Bridge dedup: content-derived stable mesh message ID (#1419)

* Bridge dedup keys on a content-derived stable mesh message ID

Public mesh messages carry no message ID on the BLE wire, so every
non-origin device minted a fresh UUID and the bridge's m-tag dedup only
matched on the origin device: duplicate bridged rows, misattributed
"across the bridge" counts, redundant downlink rebroadcasts, and an
m-tag spoof vector (an attacker could claim a victim's message ID).

Every device now derives the same stable ID from the signed wire fields
(sender ID + ms timestamp + trimmed content, SHA256/32 hex) via the new
MeshMessageIdentity — zero BLE wire change. The bridge event's m tag
carries the origin coordinates ["m", senderIDHex, timestampMs] and
receivers recompute the key from those plus the event's own content
instead of trusting a claimed ID; old-format/absent tags fall back to
the event ID as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fix mixed-version message loss: m tag leads with the derived stable ID

The previous layout (["m", senderIDHex, timestampMs]) broke v1.7.0
receivers: their parser takes m[1] unconditionally as the timeline
dedup key whenever the tag has >= 2 elements, so every bridged message
from a new-version sender keyed on the CONSTANT sender hex and
inject-dedup dropped all but the first. The tag is now
["m", <derived stable ID>, senderIDHex, timestampMs]: old parsers get a
per-message-unique m[1] (exactly today's semantics), while the new
parser recomputes the ID from elements 2-3 plus the event's own content
and never trusts element 1, keeping the recompute-don't-trust property.

Also:
- Soften the overstated security claim in MeshMessageIdentity and the
  BridgeService classify comment: forging a chosen ID onto different
  content is infeasible, but all three hash inputs are cleartext on the
  radio, so identical-content front-running by a radio-local attacker
  remains possible (no worse than the unbridged mesh).
- Fix the stale archivedEchoKeys rationale: re-synced copies of others'
  messages now carry the derived stable ID (insert-by-ID catches them);
  the content key remains for echo--prefixed archive rows + self echoes.
- Tests: old-parser semantics on the new tag (m[1] per-message-unique
  and equal to the derived ID) and a forged-m[1] event that cannot
  pre-poison a genuine message's dedup slot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

bitchatTests/Protocols/BridgeWireFormatTests.swift

@@ -111,6 +111,53 @@ struct BridgeWireFormatTests {
     }
 }
 
+@Suite("Mesh message identity")
+struct MeshMessageIdentityTests {
+    @Test func stableIDIsDeterministicHex() {
+        let id = MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderIDHex: "0011223344556677",
+            timestampMs: 1_750_000_000_123,
+            content: "hello mesh"
+        )
+        // Pinned vector: first 32 hex chars of
+        // SHA256("0011223344556677|1750000000123|hello mesh"). Any drift
+        // breaks cross-device (and cross-version) dedup.
+        #expect(id == "b83f94d81dcdd1b0c0048f6645995dd4")
+        #expect(id == MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderIDHex: "0011223344556677",
+            timestampMs: 1_750_000_000_123,
+            content: "hello mesh"
+        ))
+    }
+
+    @Test func senderIDIsCaseInsensitive() {
+        let lower = MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(senderIDHex: "aabbccdd00112233", timestampMs: 1, content: "x")
+        let upper = MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(senderIDHex: "AABBCCDD00112233", timestampMs: 1, content: "x")
+        #expect(lower == upper)
+    }
+
+    @Test func contentWhitespaceIsNormalized() {
+        // Senders bridge the trimmed content while the radio carries the
+        // original; both must derive the same key.
+        let raw = MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(senderIDHex: "aabbccdd00112233", timestampMs: 1, content: "  hello mesh \n")
+        let trimmed = MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(senderIDHex: "aabbccdd00112233", timestampMs: 1, content: "hello mesh")
+        #expect(raw == trimmed)
+    }
+
+    @Test func anyCoordinateChangeChangesTheID() {
+        let base = MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(senderIDHex: "aabbccdd00112233", timestampMs: 5, content: "x")
+        #expect(base != MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(senderIDHex: "aabbccdd00112234", timestampMs: 5, content: "x"))
+        #expect(base != MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(senderIDHex: "aabbccdd00112233", timestampMs: 6, content: "x"))
+        #expect(base != MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(senderIDHex: "aabbccdd00112233", timestampMs: 5, content: "y"))
+    }
+
+    @Test func millisecondTimestampTruncatesLikeTheWire() {
+        // Must match `BLEService.sendMessage`'s UInt64(seconds * 1000).
+        #expect(MeshMessageIdentity.millisecondTimestamp(Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000.9996)) == 1_000_999)
+        #expect(MeshMessageIdentity.millisecondTimestamp(Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)) == 1_000_000)
+    }
+}
+
 @Suite("Courier store bridge publish")
 struct CourierStoreBridgePublishTests {
     private func makeStore(now: @escaping () -> Date = Date.init) -> CourierStore {