diff --git a/bitchat/App/ConversationUIModel.swift b/bitchat/App/ConversationUIModel.swift
index 461449cc..f8633e0d 100644
--- a/bitchat/App/ConversationUIModel.swift
+++ b/bitchat/App/ConversationUIModel.swift
@@ -193,7 +193,9 @@ final class ConversationUIModel: ObservableObject {
 
     private func refreshComputedState() {
         if let selectedPeerID = privateConversationModel.selectedPeerID {
-            canSendMediaInCurrentContext = !(selectedPeerID.isGeoDM || selectedPeerID.isGeoChat)
+            // Media transfer is not wired for groups in v1; keep it off so the
+            // composer can't strand a media placeholder that never sends.
+            canSendMediaInCurrentContext = !(selectedPeerID.isGeoDM || selectedPeerID.isGeoChat || selectedPeerID.isGroup)
             return
         }
 
diff --git a/bitchat/App/PeerListModel.swift b/bitchat/App/PeerListModel.swift
index 1846b487..b96c2e72 100644
--- a/bitchat/App/PeerListModel.swift
+++ b/bitchat/App/PeerListModel.swift
@@ -29,11 +29,22 @@ struct GeohashPersonRow: Identifiable, Equatable {
     let isBlocked: Bool
 }
 
+struct GroupChatRow: Identifiable, Equatable {
+    let peerID: PeerID
+    let name: String
+    let memberCount: Int
+    let isCreator: Bool
+    let hasUnread: Bool
+
+    var id: String { peerID.id }
+}
+
 @MainActor
 final class PeerListModel: ObservableObject {
     @Published private(set) var allPeers: [BitchatPeer] = []
     @Published private(set) var meshRows: [MeshPeerRow] = []
     @Published private(set) var geohashPeople: [GeohashPersonRow] = []
+    @Published private(set) var groupRows: [GroupChatRow] = []
     @Published private(set) var reachableMeshPeerCount = 0
     @Published private(set) var connectedMeshPeerCount = 0
     @Published private(set) var visibleGeohashPeerCount = 0
@@ -132,6 +143,13 @@ final class PeerListModel: ObservableObject {
             }
             .store(in: &cancellables)
 
+        chatViewModel.groupStore.$groups
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refresh()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
         peerIdentityStore.$encryptionStatuses
             .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
             .sink { [weak self] _ in
@@ -220,22 +238,40 @@ final class PeerListModel: ObservableObject {
         }
 
         let geohashPeople = buildGeohashPeople()
+        let groupRows = buildGroupRows()
 
         self.meshRows = meshRows
         reachableMeshPeerCount = meshCounts.reachable
         connectedMeshPeerCount = meshCounts.connected
         self.geohashPeople = geohashPeople
         visibleGeohashPeerCount = geohashPeople.count
+        self.groupRows = groupRows
         renderID = (
             meshRows.map {
                 "\($0.id)-\($0.isConnected)-\($0.isReachable)-\($0.hasUnread)-\($0.isFavorite)-\($0.isBlocked)"
             } +
             geohashPeople.map {
                 "geo:\($0.id)-\($0.isTeleported)-\($0.isBlocked)-\($0.displayName)"
+            } +
+            groupRows.map {
+                "group:\($0.id)-\($0.name)-\($0.memberCount)-\($0.hasUnread)"
             }
         ).joined(separator: "|")
     }
 
+    private func buildGroupRows() -> [GroupChatRow] {
+        let myFingerprint = chatViewModel.meshService.noiseIdentityFingerprint()
+        return chatViewModel.groupStore.groups.map { group in
+            GroupChatRow(
+                peerID: group.peerID,
+                name: group.name,
+                memberCount: group.members.count,
+                isCreator: group.creatorFingerprint == myFingerprint,
+                hasUnread: chatViewModel.hasUnreadMessages(for: group.peerID)
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
     private func buildGeohashPeople() -> [GeohashPersonRow] {
         let myHex = currentGeohashIdentityHex()
         let teleportedSet = Set(locationPresenceStore.teleportedGeo.map { $0.lowercased() })
diff --git a/bitchat/App/PrivateConversationModels.swift b/bitchat/App/PrivateConversationModels.swift
index 2a465948..d9920646 100644
--- a/bitchat/App/PrivateConversationModels.swift
+++ b/bitchat/App/PrivateConversationModels.swift
@@ -108,7 +108,13 @@ struct PrivateConversationHeaderState: Equatable {
     let encryptionStatus: EncryptionStatus?
 
     var supportsFavoriteToggle: Bool {
-        !conversationPeerID.isGeoDM
+        !conversationPeerID.isGeoDM && !conversationPeerID.isGroup
+    }
+
+    /// Group chats have no single peer identity behind the header: no
+    /// fingerprint screen, no per-peer encryption badge.
+    var isGroupConversation: Bool {
+        conversationPeerID.isGroup
     }
 }
 
@@ -206,6 +212,13 @@ final class PrivateConversationModel: ObservableObject {
             }
             .store(in: &cancellables)
 
+        chatViewModel.groupStore.$groups
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
         NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: Notification.Name("peerStatusUpdated"))
             .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
             .sink { [weak self] _ in
@@ -229,6 +242,26 @@ final class PrivateConversationModel: ObservableObject {
     }
 
     private func makeHeaderState(for conversationPeerID: PeerID) -> PrivateConversationHeaderState {
+        // Group chats: the "peer" is the whole crew. Name + member count in
+        // the header; availability reads as mesh since group traffic floods
+        // the local mesh, and the per-peer encryption badge does not apply.
+        if conversationPeerID.isGroup {
+            let displayName: String
+            if let group = chatViewModel.groupStore.group(for: conversationPeerID) {
+                displayName = "#\(group.name) (\(group.members.count))"
+            } else {
+                displayName = String(localized: "common.unknown", comment: "Fallback label for unknown peer")
+            }
+            return PrivateConversationHeaderState(
+                conversationPeerID: conversationPeerID,
+                headerPeerID: conversationPeerID,
+                displayName: displayName,
+                availability: .meshReachable,
+                isFavorite: false,
+                encryptionStatus: nil
+            )
+        }
+
         let headerPeerID = chatViewModel.getShortIDForNoiseKey(conversationPeerID)
         let peer = chatViewModel.getPeer(byID: headerPeerID)
         let displayName = resolveDisplayName(for: conversationPeerID, headerPeerID: headerPeerID, peer: peer)
diff --git a/bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings b/bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings
index 49e5487e..f7979b8d 100644
--- a/bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings
+++ b/bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings
@@ -9408,6 +9408,17 @@
         }
       }
     },
+    "content.accessibility.group_chat" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "Group chat"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "content.accessibility.jump_to_latest" : {
       "comment" : "Accessibility label for the jump to latest messages button",
       "extractionState" : "manual",
@@ -15115,6 +15126,17 @@
         }
       }
     },
+    "content.commands.group" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "create or manage private groups"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "content.commands.help" : {
       "comment" : "Description of the /help command in the suggestions panel",
       "extractionState" : "manual",
@@ -18338,6 +18360,17 @@
         }
       }
     },
+    "content.input.group_placeholder" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "create|invite|leave|list"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "content.input.placeholder.location" : {
       "comment" : "Composer placeholder for a public geohash channel, naming it",
       "extractionState" : "manual",
@@ -20069,6 +20102,17 @@
         }
       }
     },
+    "content.private.caption_group" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "encrypted group · members only"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "encryption.accessibility.establishing" : {
       "extractionState" : "manual",
       "localizations" : {
@@ -24626,6 +24670,50 @@
         }
       }
     },
+    "groups.accessibility.open_group_hint" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "Opens the group chat"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "groups.member_count %@" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "(%@)"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "groups.section.header" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "groups"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "groups.state.creator" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "Creator"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "location_channels.accessibility.add_bookmark" : {
       "comment" : "Accessibility action name for bookmarking a channel",
       "extractionState" : "manual",
@@ -34155,6 +34243,303 @@
         }
       }
     },
+    "system.group.already_member" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "%@ is already a member"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.cannot_remove_creator" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "the creator cannot be removed"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.create_failed" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "could not create the group"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.created" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "created group '%@' — use /group invite @name to add people"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.creator_only" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "only the group creator can do that"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.full" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "group is full (max %@ members)"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.identity_unavailable" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "your identity keys are not ready yet"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.invite_failed" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "could not build the group invite"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.invited" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "invited %1$@ to '%2$@'"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.joined" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "you were added to group '%1$@' by %2$@ — it now appears in your people list"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.left" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "left group '%@'"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.list_header" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "your groups:"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.member_not_found" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "'%@' is not a member of this group"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.name_too_long" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "group names are limited to 40 characters"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.none" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "you are not in any groups — /group create <name> to start one"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.not_in_group" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "open a group chat first"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.peer_identity_unknown" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "cannot verify %@'s identity yet — wait for their announce"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.peer_not_connected" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "%@ must be connected over mesh to be invited"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.peer_not_found" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "'%@' not found"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.removed_from" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "you were removed from group '%@'"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.removed_member" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "removed %@ and rotated the group key"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.rotate_failed" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "could not rotate the group key"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.send_failed" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "could not encrypt the message"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.unknown" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "you are no longer in this group"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.usage_create" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "usage: /group create <name>"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.usage_invite" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "usage: /group invite @name"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "system.group.usage_remove" : {
+      "extractionState" : "manual",
+      "localizations" : {
+        "en" : {
+          "stringUnit" : {
+            "state" : "translated",
+            "value" : "usage: /group remove @name"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "system.location.not_in_channel" : {
       "extractionState" : "manual",
       "localizations" : {
diff --git a/bitchat/Models/CommandInfo.swift b/bitchat/Models/CommandInfo.swift
index bb0a0a65..b4f309d9 100644
--- a/bitchat/Models/CommandInfo.swift
+++ b/bitchat/Models/CommandInfo.swift
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
     // suggesting a spelling the processor rejects teaches users dead ends.
     case block
     case clear
+    case group
     case help
     case hug
     case message = "msg"
@@ -36,6 +37,8 @@ enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
         switch self {
         case .block, .hug, .message, .slap, .unblock, .favorite, .unfavorite, .ping, .trace:
             return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.nickname_placeholder") + ">"
+        case .group:
+            return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.group_placeholder") + ">"
         case .pay:
             return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.token_placeholder") + ">"
         case .clear, .help, .who:
@@ -47,6 +50,7 @@ enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
         switch self {
         case .block:        String(localized: "content.commands.block")
         case .clear:        String(localized: "content.commands.clear")
+        case .group:        String(localized: "content.commands.group")
         case .help:         String(localized: "content.commands.help")
         case .hug:          String(localized: "content.commands.hug")
         case .message:      String(localized: "content.commands.message")
@@ -70,11 +74,11 @@ enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
         if !isGeoPublic {
             commands.append(.pay)
         }
-        // The processor rejects favorites and mesh diagnostics in geohash
-        // contexts, so only suggest them where they actually work: mesh.
+        // The processor rejects favorites, groups, and mesh diagnostics in
+        // geohash contexts, so only suggest them where they work: mesh.
         if isGeoPublic || isGeoDM {
             return commands
         }
-        return commands + [.favorite, .unfavorite, .ping, .trace]
+        return commands + [.favorite, .unfavorite, .ping, .trace, .group]
     }
 }
diff --git a/bitchat/Protocols/BitchatProtocol.swift b/bitchat/Protocols/BitchatProtocol.swift
index c7497051..476ae876 100644
--- a/bitchat/Protocols/BitchatProtocol.swift
+++ b/bitchat/Protocols/BitchatProtocol.swift
@@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ enum NoisePayloadType: UInt8 {
     case privateMessage = 0x01      // Private chat message
     case readReceipt = 0x02         // Message was read
     case delivered = 0x03           // Message was delivered
+    // Private groups (0x04/0x05 reserved by other features)
+    case groupInvite = 0x06         // Creator-signed group state (invite)
+    case groupKeyUpdate = 0x07      // Creator-signed group state (key rotation / roster update)
     // Verification (QR-based OOB binding)
     case verifyChallenge = 0x10     // Verification challenge
     case verifyResponse  = 0x11     // Verification response
@@ -85,6 +88,8 @@ enum NoisePayloadType: UInt8 {
         case .privateMessage: return "privateMessage"
         case .readReceipt: return "readReceipt"
         case .delivered: return "delivered"
+        case .groupInvite: return "groupInvite"
+        case .groupKeyUpdate: return "groupKeyUpdate"
         case .verifyChallenge: return "verifyChallenge"
         case .verifyResponse: return "verifyResponse"
         case .vouch: return "vouch"
@@ -119,6 +124,9 @@ protocol BitchatDelegate: AnyObject {
     // Low-level events for better separation of concerns
     func didReceiveNoisePayload(from peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date)
 
+    // Encrypted group broadcast (opaque envelope; decrypted by the group coordinator)
+    func didReceiveGroupMessage(payload: Data, timestamp: Date)
+
     // Bluetooth state updates for user notifications
     func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState)
     func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?)
@@ -138,6 +146,10 @@ extension BitchatDelegate {
         // Default empty implementation
     }
 
