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Relabel private Nostr envelopes honestly

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This commit is contained in:
jack
2026-07-26 07:17:21 +02:00
committed by jack
parent 11afe9652e
commit 8ddde7ea8b
28 changed files with 1161 additions and 475 deletions
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bitchat/ViewModels/NostrInboundPipeline.swift
+98 -28
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@@ -84,13 +84,21 @@ extension ChatViewModel: NostrInboundPipelineContext {
/// Ordering is deliberate and performance-critical: cheap rejects (kind,
/// dedup lookup) run BEFORE Schnorr signature verification because duplicates
/// dominate real relay traffic; events are recorded only AFTER verification so
/// a forged-signature copy can never poison the dedup set; gift-wrap
/// a forged-signature copy can never poison the dedup set; private-envelope
/// verification for the account mailbox runs off-main with an atomic
/// main-actor check-and-record.
final class NostrInboundPipeline {
private weak var context: (any NostrInboundPipelineContext)?
private let presence: GeoPresenceTracker
private var geoEventLogCount = 0
// During the bounded wire-format migration, one logical private payload
// is published under both the primary and compatibility formats. Outer
// event IDs differ, so collapse the authenticated embedded payload before
// invoking message/ack side effects. Keep this bounded like the outer-ID
// caches; the recipient and authenticated sender are part of the key.
private var recentPrivatePayloadFormats: [String: UInt8] = [:]
private var recentPrivatePayloadKeyOrder: [String] = []
private static let privatePayloadDedupCapacity = 2_048
init(context: any NostrInboundPipelineContext, presence: GeoPresenceTracker) {
self.context = context
@@ -271,15 +279,16 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
}
@MainActor
func subscribeGiftWrap(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent, id: NostrIdentity) {
func subscribePrivateEnvelope(_ envelope: NostrEvent, id: NostrIdentity) {
guard let context else { return }
// Dedup lookup before Schnorr verification; record only after it passes.
guard !context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) else { return }
guard giftWrap.isValidSignature() else { return }
context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id)
guard !context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(envelope.id) else { return }
guard envelope.content.utf8.count <= NostrProtocol.maximumPrivateEnvelopeCiphertextBytes else { return }
guard envelope.isValidSignature() else { return }
context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(envelope.id)
guard let (content, senderPubkey, rumorTs) = try? NostrProtocol.decryptPrivateMessage(
giftWrap: giftWrap,
guard let (content, senderPubkey, messageTs) = try? NostrProtocol.decryptPrivateEnvelope(
envelope: envelope,
recipientIdentity: id
),
let packet = Self.decodeEmbeddedBitChatPacket(from: content),
@@ -288,8 +297,14 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
else {
return
}
guard shouldProcessPrivatePayload(
noisePayload,
senderPubkey: senderPubkey,
recipientPubkey: id.publicKeyHex,
envelopeKind: envelope.kind
) else { return }
let messageTimestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(rumorTs))
let messageTimestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(messageTs))
let convKey = PeerID(nostr_: senderPubkey)
context.registerNostrKeyMapping(senderPubkey, for: convKey)
@@ -316,25 +331,26 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
}
@MainActor
func handleGiftWrap(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent, id: NostrIdentity) {
func handlePrivateEnvelope(_ envelope: NostrEvent, id: NostrIdentity) {
guard let context else { return }
// Dedup lookup before Schnorr verification; record only after it passes.
if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) {
if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(envelope.id) {
return
}
guard giftWrap.isValidSignature() else { return }
context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id)
guard envelope.content.utf8.count <= NostrProtocol.maximumPrivateEnvelopeCiphertextBytes else { return }
guard envelope.isValidSignature() else { return }
context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(envelope.id)
guard let (content, senderPubkey, rumorTs) = try? NostrProtocol.decryptPrivateMessage(
giftWrap: giftWrap,
guard let (content, senderPubkey, messageTs) = try? NostrProtocol.decryptPrivateEnvelope(
envelope: envelope,
recipientIdentity: id
) else {
SecureLogger.warning("GeoDM: failed decrypt giftWrap id=\(giftWrap.id.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
SecureLogger.warning("GeoDM: failed decrypt private envelope id=\(envelope.id.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
return
}
SecureLogger.debug(
"GeoDM: decrypted gift-wrap id=\(giftWrap.id.prefix(16))... from=\(senderPubkey.prefix(8))...",
"GeoDM: decrypted private envelope id=\(envelope.id.prefix(16))... from=\(senderPubkey.prefix(8))...",
category: .session
)
@@ -344,13 +360,19 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
else {
return
}
guard shouldProcessPrivatePayload(
payload,
senderPubkey: senderPubkey,
recipientPubkey: id.publicKeyHex,
envelopeKind: envelope.kind
) else { return }
let convKey = PeerID(nostr_: senderPubkey)
context.registerNostrKeyMapping(senderPubkey, for: convKey)
switch payload.type {
case .privateMessage:
let messageTimestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(rumorTs))
let messageTimestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(messageTs))
context.handlePrivateMessage(
payload,
senderPubkey: senderPubkey,
@@ -372,28 +394,29 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
}
@MainActor
func handleNostrMessage(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent) {
func handleAccountPrivateEnvelope(_ envelope: NostrEvent) {
guard let context else { return }
// Cheap dedup pre-check only; Schnorr verification runs off-main in
// processNostrMessage, which then does the authoritative
// processAccountPrivateEnvelope, which then does the authoritative
// check-and-record. Recording stays after verification so a
// forged-signature copy can never poison the dedup set and suppress
// the genuine event.
