Pin announce signing keys to stop mesh identity spoofing (#1349)

TOFU-pins the Ed25519 signing key per noise key so a self-consistent announce that reuses a victim's peerID+noise key with the attacker's signing key/nickname is rejected instead of overwriting the registry and persisted identity. Complements #1432: that PR's signed-LEAVE verification reads the stored signing key this PR protects from announce-path poisoning.

Rebased onto main as a single commit; swift build --build-tests green, 40/40 targeted tests incl. the spoofing e2e cases, and #1432's suites 50/50 unaffected.
This commit is contained in:
jack
2026-07-26 11:38:24 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent d326cecb63
commit b96a41054e
11 changed files with 885 additions and 76 deletions
@@ -6,10 +6,13 @@ import Testing
struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
private final class Recorder {
var existingNoisePublicKey: Data?
var existingSigningPublicKey: Data?
var persistedSigningPublicKey: Data?
var persistedSigningKeyQueries: [PeerID] = []
var signatureValid = true
var linkState: (hasPeripheral: Bool, hasCentral: Bool) = (false, false)
var linkBoundToOtherPeer = false
var upsertResult = BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate(isNewPeer: false, wasDisconnected: false, previousNickname: nil)
var upsertResult: BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate? = BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate(isNewPeer: false, wasDisconnected: false, previousNickname: nil)
var dedupSeenIDs: Set<String> = []
var shouldEmitReconnectLogResult = true
@@ -36,7 +39,11 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
localPeerID: { localPeerID },
messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
now: { now },
existingNoisePublicKey: { _ in recorder.existingNoisePublicKey },
existingPeerKeys: { _ in (recorder.existingNoisePublicKey, recorder.existingSigningPublicKey) },
persistedSigningPublicKey: { peerID in
recorder.persistedSigningKeyQueries.append(peerID)
return recorder.persistedSigningPublicKey
},
verifySignature: { packet, signingPublicKey in
recorder.verifySignatureCalls.append((packet, signingPublicKey))
return recorder.signatureValid
@@ -482,6 +489,168 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
#expect(recorder.topologyUpdates.first?.neighbors == neighbors)
}
@Test
func matchingPinnedSigningKeyIsAccepted() throws {
let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9A, count: 32)
let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
peerID: peerID,
timestamp: timestamp(now),
signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64)
)
let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.existingNoisePublicKey = noiseKey
// Matches the signing key encoded by makeAnnouncePacket.
recorder.existingSigningPublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
#expect(recorder.upsertCalls.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.count == 1)
}
@Test
func signingKeyMismatchWithPinnedKeySkipsUpsertAndIdentityPersistence() throws {
let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9B, count: 32)
let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
// Attacker announce: victim's noiseKey/peerID, attacker's signing key
// (0x99 from makeAnnouncePacket) with a "valid" self-signature.
let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
peerID: peerID,
timestamp: timestamp(now),
signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64)
)
let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.existingNoisePublicKey = noiseKey
recorder.existingSigningPublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32) // victim's pinned key
recorder.signatureValid = true
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
#expect(recorder.upsertCalls.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.topologyUpdates.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.first?.notifyPeerConnected == false)
}
@Test
func persistedSigningKeyMismatchWithoutRegistryEntryIsRejected() throws {
// Registry has no entry (app restart or offline-peer eviction), but
// the persisted cryptographic identity still pins the victim's
// signing key. An attacker replaying the victim's noiseKey/peerID
// with their own signing key must not be treated as first contact.
let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9D, count: 32)
let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
peerID: peerID,
timestamp: timestamp(now),
signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64)
)
let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.existingNoisePublicKey = nil
recorder.existingSigningPublicKey = nil
recorder.persistedSigningPublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32) // victim's persisted pin
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
#expect(recorder.persistedSigningKeyQueries == [peerID])
#expect(recorder.upsertCalls.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.topologyUpdates.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.first?.notifyPeerConnected == false)
}
@Test
func persistedSigningKeyMatchWithoutRegistryEntryIsAccepted() throws {
// Legitimate returning peer: registry entry evicted, persisted pin
// matches the announced signing key accepted like a normal announce.
let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9E, count: 32)
let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
peerID: peerID,
timestamp: timestamp(now),
signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64)
)
let recorder = Recorder()
// Matches the signing key encoded by makeAnnouncePacket.