+    func didReceiveGroupMessage(payload: Data, timestamp: Date) {
+        // Default empty implementation
+    }
+
     func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
         // Default empty implementation
     }
diff --git a/bitchat/Protocols/PeerCapabilities+Local.swift b/bitchat/Protocols/PeerCapabilities+Local.swift
index b5c36f1a..819464b9 100644
--- a/bitchat/Protocols/PeerCapabilities+Local.swift
+++ b/bitchat/Protocols/PeerCapabilities+Local.swift
@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@ import BitFoundation
 extension PeerCapabilities {
     /// Capabilities this build advertises in its announce packets.
     /// Each feature adds its bit here when it ships.
-    static let localSupported: PeerCapabilities = [.vouch, .prekeys]
+    static let localSupported: PeerCapabilities = [.vouch, .prekeys, .groups]
 }
diff --git a/bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.swift b/bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.swift
index 2bec6292..64cfa73e 100644
--- a/bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.swift
+++ b/bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.swift
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ enum BLEOutboundPacketPolicy {
         switch MessageType(rawValue: packetType) {
         case .noiseEncrypted, .noiseHandshake:
             return true
-        case .none, .announce, .message, .leave, .requestSync, .fragment, .fileTransfer, .courierEnvelope, .boardPost, .ping, .pong, .nostrCarrier, .prekeyBundle:
+        case .none, .announce, .message, .leave, .requestSync, .fragment, .fileTransfer, .courierEnvelope, .boardPost, .ping, .pong, .nostrCarrier, .prekeyBundle, .groupMessage:
             return false
         }
     }
diff --git a/bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift b/bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift
index 3e6c5da7..8d9234af 100644
--- a/bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift
+++ b/bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift
@@ -1394,6 +1394,48 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
 
     // MARK: QR Verification over Noise
     
+    // MARK: Private Groups
+
+    /// Sends creator-signed group state (invite) 1:1 over the Noise session,
+    /// queueing behind a handshake when none is established yet.
+    func sendGroupInvite(_ statePayload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) {
+        sendNoisePayload(NoisePayload(type: .groupInvite, data: statePayload).encode(), to: peerID)
+    }
+
+    /// Sends creator-signed group state (key rotation / roster update) 1:1
+    /// over the Noise session.
+    func sendGroupKeyUpdate(_ statePayload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) {
+        sendNoisePayload(NoisePayload(type: .groupKeyUpdate, data: statePayload).encode(), to: peerID)
+    }
+
+    /// Broadcasts a sealed group message (MessageType 0x25) like a public
+    /// message: fire-and-flood with gossip-sync backfill. The outer packet is
+    /// intentionally unsigned — receivers authenticate the sender's Ed25519
+    /// signature inside the ciphertext, which still verifies for backfilled
+    /// copies long after the sender's announce has expired.
+    func broadcastGroupMessage(_ envelope: Data) {
+        guard !envelope.isEmpty else { return }
+        messageQueue.async { [weak self] in
+            guard let self else { return }
+            let packet = BitchatPacket(
+                type: MessageType.groupMessage.rawValue,
+                senderID: Data(hexString: self.myPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
+                recipientID: nil,
+                timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
+                payload: envelope,
+                signature: nil,
+                ttl: self.messageTTL
+            )
+            // Pre-mark our own broadcast as processed to avoid handling a
+            // relayed self copy.
+            let dedupID = BLESelfBroadcastTracker.dedupID(for: packet)
+            self.messageDeduplicator.markProcessed(dedupID)
+            self.broadcastPacket(packet)
+            // Track our own broadcast for gossip sync
+            self.gossipSyncManager?.onPublicPacketSeen(packet)
+        }
+    }
+
     func sendVerifyChallenge(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data) {
         let payload = VerificationService.shared.buildVerifyChallenge(noiseKeyHex: noiseKeyHex, nonceA: nonceA)
         sendNoisePayload(payload, to: peerID)
@@ -3758,6 +3800,9 @@ extension BLEService {
         case .courierEnvelope:
             handleCourierEnvelope(packet, from: peerID)
 
+        case .groupMessage:
+            handleGroupMessage(packet, from: senderID)
+
         case .prekeyBundle:
             handlePrekeyBundle(packet, from: senderID)
 
@@ -4095,6 +4140,26 @@ extension BLEService {
         )
     }
 
+    /// Group broadcasts are opaque ciphertext to this layer: track them for
+    /// gossip backfill and hand the payload to the UI layer, where the group
+    /// coordinator decrypts and authenticates against the roster. Non-members
+    /// still relay (generic broadcast relay path) but never decode.
+    private func handleGroupMessage(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
+        let isBroadcastRecipient: Bool = {
+            guard let recipient = packet.recipientID else { return true }
+            return recipient.count == 8 && recipient.allSatisfy { $0 == 0xFF }
+        }()
+        guard isBroadcastRecipient, !packet.payload.isEmpty else { return }
+
+        gossipSyncManager?.onPublicPacketSeen(packet)
+
+        let payload = packet.payload
+        let timestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(packet.timestamp) / 1000)
+        notifyUI { [weak self] in
+            self?.deliverTransportEvent(.groupMessageReceived(payload: payload, timestamp: timestamp))
+        }
+    }
+
     private func handleNoiseHandshake(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
         noisePacketHandler.handleHandshake(packet, from: peerID)
     }
diff --git a/bitchat/Services/CommandProcessor.swift b/bitchat/Services/CommandProcessor.swift
index 9555609a..b8a4785e 100644
--- a/bitchat/Services/CommandProcessor.swift
+++ b/bitchat/Services/CommandProcessor.swift
@@ -74,6 +74,15 @@ protocol CommandContextProvider: AnyObject {
     /// Toggles the favorite via the unified peer flow, which persists by the
     /// real noise key and notifies the peer over mesh or Nostr.
     func toggleFavorite(peerID: PeerID)
+
+    // MARK: - Groups
+    // Group logic lives in `ChatGroupCoordinator`; these forward the parsed
+    // /group subcommands.
+    func groupCreate(named name: String) -> CommandResult
+    func groupInvite(nickname: String) -> CommandResult
+    func groupRemove(nickname: String) -> CommandResult
+    func groupLeave() -> CommandResult
+    func groupList() -> CommandResult
 }
 
 /// Processes chat commands in a focused, efficient way
@@ -120,6 +129,9 @@ final class CommandProcessor {
             return handleBlock(args)
         case "/unblock":
             return handleUnblock(args)
+        case "/group":
+            if inGeoPublic || inGeoDM { return .error(message: "groups are only for mesh peers in #mesh") }
+            return handleGroup(args)
         case "/fav":
             if inGeoPublic || inGeoDM { return .error(message: "favorites are only for mesh peers in #mesh") }
             return handleFavorite(args, add: true)
@@ -153,6 +165,9 @@ final class CommandProcessor {
     /slap @name — slap with a large trout
     /block @name · /unblock @name
     /fav @name · /unfav @name — favorites (mesh only)
+    /group create <name> — start an encrypted group
+    /group invite @name · /group remove @name — manage members (creator)
+    /group leave · /group list — leave or list your groups
     /ping @name — measure round-trip time (mesh only)
     /trace @name — estimated mesh path (mesh only)
     /pay <token> — send a cashu ecash token in this chat
@@ -362,6 +377,32 @@ final class CommandProcessor {
         return .error(message: "cannot unblock \(nickname): not found")
     }
     
+    private static let groupUsage = "usage: /group create <name> · invite @name · remove @name · leave · list"
+
+    private func handleGroup(_ args: String) -> CommandResult {
+        let parts = args.split(separator: " ", maxSplits: 1, omittingEmptySubsequences: true)
+        guard let subcommand = parts.first else {
+            return .error(message: Self.groupUsage)
+        }
+        let rest = parts.count > 1 ? String(parts[1]) : ""
+        guard let provider = contextProvider else { return .handled }
+
+        switch subcommand {
+        case "create":
+            return provider.groupCreate(named: rest)
+        case "invite":
+            return provider.groupInvite(nickname: rest)
+        case "remove":
+            return provider.groupRemove(nickname: rest)
+        case "leave":
+            return provider.groupLeave()
+        case "list":
+            return provider.groupList()
+        default:
+            return .error(message: Self.groupUsage)
+        }
+    }
+
     // MARK: - Mesh Diagnostics
 
