebind - Gate all internet after full bootstrap; keep BLE mesh startup fast - Fix Swift 6 capture issues; hop UI updates to @MainActor - Remove Tor progress spam; persist initial "starting tor..." system message * UI: show Tor system messages only in geohash channels (not mesh) - Gate "starting tor..." and readiness/timeout messages to geohash view - Add helper addGeohashOnlySystemMessage() to avoid posting to mesh timeline - Persist system messages in geohash backing store via addPublicSystemMessage() * Relays: treat repeated -1011 handshake failures as permanent; skip reconnects - Classify NSURLErrorBadServerResponse as permanent and stop retrying - Filter permanently-failed relays from subscribe/connect attempts - Avoid reconnect scheduling for permanently failed relays * Embed Tor via tor_api; deterministic restart + Nostr gating; add Tor notifications - Run Tor via tor_api in a dedicated thread with OwningControllerFD - Cleanly stop Tor on background; restart on .active (single instance) - Avoid fallback to tor_main/dlopen; add is-running check to prevent duplicates - Fix argv lifetime in C glue to avoid strcmp crash on start - Gate Nostr connect/subscribe/send until Tor is fully ready - Rebuild URLSession + reset relays after Tor readiness (scene-based) - Remove TorDidBecomeReady double-reset and appDidBecomeActive resubscribe - Add TorWillRestart/TorDidBecomeReady notifications and chat system messages - Debounce path-change restarts; ACTIVE poke first; coalesce subs; cancel stale reconnect timers - Project: add CTorHost.c and TorNotifications.swift to targets; fix libz.tbd path * Defer Nostr setup logs until Tor is ready; fix subscribe coalescing and reconnect generation - Move "Connecting to Nostr relays" log after awaitReady() - Log "Queuing subscription" when Tor not ready; only coalesce when handler exists - Clear coalescer on unsubscribe - Cancel stale reconnect timers using connectionGeneration - Remove app-level TorDidBecomeReady reset to avoid duplicate reconnects - Debounce path-change restarts * Gate Nostr init/subscription logs until Tor is ready - ChatViewModel: await Tor readiness before initializing Nostr and logging - Only log GeoDM subscription when Tor is ready to avoid early noise * Make Nostr connect single-sourced; defer DM subscription until connected - Remove duplicate connect call from ChatViewModel; let scene-based flow connect - Setup DM subscription once on first connection via sink - Reduce early subscription send/cancel noise after Tor restarts * On launch, queue Nostr subscriptions without initiating connects; let centralized connect handle it - In subscribe(), if no connections exist, just list relays and queue subs - Avoids early send/cancel churn before connect() runs post-Tor-ready * Always queue subscriptions and flush on connection; avoid immediate sends - Prevents early send/cancel churn at launch and during reconnects - If relays are already connected, flush immediately; otherwise pending until connected * UI: scope Tor restart messages to geohash channels; skip initial foreground restart on cold launch to avoid confusing system message in #mesh * geo: disable background sampling + notifications\n- Gate sampling to foreground only (beginGeohashSampling, watchers)\n- Suppress geohash activity notifications unless app is active\n- Stop sampling explicitly on background scene phase * Update BitchatApp.swift Co-authored-by: asmo <asmogo@protonmail.com> * Update BitchatApp.swift Co-authored-by: asmo <asmogo@protonmail.com> * Update BitchatApp.swift Co-authored-by: asmo <asmogo@protonmail.com> * Update bitchat/BitchatApp.swift Co-authored-by: asmo <asmogo@protonmail.com> * Update bitchat/BitchatApp.swift Co-authored-by: asmo <asmogo@protonmail.com> * fix(iOS App): resolve merge artifacts in scenePhase handler\n- Remove duplicate didEnterBackground state\n- Fix switch/if braces and logic for foreground restart gating --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: asmo <asmogo@protonmail.com> |
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4f1ac30f12 |
Feat/mesh robustness efficiency (#451)
* chat: de-dup private chats across ephemeral/stable IDs; prefer most advanced delivery status\n\n- Fixes LazyVStack duplicate ID warnings and blank row in PM\n- Merges messages by id from ephemeral and Noise-key stores\n- Chooses read > delivered > partiallyDelivered > sent > sending > failed (newer wins on tie)\n- Ensures status icon updates immediately without waiting for another send\n- Adds exhaustive handling for DeliveryStatus in ranking * logging: reduce noisy info logs to debug; keep errors/warnings\n\n- Downgrade routing/ACK/subscription/connect logs to debug\n- Retain security/fingerprint/keychain info logs\n- Keep errors and warnings intact\n\ndocs: add docs/privacy-assessment.md covering BLE privacy, routing TTL/jitter, Nostr E2E gift wraps, ACK throttling, and logging posture --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> |