if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) { return }
if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(envelope.id) { return }
Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) { [weak self] in
await self?.processNostrMessage(giftWrap)
await self?.processAccountPrivateEnvelope(envelope)
}
}
func processNostrMessage(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent) async {
guard giftWrap.isValidSignature() else { return }
func processAccountPrivateEnvelope(_ envelope: NostrEvent) async {
guard envelope.content.utf8.count <= NostrProtocol.maximumPrivateEnvelopeCiphertextBytes else { return }
guard envelope.isValidSignature() else { return }
guard let context else { return }
// Authoritative check-and-record, atomic on the main actor so two
// concurrent detached tasks can't both process the same event.
let alreadyProcessed: Bool = await MainActor.run {
if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) { return true }
context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id)
if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(envelope.id) { return true }
context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(envelope.id)
return false
}
if alreadyProcessed { return }
@@ -403,8 +426,8 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
guard let currentIdentity else { return }
do {
let (content, senderPubkey, rumorTimestamp) = try NostrProtocol.decryptPrivateMessage(
giftWrap: giftWrap,
let (content, senderPubkey, messageTimestampSeconds) = try NostrProtocol.decryptPrivateEnvelope(
envelope: envelope,
recipientIdentity: currentIdentity
)
@@ -428,8 +451,14 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
if packet.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
let payload = NoisePayload.decode(packet.payload) {
let messageTimestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(rumorTimestamp))
let messageTimestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(messageTimestampSeconds))
await MainActor.run {
guard self.shouldProcessPrivatePayload(
payload,
senderPubkey: senderPubkey,
recipientPubkey: currentIdentity.publicKeyHex,
envelopeKind: envelope.kind
) else { return }
context.registerNostrKeyMapping(senderPubkey, for: targetPeerID)
switch payload.type {
@@ -503,6 +532,47 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
}
private extension NostrInboundPipeline {
@MainActor
func shouldProcessPrivatePayload(
_ payload: NoisePayload,
senderPubkey: String,
recipientPubkey: String,
envelopeKind: Int
) -> Bool {
let digest = payload.encode().sha256Fingerprint()
let key = "\(recipientPubkey.lowercased()):\(senderPubkey.lowercased()):\(digest)"
let formatBit: UInt8
switch envelopeKind {
case NostrProtocol.EventKind.privateEnvelope.rawValue:
formatBit = 1 << 0
case NostrProtocol.EventKind.legacyNIP59GiftWrap.rawValue:
formatBit = 1 << 1
default:
return true
}
if let observedFormats = recentPrivatePayloadFormats[key] {
if observedFormats & formatBit != 0 {
// A same-format re-envelope is a delivery retry. Let it reach
// the coordinator so a lost DELIVERED acknowledgement can be
// sent again; downstream message-ID dedup prevents rerendering.
return true
}
// The same authenticated payload under the other migration format
// is the compatibility twin, not a new message or acknowledgement.
recentPrivatePayloadFormats[key] = observedFormats | formatBit
return false
}
recentPrivatePayloadFormats[key] = formatBit
recentPrivatePayloadKeyOrder.append(key)
if recentPrivatePayloadKeyOrder.count > Self.privatePayloadDedupCapacity {
let evicted = recentPrivatePayloadKeyOrder.removeFirst()
recentPrivatePayloadFormats.removeValue(forKey: evicted)
}
return true
}
@MainActor
static func decodeEmbeddedBitChatPacket(from content: String) -> BitchatPacket? {
guard content.hasPrefix("bitchat1:") else { return nil }