     private enum MeshPeerResolution {
diff --git a/bitchat/Services/Groups/GroupProtocol.swift b/bitchat/Services/Groups/GroupProtocol.swift
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dc4a0abf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitchat/Services/Groups/GroupProtocol.swift
@@ -0,0 +1,569 @@
+//
+// GroupProtocol.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// Wire formats and crypto for private groups: creator-signed group state
+// (invites and key updates over Noise) and ChaCha20-Poly1305 group messages
+// broadcast as MessageType.groupMessage (0x25).
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import BitFoundation
+import CryptoKit
+import Foundation
+
+// MARK: - Models
+
+/// A member of a private group as pinned in the creator-signed roster.
+struct GroupMember: Codable, Equatable {
+    /// SHA-256 fingerprint (64 hex chars) of the member's Noise static key.
+    let fingerprint: String
+    /// The member's Ed25519 signing public key (32 bytes, from their announce).
+    let signingKey: Data
+    /// Nickname at invite time; display fallback when the peer is offline.
+    var nickname: String
+}
+
+/// Creator-managed encrypted group. Metadata only — the symmetric key lives
+/// in the keychain (see `GroupStore`).
+struct BitchatGroup: Codable, Equatable {
+    static let maxMembers = 16
+    static let groupIDLength = 16
+    static let keyLength = 32
+
+    /// 16 random bytes; travels in cleartext on group message packets so
+    /// relays can dedup/filter without membership.
+    let groupID: Data
+    var name: String
+    /// Bumps on every key rotation; messages are bound to the epoch they
+    /// were sealed under.
+    var epoch: UInt32
+    var members: [GroupMember]
+    /// Fingerprint of the creator — the only identity allowed to sign group
+    /// state (invites, key updates) in v1.
+    let creatorFingerprint: String
+
+    /// Virtual conversation ID this group's chat is keyed under.
+    var peerID: PeerID { PeerID(groupID: groupID) }
+
+    var creator: GroupMember? {
+        members.first { $0.fingerprint == creatorFingerprint }
+    }
+
+    func isMember(fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
+        members.contains { $0.fingerprint == fingerprint }
+    }
+
+    func member(withSigningKey signingKey: Data) -> GroupMember? {
+        members.first { $0.signingKey == signingKey }
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - TLV helpers
+
+enum GroupTLVError: Error, Equatable {
+    /// A TLV value exceeded the 16-bit length field. Encoding fails instead
+    /// of silently truncating (which would ship a value the receiver drops).
+    case valueTooLong
+}
+
+private enum GroupTLV {
+    /// Appends a (type, 16-bit length, value) triple. Throws rather than
+    /// truncating when `value` does not fit the 16-bit length field, so an
+    /// oversize field surfaces a send failure instead of a silently truncated
+    /// blob the recipient rejects during decrypt/verify.
+    static func put(_ type: UInt8, _ value: Data, into out: inout Data) throws {
+        guard value.count <= Int(UInt16.max) else { throw GroupTLVError.valueTooLong }
+        out.append(type)
+        let length = UInt16(value.count)
+        out.append(UInt8((length >> 8) & 0xFF))
+        out.append(UInt8(length & 0xFF))
+        out.append(value)
+    }
+
+    /// Iterates (type, value) pairs; returns nil on malformed framing.
+    static func parse(_ data: Data) -> [(type: UInt8, value: Data)]? {
+        var fields: [(UInt8, Data)] = []
+        var offset = data.startIndex
+        while offset < data.endIndex {
+            guard data.distance(from: offset, to: data.endIndex) >= 3 else { return nil }
+            let type = data[offset]
+            let high = Int(data[data.index(offset, offsetBy: 1)])
+            let low = Int(data[data.index(offset, offsetBy: 2)])
+            let length = (high << 8) | low
+            let valueStart = data.index(offset, offsetBy: 3)
+            guard data.distance(from: valueStart, to: data.endIndex) >= length else { return nil }
+            let valueEnd = data.index(valueStart, offsetBy: length)
+            fields.append((type, Data(data[valueStart..<valueEnd])))
+            offset = valueEnd
+        }
+        return fields
+    }
+
+    static func epochData(_ epoch: UInt32) -> Data {
+        var bigEndian = epoch.bigEndian
+        return withUnsafeBytes(of: &bigEndian) { Data($0) }
+    }
+
+    static func epoch(from data: Data) -> UInt32? {
+        guard data.count == 4 else { return nil }
+        return data.reduce(UInt32(0)) { ($0 << 8) | UInt32($1) }
+    }
+
+    static func timestampData(_ timestampMs: UInt64) -> Data {
+        var bigEndian = timestampMs.bigEndian
+        return withUnsafeBytes(of: &bigEndian) { Data($0) }
+    }
+
+    static func timestamp(from data: Data) -> UInt64? {
+        guard data.count == 8 else { return nil }
+        return data.reduce(UInt64(0)) { ($0 << 8) | UInt64($1) }
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Roster wire form
+
+enum GroupRosterCoding {
+    private static let fingerprintLength = 32
+    private static let signingKeyLength = 32
+    private static let maxNicknameBytes = 64
+
+    /// Deterministic roster blob: count byte, then per member the raw 32-byte
+    /// fingerprint, 32-byte signing key, and length-prefixed UTF-8 nickname.
+    /// The creator signature covers the SHA-256 of these exact bytes.
+    static func encode(_ members: [GroupMember]) -> Data? {
+        guard members.count <= BitchatGroup.maxMembers else { return nil }
+        var out = Data([UInt8(members.count)])
+        for member in members {
+            guard let fingerprintData = Data(hexString: member.fingerprint),
+                  fingerprintData.count == fingerprintLength,
+                  member.signingKey.count == signingKeyLength else { return nil }
+            out.append(fingerprintData)
+            out.append(member.signingKey)
+            // Truncate on a Character boundary so the byte prefix is always
+            // valid UTF-8; a raw byte-prefix could split a multi-byte scalar
+            // and make the whole signed roster undecodable on the recipient.
+            let nickname = truncatedNicknameBytes(member.nickname)
+            out.append(UInt8(nickname.count))
+            out.append(nickname)
+        }
+        return out
+    }
+
+    static func decode(_ data: Data) -> [GroupMember]? {
+        guard let count = data.first, count <= UInt8(BitchatGroup.maxMembers) else { return nil }
+        var members: [GroupMember] = []
+        var offset = data.index(after: data.startIndex)
+        for _ in 0..<count {
+            let fixed = fingerprintLength + signingKeyLength + 1
+            guard data.distance(from: offset, to: data.endIndex) >= fixed else { return nil }
+            let fingerprintEnd = data.index(offset, offsetBy: fingerprintLength)
+            let fingerprint = Data(data[offset..<fingerprintEnd]).hexEncodedString()
+            let signingKeyEnd = data.index(fingerprintEnd, offsetBy: signingKeyLength)
+            let signingKey = Data(data[fingerprintEnd..<signingKeyEnd])
+            let nickLength = Int(data[signingKeyEnd])
+            let nickStart = data.index(after: signingKeyEnd)
+            guard data.distance(from: nickStart, to: data.endIndex) >= nickLength else { return nil }
+            let nickEnd = data.index(nickStart, offsetBy: nickLength)
+            guard let nickname = String(data: Data(data[nickStart..<nickEnd]), encoding: .utf8) else { return nil }
+            members.append(GroupMember(fingerprint: fingerprint, signingKey: signingKey, nickname: nickname))
+            offset = nickEnd
+        }
+        guard offset == data.endIndex else { return nil }
+        return members
+    }
+
+    /// UTF-8 bytes of `nickname` trimmed to at most `maxNicknameBytes`,
+    /// dropping whole Characters so the result is never split mid-scalar.
+    private static func truncatedNicknameBytes(_ nickname: String) -> Data {
+        var candidate = nickname
+        while Data(candidate.utf8).count > maxNicknameBytes {
+            candidate.removeLast()
+        }
+        return Data(candidate.utf8)
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Group state payload (groupInvite / groupKeyUpdate over Noise)
+
+/// Creator-signed group state. The same wire form serves invites (0x06) and
+/// key updates (0x07); receivers verify the creator signature — computed over
+/// "bitchat-group-v1" | groupID | epoch | SHA256(key) | SHA256(roster) —
+/// against the creator's signing key pinned in the roster, and require the
+/// Noise session peer to BE the creator before accepting any state.
+struct GroupStatePayload: Equatable {
+    let groupID: Data
+    let name: String
+    /// Symmetric ChaCha20-Poly1305 group key (32 bytes) for `epoch`.
+    let key: Data
+    let epoch: UInt32
+    let members: [GroupMember]
+    let creatorFingerprint: String
+    /// Ed25519 signature by the creator.
+    let signature: Data
+
+    private enum FieldType: UInt8 {
+        case groupID = 0x01
+        case name = 0x02
+        case key = 0x03
+        case epoch = 0x04
+        case roster = 0x05
+        case creatorFingerprint = 0x06
+        case signature = 0x07
+    }
+
+    static let signingDomain = Data("bitchat-group-v1".utf8)
+
+    /// The bytes the creator signs. Binding the key, roster, and name by hash
+    /// keeps the signed content fixed-size. The name is covered so a relay
+    /// that caches/replays a signed state (e.g. store-and-forward) cannot swap
+    /// the display name while keeping a valid creator signature.
+    static func signingContent(groupID: Data, epoch: UInt32, key: Data, rosterBlob: Data, name: String) -> Data {
+        var content = signingDomain
+        content.append(groupID)
+        content.append(GroupTLV.epochData(epoch))
+        content.append(key.sha256Hash())
+        content.append(rosterBlob.sha256Hash())
+        content.append(Data(name.utf8).sha256Hash())
+        return content
+    }
+
+    /// Builds a signed state payload. Returns nil when the roster cannot be
+    /// encoded (over cap, malformed member) or signing fails.
+    static func makeSigned(
+        group: BitchatGroup,
+        key: Data,
+        sign: (Data) -> Data?
+    ) -> GroupStatePayload? {
+        guard let rosterBlob = GroupRosterCoding.encode(group.members) else { return nil }
+        let content = signingContent(groupID: group.groupID, epoch: group.epoch, key: key, rosterBlob: rosterBlob, name: group.name)
+        guard let signature = sign(content) else { return nil }
+        return GroupStatePayload(
+            groupID: group.groupID,
+            name: group.name,
+            key: key,
+            epoch: group.epoch,
+            members: group.members,
+            creatorFingerprint: group.creatorFingerprint,
+            signature: signature
+        )
+    }
+
+    func encode() -> Data? {
+        guard let rosterBlob = GroupRosterCoding.encode(members),
+              let fingerprintData = Data(hexString: creatorFingerprint),
+              fingerprintData.count == 32 else { return nil }
+        var out = Data()
+        do {
+            try GroupTLV.put(FieldType.groupID.rawValue, groupID, into: &out)
+            try GroupTLV.put(FieldType.name.rawValue, Data(name.utf8), into: &out)
+            try GroupTLV.put(FieldType.key.rawValue, key, into: &out)
+            try GroupTLV.put(FieldType.epoch.rawValue, GroupTLV.epochData(epoch), into: &out)
+            try GroupTLV.put(FieldType.roster.rawValue, rosterBlob, into: &out)
+            try GroupTLV.put(FieldType.creatorFingerprint.rawValue, fingerprintData, into: &out)
+            try GroupTLV.put(FieldType.signature.rawValue, signature, into: &out)
+        } catch {
+            return nil
+        }
+        return out
+    }
+
+    static func decode(_ data: Data) -> GroupStatePayload? {
+        guard let fields = GroupTLV.parse(data) else { return nil }
+        var groupID: Data?
+        var name: String?
+        var key: Data?
+        var epoch: UInt32?
+        var rosterBlob: Data?
+        var members: [GroupMember]?
+        var creatorFingerprint: String?
+        var signature: Data?
+
+        for (type, value) in fields {
+            switch FieldType(rawValue: type) {
+            case .groupID where value.count == BitchatGroup.groupIDLength:
+                groupID = value
+            case .name:
+                name = String(data: value, encoding: .utf8)
+            case .key where value.count == BitchatGroup.keyLength:
+                key = value
+            case .epoch:
+                epoch = GroupTLV.epoch(from: value)
+            case .roster:
+                rosterBlob = value
+                members = GroupRosterCoding.decode(value)
+            case .creatorFingerprint where value.count == 32:
+                creatorFingerprint = value.hexEncodedString()
+            case .signature where value.count == 64:
+                signature = value
+            default:
+                break // forward compatible; ignore unknown TLVs
+            }
+        }
+
+        guard let groupID, let name, let key, let epoch,
+              rosterBlob != nil, let members, !members.isEmpty,
+              let creatorFingerprint, let signature else { return nil }
+        return GroupStatePayload(
+            groupID: groupID,
+            name: name,
+            key: key,
+            epoch: epoch,
+            members: members,
+            creatorFingerprint: creatorFingerprint,
+            signature: signature
+        )
+    }
+
+    /// Verifies the creator signature against the creator's signing key
+    /// pinned in the roster, and that the creator is actually in the roster.
+    func verifyCreatorSignature() -> Bool {
+        guard members.count <= BitchatGroup.maxMembers,
+              let creator = members.first(where: { $0.fingerprint == creatorFingerprint }),
+              let rosterBlob = GroupRosterCoding.encode(members) else { return false }
+        let content = GroupStatePayload.signingContent(groupID: groupID, epoch: epoch, key: key, rosterBlob: rosterBlob, name: name)
+        return GroupCrypto.verify(signature: signature, for: content, publicKey: creator.signingKey)
+    }
+
+    var asGroup: BitchatGroup {
+        BitchatGroup(
+            groupID: groupID,
+            name: name,
+            epoch: epoch,
+            members: members,
+            creatorFingerprint: creatorFingerprint
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Group message envelope (MessageType 0x25 payload)
+
+/// Cleartext framing of a group message broadcast. Only the group ID, epoch,
+/// and nonce are visible to relays; everything about the message — sender,
+/// content, timestamps — is inside the ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphertext.
+struct GroupMessageEnvelope: Equatable {
+    let groupID: Data
+    let epoch: UInt32
+    let nonce: Data
+    /// ChaChaPoly ciphertext || 16-byte tag.
+    let ciphertext: Data
+
+    private enum FieldType: UInt8 {
+        case groupID = 0x01
+        case epoch = 0x02
+        case nonce = 0x03
+        case ciphertext = 0x04
+    }
+
+    func encode() throws -> Data {
+        var out = Data()
+        try GroupTLV.put(FieldType.groupID.rawValue, groupID, into: &out)
+        try GroupTLV.put(FieldType.epoch.rawValue, GroupTLV.epochData(epoch), into: &out)
+        try GroupTLV.put(FieldType.nonce.rawValue, nonce, into: &out)
+        try GroupTLV.put(FieldType.ciphertext.rawValue, ciphertext, into: &out)
+        return out
+    }
+
+    static func decode(_ data: Data) -> GroupMessageEnvelope? {
+        guard let fields = GroupTLV.parse(data) else { return nil }
+        var groupID: Data?
+        var epoch: UInt32?
+        var nonce: Data?
+        var ciphertext: Data?
+        for (type, value) in fields {
+            switch FieldType(rawValue: type) {
+            case .groupID where value.count == BitchatGroup.groupIDLength:
+                groupID = value
+            case .epoch:
+                epoch = GroupTLV.epoch(from: value)
+            case .nonce where value.count == 12:
+                nonce = value
+            case .ciphertext where !value.isEmpty:
+                ciphertext = value
+            default:
+                break
+            }
