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Pin announce signing keys to stop mesh identity spoofing (#1349)

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TOFU-pins the Ed25519 signing key per noise key so a self-consistent announce that reuses a victim's peerID+noise key with the attacker's signing key/nickname is rejected instead of overwriting the registry and persisted identity. Complements #1432: that PR's signed-LEAVE verification reads the stored signing key this PR protects from announce-path poisoning.

Rebased onto main as a single commit; swift build --build-tests green, 40/40 targeted tests incl. the spoofing e2e cases, and #1432's suites 50/50 unaffected.
This commit is contained in:
jack
2026-07-26 11:38:24 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent d326cecb63
commit b96a41054e
11 changed files with 885 additions and 76 deletions
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bitchatTests/Services/BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests.swift
+48 -4
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@@ -123,7 +123,9 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
hasSignature: false,
signatureValid: false,
existingNoisePublicKey: nil,
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32),
existingSigningPublicKey: nil,
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
)
#expect(decision == .reject(.missingSignature))
@@ -136,7 +138,9 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
hasSignature: true,
signatureValid: false,
existingNoisePublicKey: nil,
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32),
existingSigningPublicKey: nil,
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
)
#expect(decision == .reject(.invalidSignature))
@@ -148,7 +152,9 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
hasSignature: true,
signatureValid: true,
existingNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0xAA, count: 32),
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0xBB, count: 32)
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0xBB, count: 32),
existingSigningPublicKey: nil,
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
)
#expect(decision == .reject(.keyMismatch))
@@ -162,13 +168,51 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
hasSignature: true,
signatureValid: true,
existingNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey
announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
existingSigningPublicKey: nil,
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
)
#expect(decision == .verified)
#expect(decision.isVerified)
}
@Test
func trustPolicyRejectsPinnedSigningKeyMismatchEvenWithValidSignature() {
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xCC, count: 32)
// Attacker replays the victim's noiseKey/peerID with their own signing
// key and a valid self-signature; the pinned key must win.
let decision = BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy.evaluate(
hasSignature: true,
signatureValid: true,
existingNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
existingSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32),
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x66, count: 32)
)
#expect(decision == .reject(.signingKeyMismatch))
#expect(!decision.isVerified)
}
@Test
func trustPolicyAcceptsMatchingPinnedSigningKey() {
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xCC, count: 32)
let signingKey = Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
let decision = BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy.evaluate(
hasSignature: true,
signatureValid: true,
existingNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
existingSigningPublicKey: signingKey,
announcedSigningPublicKey: signingKey
)
#expect(decision == .verified)
}
@Test
func responsePolicyConnectsOnlyForDirectNewOrReconnectedPeers() {
let directNew = BLEAnnounceResponsePolicy.plan(