recorder.persistedSigningPublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
#expect(recorder.upsertCalls.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.count == 1)
}
@Test
func registryPinnedSigningKeySkipsPersistedLookup() throws {
let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9F, count: 32)
let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
peerID: peerID,
timestamp: timestamp(now),
signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64)
)
let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.existingNoisePublicKey = noiseKey
recorder.existingSigningPublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
#expect(recorder.persistedSigningKeyQueries.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.upsertCalls.count == 1)
}
@Test
func registryPinRejectionSkipsTopologyAndIdentityPersistence() throws {
let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9C, count: 32)
let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
peerID: peerID,
timestamp: timestamp(now),
signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64),
directNeighbors: [Data(repeating: 0xAB, count: 8)]
)
// Pre-barrier trust check sees no pinned key (e.g. concurrent race),
// but the registry itself refuses to replace its pinned signing key.
let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.upsertResult = nil
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
#expect(recorder.upsertCalls.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.topologyUpdates.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.first?.notifyPeerConnected == false)
#expect(recorder.afterglowDelays.isEmpty)
}
@Test
func keyMismatchWithExistingPeerKeepsAnnounceUnverified() throws {
let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
@@ -506,6 +675,253 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
#expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.first?.notifyPeerConnected == false)
}
@Test
func attackerReplayingVictimNoiseKeyWithOwnSigningKeyIsRejectedEndToEnd() throws {
// Real crypto: the attacker crafts a fully self-consistent announce
// (victim's noiseKey/peerID, attacker's signing key and nickname,
// valid packet signature made with the attacker's key). Without
// signing-key pinning this used to overwrite the victim's registry
// entry and persisted identity.
let victim = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let attacker = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let victimNoiseKey = victim.getStaticPublicKeyData()
let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: victimNoiseKey)
let now = Date()
final class RegistryBox {
var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
var persistedIdentities: [AnnouncementPacket] = []
}
let box = RegistryBox()
let environment = BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment(
localPeerID: { PeerID(str: "0102030405060708") },
messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
now: { now },
existingPeerKeys: { peerID in
let info = box.registry.info(for: peerID)
return (info?.noisePublicKey, info?.signingPublicKey)
},
persistedSigningPublicKey: { _ in nil },
verifySignature: { packet, signingPublicKey in
victim.verifyPacketSignature(packet, publicKey: signingPublicKey)
},
linkState: { _ in (hasPeripheral: true, hasCentral: false) },
linkBoundToOtherPeer: { _, _ in false },
withRegistryBarrier: { body in body() },
upsertVerifiedAnnounce: { peerID, announcement, isConnected, now in
box.registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: announcement.nickname,
noisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey,
signingPublicKey: announcement.signingPublicKey,
isConnected: isConnected,
now: now
)
},
shouldEmitReconnectLog: { _, _ in false },
updateTopology: { _, _ in },
persistIdentity: { announcement in
box.persistedIdentities.append(announcement)
},
dedupContains: { _ in true },
dedupMarkProcessed: { _ in },
deliverAnnounceUIEvents: { _, _, _ in },
trackPacketSeen: { _ in },
sendAnnounceBack: {},
scheduleAfterglow: { _ in }
)
let handler = BLEAnnounceHandler(environment: environment)
func makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: String, signer: NoiseEncryptionService) throws -> BitchatPacket {
let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
nickname: nickname,
noisePublicKey: victimNoiseKey,
signingPublicKey: signer.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
directNeighbors: nil
)
let payload = try #require(announcement.encode())
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: peerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(now.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload,
signature: nil,
ttl: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault
)
return try #require(signer.signPacket(packet))
}
// Legitimate announce from the victim is accepted and pinned.
let victimAnnounce = try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "victim", signer: victim)
handler.handle(victimAnnounce, from: peerID)
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim")
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
#expect(box.persistedIdentities.count == 1)
// Attacker announce with a valid self-signature must be rejected.
let attackerAnnounce = try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "attacker", signer: attacker)
handler.handle(attackerAnnounce, from: peerID)
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim")
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
#expect(box.persistedIdentities.count == 1)
// The victim's subsequent announces (same pinned key) still work.
let victimRename = try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "victim-renamed", signer: victim)
handler.handle(victimRename, from: peerID)
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim-renamed")
#expect(box.persistedIdentities.count == 2)
}
@Test
func signingKeyPinSurvivesRegistryEvictionAndRestartEndToEnd() throws {
// Real crypto + real persistence: the victim announces and gets
// pinned, then the registry entry disappears (offline-peer eviction
// via reconcileConnectivity, or app restart which starts with an
// empty registry). The attacker replays the victim's
// noiseKey/peerID with their own signing key and a valid
// self-signature the persisted identity must still block the
// takeover, and must not be overwritten. The victim (same signing
// key) must be re-accepted.