+        }
+        guard let groupID, let epoch, let nonce, let ciphertext else { return nil }
+        return GroupMessageEnvelope(groupID: groupID, epoch: epoch, nonce: nonce, ciphertext: ciphertext)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Decrypted, signature-verified inner content of a group message.
+struct GroupMessagePlaintext: Equatable {
+    let messageID: String
+    let senderSigningKey: Data
+    let senderNickname: String
+    let timestampMs: UInt64
+    let content: String
+}
+
+// MARK: - Crypto
+
+enum GroupCryptoError: Error, Equatable {
+    case malformedPayload
+    case signingFailed
+    case sealFailed
+    case wrongEpoch
+    case decryptionFailed
+    case badSenderSignature
+}
+
+enum GroupCrypto {
+    static let messageSigningDomain = Data("bitchat-group-msg-v1".utf8)
+
+    private enum InnerField: UInt8 {
+        case messageID = 0x01
+        case senderSigningKey = 0x02
+        case senderNickname = 0x03
+        case timestamp = 0x04
+        case content = 0x05
+        case signature = 0x06
+    }
+
+    /// Bytes the sender signs: domain | groupID | epoch | messageID | timestamp | content.
+    /// Covering the epoch stops a current member from re-sealing another
+    /// member's decrypted inner bytes under a later epoch key (the signature
+    /// would no longer verify at the new epoch).
+    static func messageSigningContent(groupID: Data, epoch: UInt32, messageID: String, timestampMs: UInt64, content: String) -> Data {
+        var data = messageSigningDomain
+        data.append(groupID)
+        data.append(GroupTLV.epochData(epoch))
+        data.append(Data(messageID.utf8))
+        data.append(GroupTLV.timestampData(timestampMs))
+        data.append(Data(content.utf8))
+        return data
+    }
+
+    static func verify(signature: Data, for data: Data, publicKey: Data) -> Bool {
+        guard let key = try? Curve25519.Signing.PublicKey(rawRepresentation: publicKey) else { return false }
+        return key.isValidSignature(signature, for: data)
+    }
+
+    /// Seals a group message: builds the signed inner TLV and encrypts it with
+    /// the epoch key. The cleartext group ID and epoch are bound into the AEAD
+    /// as additional data so ciphertext cannot be replayed across groups or
+    /// epochs. Returns the encoded 0x25 packet payload.
+    static func sealMessage(
+        content: String,
+        messageID: String,
+        senderNickname: String,
+        senderSigningKey: Data,
+        timestampMs: UInt64,
+        groupID: Data,
+        epoch: UInt32,
+        key: Data,
+        sign: (Data) -> Data?
+    ) throws -> Data {
+        let signingContent = messageSigningContent(
+            groupID: groupID,
+            epoch: epoch,
+            messageID: messageID,
+            timestampMs: timestampMs,
+            content: content
+        )
+        guard let signature = sign(signingContent), signature.count == 64 else {
+            throw GroupCryptoError.signingFailed
+        }
+
+        var inner = Data()
+        try GroupTLV.put(InnerField.messageID.rawValue, Data(messageID.utf8), into: &inner)
+        try GroupTLV.put(InnerField.senderSigningKey.rawValue, senderSigningKey, into: &inner)
+        try GroupTLV.put(InnerField.senderNickname.rawValue, Data(senderNickname.utf8), into: &inner)
+        try GroupTLV.put(InnerField.timestamp.rawValue, GroupTLV.timestampData(timestampMs), into: &inner)
+        try GroupTLV.put(InnerField.content.rawValue, Data(content.utf8), into: &inner)
+        try GroupTLV.put(InnerField.signature.rawValue, signature, into: &inner)
+
+        do {
+            let symmetricKey = SymmetricKey(data: key)
+            var aad = groupID
+            aad.append(GroupTLV.epochData(epoch))
+            let sealed = try ChaChaPoly.seal(inner, using: symmetricKey, authenticating: aad)
+            var ciphertext = sealed.ciphertext
+            ciphertext.append(sealed.tag)
+            let envelope = GroupMessageEnvelope(
+                groupID: groupID,
+                epoch: epoch,
+                nonce: Data(sealed.nonce),
+                ciphertext: ciphertext
+            )
+            return try envelope.encode()
+        } catch {
+            throw GroupCryptoError.sealFailed
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Opens a group message envelope with the epoch key: decrypts, parses the
+    /// inner TLV, and verifies the sender's Ed25519 signature. Roster
+    /// membership of the sender is the CALLER's check — this function only
+    /// proves the payload was authored by `senderSigningKey`.
+    static func openMessage(_ envelope: GroupMessageEnvelope, key: Data) throws -> GroupMessagePlaintext {
+        let inner: Data
+        do {
+            let symmetricKey = SymmetricKey(data: key)
+            var aad = envelope.groupID
+            aad.append(GroupTLV.epochData(envelope.epoch))
+            let nonce = try ChaChaPoly.Nonce(data: envelope.nonce)
+            guard envelope.ciphertext.count > 16 else { throw GroupCryptoError.decryptionFailed }
+            let tag = envelope.ciphertext.suffix(16)
+            let body = envelope.ciphertext.prefix(envelope.ciphertext.count - 16)
+            let sealedBox = try ChaChaPoly.SealedBox(nonce: nonce, ciphertext: body, tag: tag)
+            inner = try ChaChaPoly.open(sealedBox, using: symmetricKey, authenticating: aad)
+        } catch {
+            throw GroupCryptoError.decryptionFailed
+        }
+
+        guard let fields = GroupTLV.parse(inner) else { throw GroupCryptoError.malformedPayload }
+        var messageID: String?
+        var senderSigningKey: Data?
+        var senderNickname: String?
+        var timestampMs: UInt64?
+        var content: String?
+        var signature: Data?
+        for (type, value) in fields {
+            switch InnerField(rawValue: type) {
+            case .messageID:
+                messageID = String(data: value, encoding: .utf8)
+            case .senderSigningKey where value.count == 32:
+                senderSigningKey = value
+            case .senderNickname:
+                senderNickname = String(data: value, encoding: .utf8)
+            case .timestamp:
+                timestampMs = GroupTLV.timestamp(from: value)
+            case .content:
+                content = String(data: value, encoding: .utf8)
+            case .signature where value.count == 64:
+                signature = value
+            default:
+                break
+            }
+        }
+        guard let messageID, !messageID.isEmpty,
+              let senderSigningKey,
+              let senderNickname,
+              let timestampMs,
+              let content,
+              let signature else { throw GroupCryptoError.malformedPayload }
+
+        let signingContent = messageSigningContent(
+            groupID: envelope.groupID,
+            epoch: envelope.epoch,
+            messageID: messageID,
+            timestampMs: timestampMs,
+            content: content
+        )
+        guard verify(signature: signature, for: signingContent, publicKey: senderSigningKey) else {
+            throw GroupCryptoError.badSenderSignature
+        }
+
+        return GroupMessagePlaintext(
+            messageID: messageID,
+            senderSigningKey: senderSigningKey,
+            senderNickname: senderNickname,
+            timestampMs: timestampMs,
+            content: content
+        )
+    }
+}
diff --git a/bitchat/Services/Groups/GroupStore.swift b/bitchat/Services/Groups/GroupStore.swift
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3a45dcb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitchat/Services/Groups/GroupStore.swift
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+//
+// GroupStore.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// Persistence for private groups: symmetric keys in the keychain, metadata
+// (roster, name, epoch) as protected JSON in Application Support. Both are
+// dropped by the panic wipe.
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import BitFoundation
+import BitLogger
+import Combine
+import Foundation
+import Security
+
+@MainActor
+final class GroupStore: ObservableObject {
+    /// All groups this device is a member of, in creation/join order.
+    @Published private(set) var groups: [BitchatGroup] = []
+
+    private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
+    private let fileURL: URL?
+
+    /// - Parameter fileURL: Overrides the on-disk location (tests). Ignored
+    ///   when `persistsToDisk` is false.
+    init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol, persistsToDisk: Bool = true, fileURL: URL? = nil) {
+        self.keychain = keychain
+        self.fileURL = persistsToDisk ? (fileURL ?? Self.defaultFileURL()) : nil
+        loadFromDisk()
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Reads
+
+    func group(withID groupID: Data) -> BitchatGroup? {
+        groups.first { $0.groupID == groupID }
+    }
+
+    func group(for peerID: PeerID) -> BitchatGroup? {
+        guard let groupID = peerID.groupIDData else { return nil }
+        return group(withID: groupID)
+    }
+
+    /// Current-epoch symmetric key for the group, from the keychain.
+    func key(forGroupID groupID: Data) -> Data? {
+        keychain.getIdentityKey(forKey: Self.keychainKey(for: groupID))
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Mutations
+
+    /// Creates a new group with a random 16-byte ID and 32-byte key at
+    /// epoch 1, with the creator as sole member. Returns nil when key
+    /// generation or persistence fails.
+    func createGroup(named name: String, creator: GroupMember) -> BitchatGroup? {
+        guard let groupID = Self.randomBytes(BitchatGroup.groupIDLength),
+              let key = Self.randomBytes(BitchatGroup.keyLength) else { return nil }
+        let group = BitchatGroup(
+            groupID: groupID,
+            name: name,
+            epoch: 1,
+            members: [creator],
+            creatorFingerprint: creator.fingerprint
+        )
+        guard upsert(group, key: key) else { return nil }
+        return group
+    }
+
+    /// Inserts or replaces a group and its current key. Rejects rosters over
+    /// the hard cap or groups whose creator is missing from the roster.
+    @discardableResult
+    func upsert(_ group: BitchatGroup, key: Data) -> Bool {
+        guard group.groupID.count == BitchatGroup.groupIDLength,
+              key.count == BitchatGroup.keyLength,
+              !group.members.isEmpty,
+              group.members.count <= BitchatGroup.maxMembers,
+              group.creator != nil else { return false }
+        guard keychain.saveIdentityKey(key, forKey: Self.keychainKey(for: group.groupID)) else {
+            SecureLogger.error("Failed to store group key in keychain", category: .security)
+            return false
+        }
+        if let index = groups.firstIndex(where: { $0.groupID == group.groupID }) {
+            groups[index] = group
+        } else {
+            groups.append(group)
+        }
+        persist()
+        return true
+    }
+
+    /// Updates the roster of an existing group without changing key or epoch
+    /// (creator-side invite). Enforces the member cap.
+    @discardableResult
+    func updateRoster(groupID: Data, members: [GroupMember]) -> BitchatGroup? {
+        guard let index = groups.firstIndex(where: { $0.groupID == groupID }),
+              !members.isEmpty,
+              members.count <= BitchatGroup.maxMembers,
+              members.contains(where: { $0.fingerprint == groups[index].creatorFingerprint }) else { return nil }
+        groups[index].members = members
+        persist()
+        return groups[index]
+    }
+
+    /// Rotates the group key (creator-side removal/rotation): new random key,
+    /// epoch + 1, and the given roster. Returns the updated group and new key.
+    func rotateKey(groupID: Data, members: [GroupMember]) -> (group: BitchatGroup, key: Data)? {
+        guard let existing = group(withID: groupID),
+              let newKey = Self.randomBytes(BitchatGroup.keyLength) else { return nil }
+        var rotated = existing
+        rotated.epoch = existing.epoch &+ 1
+        rotated.members = members
+        guard upsert(rotated, key: newKey) else { return nil }
+        return (rotated, newKey)
+    }
+
+    func removeGroup(withID groupID: Data) {
+        groups.removeAll { $0.groupID == groupID }
+        _ = keychain.deleteIdentityKey(forKey: Self.keychainKey(for: groupID))
+        persist()
+    }
+
+    /// Panic wipe: drop all group keys and metadata from memory and disk.
+    /// (The panic flow also nukes the whole keychain; deleting per-group keys
+    /// here keeps the store safe to wipe on its own.)
+    func wipe() {
+        for group in groups {
+            _ = keychain.deleteIdentityKey(forKey: Self.keychainKey(for: group.groupID))
+        }
+        groups.removeAll()
+        if let fileURL {
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: fileURL)
+        }
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Internals
+
+    private static func keychainKey(for groupID: Data) -> String {
+        "groupKey-\(groupID.hexEncodedString())"
+    }
+
+    private static func randomBytes(_ count: Int) -> Data? {
+        var bytes = Data(count: count)
+        let status = bytes.withUnsafeMutableBytes { buffer -> OSStatus in
+            guard let baseAddress = buffer.baseAddress else { return errSecParam }
+            return SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, count, baseAddress)
+        }
+        return status == errSecSuccess ? bytes : nil
+    }
+
+    private func persist() {
+        guard let fileURL else { return }
+        do {
+            if groups.isEmpty {
+                try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: fileURL)
+                return
+            }
+            try FileManager.default.createDirectory(
+                at: fileURL.deletingLastPathComponent(),
+                withIntermediateDirectories: true
+            )
+            let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(groups)
+            var options: Data.WritingOptions = [.atomic]
+            #if os(iOS)
+            options.insert(.completeFileProtection)
+            #endif
+            try data.write(to: fileURL, options: options)
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error("Failed to persist group store: \(error)", category: .session)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func loadFromDisk() {
+        guard let fileURL,
+              let data = try? Data(contentsOf: fileURL),
+              let stored = try? JSONDecoder().decode([BitchatGroup].self, from: data) else {
+            return
+        }
+        // Only groups whose key survived in the keychain are usable.
+        groups = stored.filter { key(forGroupID: $0.groupID) != nil }
+    }
+
+    private static func defaultFileURL() -> URL? {
+        guard let base = try? FileManager.default.url(
+            for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
+            in: .userDomainMask,
+            appropriateFor: nil,
+            create: true
+        ) else { return nil }
+        return base
+            .appendingPathComponent("groups", isDirectory: true)
+            .appendingPathComponent("groups.json")
+    }
+}
diff --git a/bitchat/Services/Transport.swift b/bitchat/Services/Transport.swift
index 45aed91e..d6bdef33 100644
--- a/bitchat/Services/Transport.swift
+++ b/bitchat/Services/Transport.swift
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ enum TransportEvent: @unchecked Sendable {
     case messageReceived(BitchatMessage)
     case publicMessageReceived(peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?)
     case noisePayloadReceived(peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date)
+    /// Encrypted group broadcast (MessageType 0x25). Opaque here — the group
+    /// coordinator decrypts and authenticates against the roster.
+    case groupMessageReceived(payload: Data, timestamp: Date)
     case peerConnected(PeerID)
     case peerDisconnected(PeerID)
     case peerListUpdated([PeerID])
@@ -158,6 +161,12 @@ protocol Transport: AnyObject {
     // transport cannot courier (no connected courier, or unsupported).
     func sendCourierMessage(_ content: String, messageID: String, recipientNoiseKey: Data, via couriers: [PeerID]) -> Bool
 
+    // Private groups (mesh transports only): creator-signed state travels
+    // 1:1 over Noise sessions; group messages flood like public broadcasts.
+    func sendGroupInvite(_ statePayload: Data, to peerID: PeerID)
+    func sendGroupKeyUpdate(_ statePayload: Data, to peerID: PeerID)
+    func broadcastGroupMessage(_ envelope: Data)
+
     // Bulletin board (mesh transports only): broadcast a pre-signed board
     // payload (post or tombstone) so it spreads over relay and gossip sync.
     func sendBoardPayload(_ payload: Data)
@@ -214,6 +223,9 @@ extension Transport {
 
     func sendVerifyChallenge(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data) {}
     func sendVerifyResponse(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data) {}
+    func sendGroupInvite(_ statePayload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) {}
+    func sendGroupKeyUpdate(_ statePayload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) {}
+    func broadcastGroupMessage(_ envelope: Data) {}
     func peerCapabilities(_ peerID: PeerID) -> PeerCapabilities { [] }
     func sendVouchAttestations(_ payload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) {}
     func addPeerAuthenticatedObserver(_ handler: @escaping (PeerID, String) -> Void) {}
@@ -259,6 +271,8 @@ extension BitchatDelegate {
             )
         case let .noisePayloadReceived(peerID, type, payload, timestamp):
             didReceiveNoisePayload(from: peerID, type: type, payload: payload, timestamp: timestamp)
+        case let .groupMessageReceived(payload, timestamp):
+            didReceiveGroupMessage(payload: payload, timestamp: timestamp)
         case .peerConnected(let peerID):
             didConnectToPeer(peerID)
         case .peerDisconnected(let peerID):
diff --git a/bitchat/Sync/GossipSyncManager.swift b/bitchat/Sync/GossipSyncManager.swift
index b0d72e47..3dee21e0 100644
--- a/bitchat/Sync/GossipSyncManager.swift
+++ b/bitchat/Sync/GossipSyncManager.swift
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
         var stalePeerTimeoutSeconds: TimeInterval = 60.0
         var fragmentCapacity: Int = 600
         var fileTransferCapacity: Int = 200
+        var groupMessageCapacity: Int = 200
         var fragmentSyncIntervalSeconds: TimeInterval = 30.0
         var fileTransferSyncIntervalSeconds: TimeInterval = 60.0
         var messageSyncIntervalSeconds: TimeInterval = 15.0
@@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
     private var messages = PacketStore()
     private var fragments = PacketStore()
     private var fileTransfers = PacketStore()
+    private var groupMessages = PacketStore()
     private var latestAnnouncementByPeer: [PeerID: BitchatPacket] = [:]
     // Latest verified prekey bundle per owner. Unlike announces, bundles are
     // NOT dropped on leave/stale peer: their whole purpose is reaching a
@@ -131,7 +133,13 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
         )
         var schedules: [SyncSchedule] = []
         if config.seenCapacity > 0 && config.messageSyncIntervalSeconds > 0 {
-            schedules.append(SyncSchedule(types: .publicMessages, interval: config.messageSyncIntervalSeconds, lastSent: .distantPast))
+            // Group messages ride the public-message cadence; old clients
+            // ignore the extended bit and answer with announces/messages only.
+            var messageTypes: SyncTypeFlags = .publicMessages
+            if config.groupMessageCapacity > 0 {
+                messageTypes.formUnion(.groupMessage)
+            }
+            schedules.append(SyncSchedule(types: messageTypes, interval: config.messageSyncIntervalSeconds, lastSent: .distantPast))
         }
         if config.fragmentCapacity > 0 && config.fragmentSyncIntervalSeconds > 0 {
             schedules.append(SyncSchedule(types: .fragment, interval: config.fragmentSyncIntervalSeconds, lastSent: .distantPast))
@@ -175,6 +183,9 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
             guard let self = self else { return }
 
             var types: SyncTypeFlags = .publicMessages
+            if self.config.groupMessageCapacity > 0 {
+                types.formUnion(.groupMessage)
+            }
             if self.config.fragmentCapacity > 0 && self.config.fragmentSyncIntervalSeconds > 0 {
                 types.formUnion(.fragment)
             }
@@ -201,9 +212,11 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
     // messages get the long town-crier window; fragments, file transfers and
     // announces keep the short one.
     private func isPacketFresh(_ packet: BitchatPacket) -> Bool {
+        // Group messages share the whole-message window: members off the mesh
+        // for a while should backfill their crew's history like public chat.
         let maxAgeSeconds: TimeInterval
         switch packet.type {
-        case MessageType.message.rawValue:
+        case MessageType.message.rawValue, MessageType.groupMessage.rawValue:
             maxAgeSeconds = config.publicMessageMaxAgeSeconds
         case MessageType.prekeyBundle.rawValue:
             maxAgeSeconds = config.prekeyBundleMaxAgeSeconds
@@ -262,6 +275,13 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
             guard isPacketFresh(packet) else { return }
             let idHex = PacketIdUtil.computeId(packet).hexEncodedString()
             fileTransfers.insert(idHex: idHex, packet: packet, capacity: max(1, config.fileTransferCapacity))
+        case .groupMessage:
+            // Opaque ciphertext to non-members; carried and served like any
+            // other broadcast so members get backfill from any relay.
+            guard isBroadcastRecipient else { return }
+            guard isPacketFresh(packet) else { return }
+            let idHex = PacketIdUtil.computeId(packet).hexEncodedString()
+            groupMessages.insert(idHex: idHex, packet: packet, capacity: max(1, config.groupMessageCapacity))
         case .prekeyBundle:
             // Callers only feed verified bundles here (own bundles at send
             // time, peers' after signature verification), so gossip never
@@ -454,6 +474,19 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
             }
         }
 
+        if requestedTypes.contains(.groupMessage) {
+            let groupPkts = groupMessages.allPackets(isFresh: isPacketFresh)
+            for pkt in groupPkts {
+                if let since, pkt.timestamp < since { continue }
+                let idBytes = PacketIdUtil.computeId(pkt)
+                if !mightContain(idBytes) {
+                    var toSend = pkt
+                    toSend.ttl = 0
+                    toSend.isRSR = true // Mark as solicited response
+                    delegate?.sendPacket(to: peerID, packet: toSend)
+                }
+            }
+        }
         // Like announces, prekey bundles are exempt from the since-cursor:
         // there is at most one per owner (newer replaces older), so the
         // resend cost is bounded and a joining peer must be able to learn
@@ -505,6 +538,9 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
         if types.contains(.fileTransfer) {
             candidates.append(contentsOf: fileTransfers.allPackets(isFresh: isPacketFresh))
         }
+        if types.contains(.groupMessage) {
+            candidates.append(contentsOf: groupMessages.allPackets(isFresh: isPacketFresh))
+        }
         if types.contains(.prekeyBundle) {
             for (_, pair) in latestPrekeyBundleByPeer where isPacketFresh(pair.packet) {
                 candidates.append(pair.packet)
@@ -574,6 +610,7 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
         }
         fragments.removeExpired(isFresh: isPacketFresh)
         fileTransfers.removeExpired(isFresh: isPacketFresh)
+        groupMessages.removeExpired(isFresh: isPacketFresh)
         latestPrekeyBundleByPeer = latestPrekeyBundleByPeer.filter { _, pair in
             isPacketFresh(pair.packet)
         }
@@ -677,6 +714,7 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
         }
         fragments.remove { PeerID(hexData: $0.senderID) == peerID }
         fileTransfers.remove { PeerID(hexData: $0.senderID) == peerID }
+        groupMessages.remove { PeerID(hexData: $0.senderID) == peerID }
     }
 }
 
diff --git a/bitchat/Sync/SyncTypeFlags.swift b/bitchat/Sync/SyncTypeFlags.swift
index cb743ce1..3b4b0c82 100644
--- a/bitchat/Sync/SyncTypeFlags.swift
+++ b/bitchat/Sync/SyncTypeFlags.swift
@@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ struct SyncTypeFlags: OptionSet {
         case .requestSync: return 6
         case .fileTransfer: return 7
         case .boardPost: return 8
+        // Extended bits are compat-safe by construction: `toData()` encodes
+        // the bitfield little-endian with trailing zero bytes trimmed (bit 10
+        // widens the wire form from 1 to 2 bytes inside the length-prefixed
+        // REQUEST_SYNC TLV 0x04), and `decode(_:)` accepts 1...8 bytes while
+        // `type(forBit:)` maps unknown bits to nil — so old clients simply
+        // ignore the group bit and answer with the types they know.
+        case .groupMessage: return 10
         // Courier envelopes are directed deposits between trusted peers and
         // must never spread via gossip sync.
         case .courierEnvelope: return nil
@@ -70,6 +77,7 @@ struct SyncTypeFlags: OptionSet {
         // known type, so old clients ignore board rounds instead of choking.
         case 8: return .boardPost
         case 9: return .prekeyBundle
+        case 10: return .groupMessage
         default:
             return nil
         }
@@ -81,6 +89,7 @@ struct SyncTypeFlags: OptionSet {
     static let fileTransfer = SyncTypeFlags(messageTypes: [.fileTransfer])
     static let board = SyncTypeFlags(messageTypes: [.boardPost])
     static let prekeyBundle = SyncTypeFlags(messageTypes: [.prekeyBundle])
+    static let groupMessage = SyncTypeFlags(messageTypes: [.groupMessage])
 
     static let publicMessages = SyncTypeFlags(messageTypes: [.announce, .message])
 