let victim = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let attacker = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let victimNoiseKey = victim.getStaticPublicKeyData()
let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: victimNoiseKey)
let now = Date()
let identityKeychain = MockKeychain()
let identityManager = SecureIdentityStateManager(identityKeychain)
final class RegistryBox {
var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
}
let box = RegistryBox()
func makeEnvironment(identityManager: SecureIdentityStateManager) -> BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment {
BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment(
localPeerID: { PeerID(str: "0102030405060708") },
messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
now: { now },
existingPeerKeys: { peerID in
let info = box.registry.info(for: peerID)
return (info?.noisePublicKey, info?.signingPublicKey)
},
// Mirrors the BLEService wiring: fall back to the persisted
// cryptographic identity.
persistedSigningPublicKey: { peerID in
identityManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID)
.compactMap { $0.signingPublicKey }
.first
},
verifySignature: { packet, signingPublicKey in
victim.verifyPacketSignature(packet, publicKey: signingPublicKey)
},
linkState: { _ in (hasPeripheral: true, hasCentral: false) },
linkBoundToOtherPeer: { _, _ in false },
withRegistryBarrier: { body in body() },
upsertVerifiedAnnounce: { peerID, announcement, isConnected, now in
box.registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: announcement.nickname,
noisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey,
signingPublicKey: announcement.signingPublicKey,
isConnected: isConnected,
now: now
)
},
shouldEmitReconnectLog: { _, _ in false },
updateTopology: { _, _ in },
persistIdentity: { announcement in
identityManager.upsertCryptographicIdentity(
fingerprint: announcement.noisePublicKey.sha256Fingerprint(),
noisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey,
signingPublicKey: announcement.signingPublicKey,
claimedNickname: announcement.nickname
)
},
dedupContains: { _ in true },
dedupMarkProcessed: { _ in },
deliverAnnounceUIEvents: { _, _, _ in },
trackPacketSeen: { _ in },
sendAnnounceBack: {},
scheduleAfterglow: { _ in }
)
}
let handler = BLEAnnounceHandler(environment: makeEnvironment(identityManager: identityManager))
func makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: String, signer: NoiseEncryptionService) throws -> BitchatPacket {
let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
nickname: nickname,
noisePublicKey: victimNoiseKey,
signingPublicKey: signer.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
directNeighbors: nil
)
let payload = try #require(announcement.encode())
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: peerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(now.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload,
signature: nil,
ttl: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault
)
return try #require(signer.signPacket(packet))
}
func persistedIdentity() -> CryptographicIdentity? {
// queue.sync read; fences the manager's pending barrier writes.
identityManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID).first
}
// 1. Victim announces: pinned in the registry and persisted.
handler.handle(try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "victim", signer: victim), from: peerID)
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
#expect(persistedIdentity()?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
// 2. Registry entry disappears (eviction / restart).
_ = box.registry.remove(peerID)
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID) == nil)
// 3. Attacker replay with own signing key: rejected via the persisted
// pin, and neither the registry nor the persisted identity change.
handler.handle(try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "attacker", signer: attacker), from: peerID)
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID) == nil)
#expect(persistedIdentity()?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
#expect(identityManager.getSocialIdentity(for: victimNoiseKey.sha256Fingerprint())?.claimedNickname == "victim")
// 4. Victim re-announces with the same signing key: accepted again.
handler.handle(try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "victim", signer: victim), from: peerID)
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim")
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
// 5. Simulated app restart: a fresh identity manager reloads the pin
// from the (mock) keychain, and a fresh registry starts empty. The
// attacker replay is still rejected.
identityManager.forceSave()
let reloadedManager = SecureIdentityStateManager(identityKeychain)
#expect(
reloadedManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID).first?.signingPublicKey
== victim.getSigningPublicKeyData()
)
box.registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
let restartedHandler = BLEAnnounceHandler(environment: makeEnvironment(identityManager: reloadedManager))
restartedHandler.handle(try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "attacker", signer: attacker), from: peerID)
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID) == nil)
#expect(
reloadedManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID).first?.signingPublicKey
== victim.getSigningPublicKeyData()
)
// ...while the victim is accepted after the restart.
restartedHandler.handle(try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "victim", signer: victim), from: peerID)
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
}
private func expectNoSideEffects(_ recorder: Recorder) {
#expect(recorder.barrierCount == 0)
#expect(recorder.upsertCalls.isEmpty)