diff --git a/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatGroupCoordinator.swift b/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatGroupCoordinator.swift
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a83cb024
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatGroupCoordinator.swift
@@ -0,0 +1,602 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import BitLogger
+import Foundation
+
+/// The narrow surface `ChatGroupCoordinator` needs from its owner.
+///
+/// Follows the `ChatDeliveryContext` exemplar: the coordinator depends on the
+/// minimal context it actually uses instead of holding an `unowned` back-ref
+/// to the whole `ChatViewModel`. Group chats are keyed like direct chats
+/// (virtual "group_" peer IDs), so the conversation intents below reuse the
+/// private-chat store operations.
+@MainActor
+protocol ChatGroupContext: AnyObject {
+    // MARK: Identity & state
+    var nickname: String { get }
+    var myPeerID: PeerID { get }
+    var selectedPrivateChatPeer: PeerID? { get }
+    var groupStore: GroupStore { get }
+
+    /// Fingerprint of our own Noise static identity key.
+    func myNoiseFingerprint() -> String
+    /// Our Ed25519 signing public key.
+    func mySigningPublicKey() -> Data
+    /// Signs `data` with our Noise signing key.
+    func signWithNoiseKey(_ data: Data) -> Data?
+
+    // MARK: Peers
+    func getPeerIDForNickname(_ nickname: String) -> PeerID?
+    func isPeerConnected(_ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool
+    func peerNickname(for peerID: PeerID) -> String?
+    /// The peer's Noise fingerprint from the live session/registry.
+    func meshFingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) -> String?
+    /// The peer's persisted crypto identity (fingerprint + signing key), if
+    /// the identity store has a signature-verified announce for them.
+    func cryptoIdentity(for peerID: PeerID) -> (fingerprint: String, signingKey: Data)?
+    /// The connected short peer ID whose fingerprint matches, if any.
+    func connectedPeerID(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> PeerID?
+    /// Whether the user has blocked the identity with this Noise fingerprint.
+    func isFingerprintBlocked(_ fingerprint: String) -> Bool
+
+    // MARK: Transport
+    func sendGroupInvitePayload(_ payload: Data, to peerID: PeerID)
+    func sendGroupKeyUpdatePayload(_ payload: Data, to peerID: PeerID)
+    func broadcastGroupMessagePayload(_ payload: Data)
+
+    // MARK: Conversation intents (group chats are direct-keyed)
+    @discardableResult
+    func appendPrivateMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage, to peerID: PeerID) -> Bool
+    func markPrivateChatUnread(_ peerID: PeerID)
+    func removePrivateChat(_ peerID: PeerID)
+    func startPrivateChat(with peerID: PeerID)
+    func endPrivateChat()
+    func addSystemMessage(_ content: String)
+    func addLocalPrivateSystemMessage(_ content: String, to peerID: PeerID)
+    func notifyUIChanged()
+    func notifyPrivateMessage(from senderName: String, message: String, peerID: PeerID)
+}
+
+extension ChatViewModel: ChatGroupContext {
+    // `nickname`, `myPeerID`, `selectedPrivateChatPeer`, `groupStore`,
+    // `getPeerIDForNickname(_:)`, `isPeerConnected(_:)`, `peerNickname(for:)`,
+    // `appendPrivateMessage(_:to:)`, `markPrivateChatUnread(_:)`,
+    // `removePrivateChat(_:)`, `startPrivateChat(with:)`,
+    // `addSystemMessage(_:)`, `addLocalPrivateSystemMessage(_:to:)`,
+    // `notifyUIChanged()`, and `notifyPrivateMessage(from:message:peerID:)`
+    // are shared requirements with the other contexts or satisfied by
+    // existing `ChatViewModel` members. The members below flatten nested
+    // service accesses into intent-named calls.
+
+    func myNoiseFingerprint() -> String {
+        meshService.noiseIdentityFingerprint()
+    }
+
+    func mySigningPublicKey() -> Data {
+        meshService.noiseSigningPublicKeyData()
+    }
+
+    func signWithNoiseKey(_ data: Data) -> Data? {
+        meshService.noiseSignData(data)
+    }
+
+    func meshFingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) -> String? {
+        meshService.getFingerprint(for: peerID)
+    }
+
+    /// The persisted, signature-verified identity behind a short mesh peer
+    /// ID. Cross-checked against the live session fingerprint so a roster
+    /// entry can never be pinned to a signing key from a different identity.
+    func cryptoIdentity(for peerID: PeerID) -> (fingerprint: String, signingKey: Data)? {
+        guard let fingerprint = meshService.getFingerprint(for: peerID) else { return nil }
+        let candidates = identityManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID)
+        guard let identity = candidates.first(where: { $0.fingerprint == fingerprint }),
+              let signingKey = identity.signingPublicKey else { return nil }
+        return (fingerprint, signingKey)
+    }
+
+    /// Short mesh peer IDs are the fingerprint's first 16 hex chars, so the
+    /// connected peer for a roster fingerprint is a direct derivation.
+    func connectedPeerID(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> PeerID? {
+        let shortID = PeerID(str: String(fingerprint.prefix(16)))
+        return meshService.isPeerConnected(shortID) ? shortID : nil
+    }
+
+    func isFingerprintBlocked(_ fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
+        identityManager.isBlocked(fingerprint: fingerprint)
+    }
+
+    func sendGroupInvitePayload(_ payload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) {
+        meshService.sendGroupInvite(payload, to: peerID)
+    }
+
+    func sendGroupKeyUpdatePayload(_ payload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) {
+        meshService.sendGroupKeyUpdate(payload, to: peerID)
+    }
+
+    func broadcastGroupMessagePayload(_ payload: Data) {
+        meshService.broadcastGroupMessage(payload)
+    }
+
+    // MARK: CommandContextProvider group commands (parsed by CommandProcessor)
+
+    func groupCreate(named name: String) -> CommandResult {
+        groupCoordinator.createGroup(named: name)
+    }
+
+    func groupInvite(nickname: String) -> CommandResult {
+        groupCoordinator.inviteMember(nickname: nickname)
+    }
+
+    func groupRemove(nickname: String) -> CommandResult {
+        groupCoordinator.removeMember(nickname: nickname)
+    }
+
+    func groupLeave() -> CommandResult {
+        groupCoordinator.leaveGroup()
+    }
+
+    func groupList() -> CommandResult {
+        groupCoordinator.listGroups()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Owns the private-groups feature: creating groups, creator-managed invites
+/// and key rotation over Noise, and sealing/opening group message broadcasts.
+/// Delivery is fire-and-flood like public chat — no per-member acks in v1 —
+/// with gossip-sync backfill as the only offline catch-up.
+@MainActor
+final class ChatGroupCoordinator {
+    private unowned let context: any ChatGroupContext
+
+    private static let maxGroupNameLength = 40
+
+    init(context: any ChatGroupContext) {
+        self.context = context
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Commands
+
+    func createGroup(named rawName: String) -> CommandResult {
+        let name = rawName.trimmed
+        guard !name.isEmpty else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.usage_create", comment: "Usage hint for /group create"))
+        }
+        guard name.count <= Self.maxGroupNameLength else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.name_too_long", comment: "Error when a group name exceeds the length cap"))
+        }
+
+        let myFingerprint = context.myNoiseFingerprint()
+        let mySigningKey = context.mySigningPublicKey()
+        guard !myFingerprint.isEmpty, mySigningKey.count == 32 else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.identity_unavailable", comment: "Error when the local identity is not ready for group operations"))
+        }
+
+        let creator = GroupMember(fingerprint: myFingerprint, signingKey: mySigningKey, nickname: context.nickname)
+        guard let group = context.groupStore.createGroup(named: name, creator: creator) else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.create_failed", comment: "Error when group creation fails"))
+        }
+
+        context.startPrivateChat(with: group.peerID)
+        return .success(message: String(
+            format: String(localized: "system.group.created", comment: "System message after creating a group; placeholder is the group name"),
+            locale: .current,
+            name
+        ))
+    }
+
+    func inviteMember(nickname rawNickname: String) -> CommandResult {
+        let nickname = normalizedNickname(rawNickname)
+        guard !nickname.isEmpty else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.usage_invite", comment: "Usage hint for /group invite"))
+        }
+        guard let group = selectedGroup() else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.not_in_group", comment: "Error when a group command requires an open group chat"))
+        }
+        guard group.creatorFingerprint == context.myNoiseFingerprint() else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.creator_only", comment: "Error when a non-creator attempts a creator-only group action"))
+        }
+        guard let peerID = context.getPeerIDForNickname(nickname) else {
+            return .error(message: String(
+                format: String(localized: "system.group.peer_not_found", comment: "Error when the invitee nickname is unknown; placeholder is the nickname"),
+                locale: .current,
+                nickname
+            ))
+        }
+        guard context.isPeerConnected(peerID) else {
+            return .error(message: String(
+                format: String(localized: "system.group.peer_not_connected", comment: "Error when the invitee is not connected over mesh; placeholder is the nickname"),
+                locale: .current,
+                nickname
+            ))
+        }
+        guard let identity = context.cryptoIdentity(for: peerID) else {
+            return .error(message: String(
+                format: String(localized: "system.group.peer_identity_unknown", comment: "Error when the invitee's verified identity is unavailable; placeholder is the nickname"),
+                locale: .current,
+                nickname
+            ))
+        }
+        guard !group.isMember(fingerprint: identity.fingerprint) else {
+            return .error(message: String(
+                format: String(localized: "system.group.already_member", comment: "Error when the invitee is already a member; placeholder is the nickname"),
+                locale: .current,
+                nickname
+            ))
+        }
+        guard group.members.count < BitchatGroup.maxMembers else {
+            return .error(message: String(
+                format: String(localized: "system.group.full", comment: "Error when the group is at the member cap; placeholder is the cap"),
+                locale: .current,
+                "\(BitchatGroup.maxMembers)"
+            ))
+        }
+
+        let newMember = GroupMember(
+            fingerprint: identity.fingerprint,
+            signingKey: identity.signingKey,
+            nickname: context.peerNickname(for: peerID) ?? nickname
+        )
+        // Rotate the key (epoch + 1) on every roster change, not just removals.
+        // A monotonically increasing epoch per roster gives the receiver a
+        // strict ordering: two out-of-order invite states can no longer share
+        // an epoch and last-writer-wins a just-added member back out.
+        let members = group.members + [newMember]
+        guard let (updated, key) = context.groupStore.rotateKey(groupID: group.groupID, members: members),
+              let payload = signedStatePayload(for: updated, key: key) else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.invite_failed", comment: "Error when building or signing a group invite fails"))
+        }
+
+        context.sendGroupInvitePayload(payload, to: peerID)
+        distributeState(payload, group: updated, excluding: [identity.fingerprint], type: .keyUpdate)
+
+        return .success(message: String(
+            format: String(localized: "system.group.invited", comment: "System message after inviting someone; placeholders are the nickname and the group name"),
+            locale: .current,
+            nickname,
+            updated.name
+        ))
+    }
+
+    /// Creator-side removal: rotates the group key (epoch + 1) and sends the
+    /// new state to every remaining member so the removed member's key stops
+    /// decrypting future traffic.
+    func removeMember(nickname rawNickname: String) -> CommandResult {
+        let nickname = normalizedNickname(rawNickname)
+        guard !nickname.isEmpty else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.usage_remove", comment: "Usage hint for /group remove"))
+        }
+        guard let group = selectedGroup() else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.not_in_group", comment: "Error when a group command requires an open group chat"))
+        }
+        guard group.creatorFingerprint == context.myNoiseFingerprint() else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.creator_only", comment: "Error when a non-creator attempts a creator-only group action"))
+        }
+        guard let member = group.members.first(where: { $0.nickname.caseInsensitiveCompare(nickname) == .orderedSame }) else {
+            return .error(message: String(
+                format: String(localized: "system.group.member_not_found", comment: "Error when the member to remove is not in the roster; placeholder is the nickname"),
+                locale: .current,
+                nickname
+            ))
+        }
+        guard member.fingerprint != group.creatorFingerprint else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.cannot_remove_creator", comment: "Error when the creator tries to remove themselves"))
+        }
+
+        let remaining = group.members.filter { $0.fingerprint != member.fingerprint }
+        guard let (rotated, newKey) = context.groupStore.rotateKey(groupID: group.groupID, members: remaining),
+              let payload = signedStatePayload(for: rotated, key: newKey) else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.rotate_failed", comment: "Error when rotating the group key fails"))
+        }
+
+        distributeState(payload, group: rotated, excluding: [], type: .keyUpdate)
+        notifyRemovedMember(member, rotated: rotated)
+
+        return .success(message: String(
+            format: String(localized: "system.group.removed_member", comment: "System message after removing a member and rotating the key; placeholder is the nickname"),
+            locale: .current,
+            member.nickname
+        ))
+    }
+
+    func leaveGroup() -> CommandResult {
+        guard let group = selectedGroup() else {
+            return .error(message: String(localized: "system.group.not_in_group", comment: "Error when a group command requires an open group chat"))
+        }
+        // Close the chat window first so the confirmation message doesn't
+        // resurrect the conversation we're about to remove.
+        context.endPrivateChat()
+        context.removePrivateChat(group.peerID)
+        context.groupStore.removeGroup(withID: group.groupID)
+        context.notifyUIChanged()
+        return .success(message: String(
+            format: String(localized: "system.group.left", comment: "System message after leaving a group; placeholder is the group name"),
+            locale: .current,
+            group.name
+        ))
+    }
+
+    func listGroups() -> CommandResult {
+        let groups = context.groupStore.groups
+        guard !groups.isEmpty else {
+            return .success(message: String(localized: "system.group.none", comment: "System message when the user is in no groups"))
+        }
+        let myFingerprint = context.myNoiseFingerprint()
+        let lines = groups.map { group -> String in
+            let role = group.creatorFingerprint == myFingerprint ? " (creator)" : ""
+            return "#\(group.name)\(role) — \(group.members.count)/\(BitchatGroup.maxMembers)"
+        }
+        return .success(message: String(localized: "system.group.list_header", comment: "Header line for the /group list output") + "\n" + lines.joined(separator: "\n"))
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Sending
+
+    /// Fire-and-flood send: local echo goes straight to `.sent` because group
+    /// messages have no per-member acknowledgments in v1.
+    func sendGroupMessage(_ content: String, to groupPeerID: PeerID) {
+        guard !content.isEmpty, content.count <= InputValidator.Limits.maxMessageLength else { return }
+        guard let group = context.groupStore.group(for: groupPeerID),
+              let key = context.groupStore.key(forGroupID: group.groupID) else {
+            context.addSystemMessage(String(localized: "system.group.unknown", comment: "System message when sending into an unknown group"))
+            return
+        }
+
+        let messageID = UUID().uuidString
+        let timestamp = Date()
+        let payload: Data
+        do {
+            payload = try GroupCrypto.sealMessage(
+                content: content,
+                messageID: messageID,
+                senderNickname: context.nickname,
+                senderSigningKey: context.mySigningPublicKey(),
+                timestampMs: UInt64(timestamp.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
+                groupID: group.groupID,
+                epoch: group.epoch,
+                key: key,
+                sign: { [weak context] data in context?.signWithNoiseKey(data) }
+            )
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error("Failed to seal group message: \(error)", category: .encryption)
+            context.addLocalPrivateSystemMessage(
+                String(localized: "system.group.send_failed", comment: "System message when sealing a group message fails"),
+                to: groupPeerID
+            )
+            return
+        }
+
+        let message = BitchatMessage(
+            id: messageID,
+            sender: context.nickname,
+            content: content,
+            timestamp: timestamp,
+            isRelay: false,
+            originalSender: nil,
+            isPrivate: true,
+            recipientNickname: group.name,
+            senderPeerID: context.myPeerID,
+            mentions: nil,
+            deliveryStatus: .sent
+        )
+        context.appendPrivateMessage(message, to: groupPeerID)
+        context.broadcastGroupMessagePayload(payload)
+        context.notifyUIChanged()
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Receiving
+
+    /// Decrypt-verify path for an incoming 0x25 broadcast. Drops silently for
+    /// unknown groups (non-members relay but never read), wrong epochs, bad
+    /// sender signatures, and senders missing from the pinned roster.
+    func handleGroupMessagePayload(_ payload: Data, timestamp: Date) {
+        guard let envelope = GroupMessageEnvelope.decode(payload) else { return }
+        guard let group = context.groupStore.group(withID: envelope.groupID) else { return }
+        guard envelope.epoch == group.epoch else {
+            SecureLogger.debug("Dropping group message with epoch \(envelope.epoch) (current \(group.epoch))", category: .encryption)
+            return
+        }
+        guard let key = context.groupStore.key(forGroupID: group.groupID) else { return }
+
+        let plaintext: GroupMessagePlaintext
+        do {
+            plaintext = try GroupCrypto.openMessage(envelope, key: key)
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.debug("Failed to open group message: \(error)", category: .encryption)
+            return
+        }
+
+        // Sender must be pinned in the creator-signed roster; key possession
+        // alone is not authorship.
+        guard let member = group.member(withSigningKey: plaintext.senderSigningKey) else {
+            SecureLogger.warning("Dropping group message from non-roster sender", category: .security)
+            return
+        }
+        // Our own broadcast echoed back via relay or sync replay.
+        guard plaintext.senderSigningKey != context.mySigningPublicKey() else { return }
+        // Honor /block inside groups too: drop display + notification for a
+        // blocked member, consistent with every other inbound path.
+        guard !context.isFingerprintBlocked(member.fingerprint) else {
+            SecureLogger.debug("Dropping group message from blocked member", category: .security)
+            return
+        }
+
+        let groupPeerID = group.peerID
+        // Trust the authenticated inner timestamp (clamped so a future-dated
+        // message cannot pin itself to the bottom of the timeline).
+        let messageDate = min(Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(plaintext.timestampMs) / 1000), Date())
+        let senderName = member.nickname.isEmpty ? plaintext.senderNickname : member.nickname
+        let senderPeerID = PeerID(str: String(member.fingerprint.prefix(16)))
+        let message = BitchatMessage(
+            id: plaintext.messageID,
+            sender: senderName,
+            content: plaintext.content,
+            timestamp: messageDate,
+            isRelay: false,
+            originalSender: nil,
+            isPrivate: true,
+            recipientNickname: group.name,
+            senderPeerID: senderPeerID,
+            mentions: nil
+        )
+
+        guard context.appendPrivateMessage(message, to: groupPeerID) else { return }
+
+        let isViewing = context.selectedPrivateChatPeer == groupPeerID
+        if !isViewing {
+            context.markPrivateChatUnread(groupPeerID)
+            let isRecent = Date().timeIntervalSince(messageDate) < 30
+            if isRecent {
+                context.notifyPrivateMessage(
+                    from: "\(senderName) @ \(group.name)",
+                    message: plaintext.content,
+                    peerID: groupPeerID
+                )
+            }
+        }
+        context.notifyUIChanged()
+    }
+
+    /// Accepts creator-signed group state arriving as an invite. The Noise
+    /// session peer must BE the creator, the signature must verify against
+    /// the creator key pinned in the roster, and we must be in the roster.
+    func handleGroupInvitePayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data) {
+        applyGroupState(from: peerID, payload: payload, isInvite: true)
+    }
+
+    /// Accepts creator-signed state updates (rotation/roster). A state whose
+    /// roster no longer includes us means we were removed: drop the group.
+    func handleGroupKeyUpdatePayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data) {
+        applyGroupState(from: peerID, payload: payload, isInvite: false)
+    }
+}
+
+private extension ChatGroupCoordinator {
+    enum StateSendType {
+        case invite
+        case keyUpdate
+    }
+
+    func normalizedNickname(_ raw: String) -> String {
+        let trimmed = raw.trimmed
+        return trimmed.hasPrefix("@") ? String(trimmed.dropFirst()) : trimmed
+    }
+
+    func selectedGroup() -> BitchatGroup? {
+        guard let selected = context.selectedPrivateChatPeer, selected.isGroup else { return nil }
+        return context.groupStore.group(for: selected)
+    }
+
+    func signedStatePayload(for group: BitchatGroup, key: Data) -> Data? {
+        GroupStatePayload.makeSigned(group: group, key: key) { [weak context] data in
+            context?.signWithNoiseKey(data)
+        }?.encode()
+    }
+
+    /// Sends the state payload to every connected roster member except us and
+    /// the excluded fingerprints. Offline members catch up the next time the
+    /// creator sends them state (v1 limitation, documented in the PR).
+    func distributeState(_ payload: Data, group: BitchatGroup, excluding excludedFingerprints: Set<String>, type: StateSendType) {
+        let myFingerprint = context.myNoiseFingerprint()
+        for member in group.members {
+            guard member.fingerprint != myFingerprint,
+                  !excludedFingerprints.contains(member.fingerprint),
+                  let peerID = context.connectedPeerID(forFingerprint: member.fingerprint) else { continue }
+            switch type {
+            case .invite:
+                context.sendGroupInvitePayload(payload, to: peerID)
+            case .keyUpdate:
+                context.sendGroupKeyUpdatePayload(payload, to: peerID)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Tells a just-removed member they're out so their client can deactivate
+    /// the group instead of silently going dark (dropping every message under
+    /// the epoch it no longer has the key for). The notice is a creator-signed
+    /// state whose roster excludes the removee — their `applyGroupState`
+    /// removal branch fires on the missing-self roster and surfaces the
+    /// "removed from group" system message.
+    ///
+    /// It carries a throwaway all-zero key, never the rotated key, so the
+    /// removee cannot decrypt post-removal traffic. State is sent 1:1 over
+    /// authenticated Noise, so no remaining member ever receives this blob
+    /// (and even if one did, its own missing-self check would not match).
+    /// If the removee is offline the notice can't be delivered — same v1
+    /// limitation as any other missed key update, documented in the PR.
+    func notifyRemovedMember(_ removed: GroupMember, rotated: BitchatGroup) {
+        guard let peerID = context.connectedPeerID(forFingerprint: removed.fingerprint) else { return }
+        let throwawayKey = Data(count: BitchatGroup.keyLength)
+        guard let payload = signedStatePayload(for: rotated, key: throwawayKey) else { return }
+        context.sendGroupKeyUpdatePayload(payload, to: peerID)
+    }
+
+    func applyGroupState(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data, isInvite: Bool) {
+        guard let state = GroupStatePayload.decode(payload) else {
+            SecureLogger.warning("Malformed group state payload from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .security)
+            return
+        }
+        // The Noise session already authenticated `peerID`; require that the
+        // authenticated peer IS the creator whose key signed the state, so a
+        // member can't re-invite or rotate on the creator's behalf.
+        guard let senderFingerprint = context.meshFingerprint(for: peerID),
+              senderFingerprint == state.creatorFingerprint else {
+            SecureLogger.warning("Dropping group state from non-creator \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .security)
+            return
+        }
+        guard state.verifyCreatorSignature() else {
+            SecureLogger.warning("Dropping group state with invalid creator signature", category: .security)
+            return
+        }
+
+        let myFingerprint = context.myNoiseFingerprint()
+        let existing = context.groupStore.group(withID: state.groupID)
+
+        // A creator-signed roster that no longer includes us is a removal.
+        guard state.members.contains(where: { $0.fingerprint == myFingerprint }) else {
+            if let existing {
+                if context.selectedPrivateChatPeer == existing.peerID {
+                    context.endPrivateChat()
+                }
+                context.removePrivateChat(existing.peerID)
+                context.groupStore.removeGroup(withID: existing.groupID)
+                context.addSystemMessage(String(
+                    format: String(localized: "system.group.removed_from", comment: "System message when removed from a group; placeholder is the group name"),
+                    locale: .current,
+                    existing.name
+                ))
+                context.notifyUIChanged()
+            }
+            return
+        }
+
+        // Never regress the epoch: state travels over live Noise sessions,
+        // so an older epoch here is a stale (or misbehaving) creator device.
+        if let existing, state.epoch < existing.epoch {
+            SecureLogger.warning("Dropping stale group state (epoch \(state.epoch) < \(existing.epoch))", category: .security)
+            return
+        }
+
+        let isNewMembership = existing == nil
+        guard context.groupStore.upsert(state.asGroup, key: state.key) else {
+            SecureLogger.error("Failed to store group state for \(state.name)", category: .session)
+            return
+        }
+
+        if isNewMembership {
+            let inviter = state.members.first { $0.fingerprint == state.creatorFingerprint }?.nickname
+                ?? context.peerNickname(for: peerID)
+                ?? "?"
+            let notice = String(
+                format: String(localized: "system.group.joined", comment: "System message when added to a group; placeholders are the group name and the inviter"),
+                locale: .current,
+                state.name,
+                inviter
+            )
+            context.addSystemMessage(notice)
+            context.markPrivateChatUnread(state.asGroup.peerID)
+            context.notifyPrivateMessage(from: inviter, message: notice, peerID: state.asGroup.peerID)
+        } else if isInvite == false, let existing, state.epoch > existing.epoch {
+            SecureLogger.info("Group '\(state.name)' rotated to epoch \(state.epoch)", category: .session)
+        }
+        context.notifyUIChanged()
+    }
+}
diff --git a/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatLifecycleCoordinator.swift b/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatLifecycleCoordinator.swift
index 60c199f6..1241f71b 100644
--- a/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatLifecycleCoordinator.swift
+++ b/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatLifecycleCoordinator.swift
@@ -185,6 +185,13 @@ final class ChatLifecycleCoordinator {
     func markPrivateMessagesAsRead(from peerID: PeerID) {
         context.markChatAsRead(from: peerID)
 
+        // Group chats are keyed under a virtual group_ peerID; no member IS the
+        // conversation peer, so the receipt loops below (which gate on
+        // senderPeerID == peerID) must never emit a read/delivered receipt for
+        // one. This guard makes that explicit so a future refactor of the
+        // receipt matching can't silently start leaking receipts into groups.
+        guard !peerID.isGroup else { return }
+
         if peerID.isGeoDM,
            let recipientHex = context.nostrKeyMapping[peerID],
            case .location(let channel) = context.activeChannel,
diff --git a/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatPeerIdentityCoordinator.swift b/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatPeerIdentityCoordinator.swift
index 46e0787a..30d566b8 100644
--- a/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatPeerIdentityCoordinator.swift
+++ b/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatPeerIdentityCoordinator.swift
@@ -323,6 +323,15 @@ final class ChatPeerIdentityCoordinator {
     func startPrivateChat(with peerID: PeerID) {
         guard peerID != context.myPeerID else { return }
 
+        // Group chats are virtual conversations: no peer identity, favorites,
+        // handshake, or message consolidation applies — just select the chat.
+        if peerID.isGroup {
+            context.selectedPrivateChatFingerprint = nil
+            context.beginPrivateChatSession(with: peerID)
+            context.markPrivateChatRead(peerID)
+            return
+        }
+
         let peerNickname = context.peerNickname(for: peerID) ?? "unknown"
 
         if context.unifiedIsBlocked(peerID) {
diff --git a/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatTransportEventCoordinator.swift b/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatTransportEventCoordinator.swift
index a24273d7..34b1653c 100644
--- a/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatTransportEventCoordinator.swift
+++ b/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatTransportEventCoordinator.swift
@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ protocol ChatTransportEventContext: AnyObject {
     // MARK: Verification payloads
     func handleVerifyChallengePayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data)
     func handleVerifyResponsePayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data)
+
+    // MARK: Group payloads (creator-signed state over Noise)
+    func handleGroupInvitePayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data)
+    func handleGroupKeyUpdatePayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data)
     func handleVouchPayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data)
 }
 
@@ -131,6 +135,14 @@ extension ChatViewModel: ChatTransportEventContext {
         verificationCoordinator.handleVerifyResponsePayload(from: peerID, payload: payload)
     }
 
+    func handleGroupInvitePayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data) {
+        groupCoordinator.handleGroupInvitePayload(from: peerID, payload: payload)
+    }
+
+    func handleGroupKeyUpdatePayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data) {
+        groupCoordinator.handleGroupKeyUpdatePayload(from: peerID, payload: payload)
+    }
+
     func handleVouchPayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data) {
         vouchCoordinator.handleVouchPayload(from: peerID, payload: payload)
     }
@@ -377,6 +389,12 @@ private extension ChatTransportEventCoordinator {
         case .verifyResponse:
             context.handleVerifyResponsePayload(from: peerID, payload: payload)
 
+        case .groupInvite:
+            context.handleGroupInvitePayload(from: peerID, payload: payload)
+
+        case .groupKeyUpdate:
+            context.handleGroupKeyUpdatePayload(from: peerID, payload: payload)
+
         case .vouch:
             context.handleVouchPayload(from: peerID, payload: payload)
         }
diff --git a/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatViewModel.swift b/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatViewModel.swift
index 21e250f2..c0c0d8b1 100644
--- a/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatViewModel.swift
+++ b/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatViewModel.swift
@@ -102,7 +102,9 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
     @MainActor
     var canSendMediaInCurrentContext: Bool {
         if let peer = selectedPrivateChatPeer {
-            return !(peer.isGeoDM || peer.isGeoChat)
+            // Media transfer is not wired for groups in v1 (sendFilePrivate
+            // rejects the virtual group_ recipient), so keep the affordance off.
+            return !(peer.isGeoDM || peer.isGeoChat || peer.isGroup)
         }
         switch activeChannel {
         case .mesh: return true
@@ -177,6 +179,7 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
     lazy var nostrCoordinator = ChatNostrCoordinator(context: self)
     lazy var mediaTransferCoordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: self)
     lazy var verificationCoordinator = ChatVerificationCoordinator(context: self)
+    lazy var groupCoordinator = ChatGroupCoordinator(context: self)
     lazy var vouchCoordinator = ChatVouchCoordinator(context: self)
 
     // Computed properties for compatibility
@@ -306,6 +309,8 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
     var nostrRelayManager: NostrRelayManager?
     private let userDefaults = UserDefaults.standard
     let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
+    /// Private group membership: keys in the keychain, metadata on disk.
+    let groupStore: GroupStore
     private let nicknameKey = "bitchat.nickname"
     // Location channel state (macOS supports manual geohash selection)
     var activeChannel: ChannelID {
@@ -813,6 +818,7 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
         )
 
         self.keychain = keychain
+        self.groupStore = GroupStore(keychain: keychain)
         self.idBridge = idBridge
         self.identityManager = identityManager
         self.conversations = conversations
@@ -1209,6 +1215,8 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
         GossipMessageArchive.wipeDefault()
         StoreAndForwardMetrics.shared.reset()
 
+        // Drop private group keys and rosters (keychain + disk)
+        groupStore.wipe()
         // Drop cached peers' prekey bundles (who we could write to is
         // metadata too). Our own prekey privates are keychain-backed and go
         // with deleteAllKeychainData above plus the identity reset below.
@@ -1609,6 +1617,12 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
         )
     }
 
+    func didReceiveGroupMessage(payload: Data, timestamp: Date) {
+        Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
+            self?.groupCoordinator.handleGroupMessagePayload(payload, timestamp: timestamp)
+        }
+    }
+
     // MARK: - QR Verification API
     @MainActor
     func beginQRVerification(with qr: VerificationService.VerificationQR) -> Bool {
diff --git a/bitchat/ViewModels/Extensions/ChatViewModel+PrivateChat.swift b/bitchat/ViewModels/Extensions/ChatViewModel+PrivateChat.swift
index af8d06aa..939adf6a 100644
--- a/bitchat/ViewModels/Extensions/ChatViewModel+PrivateChat.swift
+++ b/bitchat/ViewModels/Extensions/ChatViewModel+PrivateChat.swift
@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
 
     @MainActor
     func sendPrivateMessage(_ content: String, to peerID: PeerID) {
+        // Group chats reuse the private-chat surface but broadcast a sealed
+        // envelope instead of routing to a single peer.
+        if peerID.isGroup {
+            groupCoordinator.sendGroupMessage(content, to: peerID)
+            return
+        }
         privateConversationCoordinator.sendPrivateMessage(content, to: peerID)
     }
 
diff --git a/bitchat/ViewModels/NostrInboundPipeline.swift b/bitchat/ViewModels/NostrInboundPipeline.swift
index c5bd6525..be50a687 100644
--- a/bitchat/ViewModels/NostrInboundPipeline.swift
+++ b/bitchat/ViewModels/NostrInboundPipeline.swift
@@ -303,7 +303,9 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
             context.handleDelivered(noisePayload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey)
         case .readReceipt:
             context.handleReadReceipt(noisePayload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey)
-        case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse, .vouch:
+        // Group state travels only over mesh Noise sessions in v1; anything
+        // claiming to be group traffic over Nostr is ignored.
+        case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse, .groupInvite, .groupKeyUpdate, .vouch:
             break
         }
     }
@@ -355,7 +357,9 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
             context.handleDelivered(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey)
         case .readReceipt:
             context.handleReadReceipt(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey)
-        case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse, .vouch:
+        // Group state travels only over mesh Noise sessions in v1; anything
+        // claiming to be group traffic over Nostr is ignored.
+        case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse, .groupInvite, .groupKeyUpdate, .vouch:
             break
         }
     }
@@ -434,7 +438,9 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
                             context.handleDelivered(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: targetPeerID)
                         case .readReceipt:
                             context.handleReadReceipt(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: targetPeerID)
-                        case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse, .vouch:
+                        // Group state travels only over mesh Noise sessions
+                        // in v1; group traffic over Nostr is ignored.
+                        case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse, .groupInvite, .groupKeyUpdate, .vouch:
                             break
                         }
                     }
diff --git a/bitchat/Views/ContentSheetViews.swift b/bitchat/Views/ContentSheetViews.swift
index dd72d8b6..4d9d5c5b 100644
--- a/bitchat/Views/ContentSheetViews.swift
+++ b/bitchat/Views/ContentSheetViews.swift
@@ -221,6 +221,13 @@ private struct ContentPeopleListView: View {
                             }
                         )
                     } else {
+                        GroupChatList(
+                            groups: peerListModel.groupRows,
+                            onTapGroup: { peerID in
+                                peerListModel.startConversation(with: peerID)
+                                showSidebar = true
+                            }
+                        )
                         MeshPeerList(
                             onTapPeer: { peerID in
                                 peerListModel.startConversation(with: peerID)
@@ -455,6 +462,10 @@ private struct ContentPrivateChatSheetView: View {
     }
 
     private var privacyCaptionText: String {
+        // Group chats are ChaCha20-Poly1305 sealed to the roster's shared key.
+        if privateConversationModel.selectedPeerID?.isGroup == true {
+            return String(localized: "content.private.caption_group", comment: "Caption above the group chat composer noting messages are encrypted to group members")
+        }
         // Geohash DMs are NIP-17 gift-wrapped — always end-to-end encrypted,
         // even though they carry no Noise session status. Mesh DMs earn the
         // "encrypted" claim only once the Noise handshake has secured.
@@ -503,30 +514,39 @@ private struct ContentPrivateHeaderInfoButton: View {
 
     var body: some View {
         Button(action: {
+            // A group has no single fingerprint to show.
+            guard !headerState.isGroupConversation else { return }
             appChromeModel.showFingerprint(for: headerState.headerPeerID)
         }) {
             HStack(spacing: 6) {
-                switch headerState.availability {
-                case .bluetoothConnected:
-                    Image(systemName: "dot.radiowaves.left.and.right")
+                if headerState.isGroupConversation {
+                    Image(systemName: "person.3.fill")
                         .font(.bitchatSystem(size: 14))
                         .foregroundColor(palette.primary)
-                        .accessibilityLabel(String(localized: "content.accessibility.connected_mesh", comment: "Accessibility label for mesh-connected peer indicator"))
-                case .meshReachable:
-                    Image(systemName: "point.3.filled.connected.trianglepath.dotted")
-                        .font(.bitchatSystem(size: 14))
-                        .foregroundColor(palette.primary)
-                        .accessibilityLabel(String(localized: "content.accessibility.reachable_mesh", comment: "Accessibility label for mesh-reachable peer indicator"))
-                case .nostrAvailable:
-                    Image(systemName: "globe")
-                        .font(.bitchatSystem(size: 14))
-                        .foregroundColor(.purple)
-                        .accessibilityLabel(String(localized: "content.accessibility.available_nostr", comment: "Accessibility label for Nostr-available peer indicator"))
-                case .offline:
-                    // Absence of a glyph was the only offline signal; say it.
-                    Text("mesh_peers.state.offline")
-                        .bitchatFont(size: 11)
-                        .foregroundColor(palette.secondary)
+                        .accessibilityLabel(String(localized: "content.accessibility.group_chat", comment: "Accessibility label for the group chat indicator"))
+                } else {
+                    switch headerState.availability {
+                    case .bluetoothConnected:
+                        Image(systemName: "dot.radiowaves.left.and.right")
+                            .font(.bitchatSystem(size: 14))
+                            .foregroundColor(palette.primary)
+                            .accessibilityLabel(String(localized: "content.accessibility.connected_mesh", comment: "Accessibility label for mesh-connected peer indicator"))
+                    case .meshReachable:
+                        Image(systemName: "point.3.filled.connected.trianglepath.dotted")
+                            .font(.bitchatSystem(size: 14))
+                            .foregroundColor(palette.primary)
+                            .accessibilityLabel(String(localized: "content.accessibility.reachable_mesh", comment: "Accessibility label for mesh-reachable peer indicator"))
+                    case .nostrAvailable:
+                        Image(systemName: "globe")
+                            .font(.bitchatSystem(size: 14))
+                            .foregroundColor(.purple)
+                            .accessibilityLabel(String(localized: "content.accessibility.available_nostr", comment: "Accessibility label for Nostr-available peer indicator"))
+                    case .offline:
+                        // Absence of a glyph was the only offline signal; say it.
+                        Text("mesh_peers.state.offline")
+                            .bitchatFont(size: 11)
+                            .foregroundColor(palette.secondary)
+                    }
                 }
 
                 Text(headerState.displayName)
@@ -571,7 +591,9 @@ private struct ContentPrivateHeaderInfoButton: View {
             )
         )
         .accessibilityHint(
-            String(localized: "content.accessibility.view_fingerprint_hint", comment: "Accessibility hint for viewing encryption fingerprint")
+            headerState.isGroupConversation
+            ? ""
+            : String(localized: "content.accessibility.view_fingerprint_hint", comment: "Accessibility hint for viewing encryption fingerprint")
         )
         .frame(minHeight: headerHeight)
     }
diff --git a/bitchat/Views/GroupChatList.swift b/bitchat/Views/GroupChatList.swift
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8b62d8a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitchat/Views/GroupChatList.swift
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import SwiftUI
+
+/// Compact "groups" section for the people sheet: one row per private group
+/// this device belongs to, tappable to open the group chat window.
+struct GroupChatList: View {
+    @ThemedPalette private var palette
+
+    let groups: [GroupChatRow]
+    let onTapGroup: (PeerID) -> Void
+
+    private enum Strings {
+        static let header = String(localized: "groups.section.header", comment: "Section header above the private groups list")
+        static let creator = String(localized: "groups.state.creator", comment: "State label for a group the user created")
+        static let unread = String(localized: "mesh_peers.state.unread", comment: "State label for a peer with unread private messages")
+        static let newMessagesTooltip = String(localized: "mesh_peers.tooltip.new_messages", comment: "Tooltip for the unread messages indicator")
+        static let openGroupHint = String(localized: "groups.accessibility.open_group_hint", comment: "Accessibility hint on a group row explaining activation opens the group chat")
+        static let memberCountFormat = String(localized: "groups.member_count %@", comment: "Member count shown next to a group name; placeholder is the count")
+    }
+
+    var body: some View {
+        if !groups.isEmpty {
+            VStack(alignment: .leading, spacing: 0) {
+                Text(Strings.header)
+                    .bitchatFont(size: 11, weight: .medium)
+                    .foregroundColor(palette.secondary)
+                    .padding(.horizontal)
+                    .padding(.top, 10)
+                    .padding(.bottom, 2)
+                    .accessibilityAddTraits(.isHeader)
+
+                ForEach(groups) { group in
+                    HStack(spacing: 4) {
+                        Image(systemName: "person.3.fill")
+                            .font(.bitchatSystem(size: 10))
+                            .foregroundColor(palette.primary)
+
+                        Text("#\(group.name)")
+                            .bitchatFont(size: 14)
+                            .foregroundColor(palette.primary)
+                            .lineLimit(1)
+                            .truncationMode(.tail)
+
+                        Text(String(format: Strings.memberCountFormat, locale: .current, "\(group.memberCount)"))
+                            .bitchatFont(size: 12)
+                            .foregroundColor(palette.secondary)
+
+                        if group.isCreator {
+                            Image(systemName: "crown.fill")
+                                .font(.bitchatSystem(size: 9))
+                                .foregroundColor(.yellow)
+                                .help(Strings.creator)
+                        }
+
+                        Spacer()
+
+                        if group.hasUnread {
+                            Image(systemName: "envelope.fill")
+                                .font(.bitchatSystem(size: 10))
+                                .foregroundColor(.orange)
+                                .help(Strings.newMessagesTooltip)
+                        }
+                    }
+                    .padding(.horizontal)
+                    .padding(.vertical, 6)
+                    .contentShape(Rectangle())
+                    .onTapGesture { onTapGroup(group.peerID) }
+                    .accessibilityElement(children: .ignore)
+                    .accessibilityLabel(accessibilityDescription(for: group))
+                    .accessibilityAddTraits(.isButton)
+                    .accessibilityHint(Strings.openGroupHint)
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func accessibilityDescription(for group: GroupChatRow) -> String {
+        var parts: [String] = [
+            group.name,
+            String(format: Strings.memberCountFormat, locale: .current, "\(group.memberCount)")
+        ]
+        if group.isCreator { parts.append(Strings.creator) }
+        if group.hasUnread { parts.append(Strings.unread) }
+        return parts.joined(separator: ", ")
+    }
+}
diff --git a/bitchatTests/ChatTransportEventCoordinatorContextTests.swift b/bitchatTests/ChatTransportEventCoordinatorContextTests.swift
index bd112e9b..b0d39782 100644
--- a/bitchatTests/ChatTransportEventCoordinatorContextTests.swift
+++ b/bitchatTests/ChatTransportEventCoordinatorContextTests.swift
@@ -157,6 +157,18 @@ private final class MockChatTransportEventContext: ChatTransportEventContext {
         verifyResponsePayloads.append((peerID, payload))
     }
 
+    // Group payloads
+    private(set) var groupInvitePayloads: [(peerID: PeerID, payload: Data)] = []
+    private(set) var groupKeyUpdatePayloads: [(peerID: PeerID, payload: Data)] = []
+
+    func handleGroupInvitePayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data) {
+        groupInvitePayloads.append((peerID, payload))
+    }
+
+    func handleGroupKeyUpdatePayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data) {
+        groupKeyUpdatePayloads.append((peerID, payload))
+    }
+
     private(set) var vouchPayloads: [(peerID: PeerID, payload: Data)] = []
 
     func handleVouchPayload(from peerID: PeerID, payload: Data) {
diff --git a/bitchatTests/CommandProcessorTests.swift b/bitchatTests/CommandProcessorTests.swift
index 718df1c8..3da82140 100644
--- a/bitchatTests/CommandProcessorTests.swift
+++ b/bitchatTests/CommandProcessorTests.swift
@@ -678,4 +678,32 @@ private final class MockCommandContextProvider: CommandContextProvider {
     func sendFavoriteNotification(to peerID: PeerID, isFavorite: Bool) {
         favoriteNotifications.append((peerID, isFavorite))
     }
+
+    // Groups: record the parsed subcommand + argument the processor forwarded.
+    private(set) var groupCommands: [(subcommand: String, argument: String)] = []
+
+    func groupCreate(named name: String) -> CommandResult {
+        groupCommands.append(("create", name))
+        return .handled
+    }
+
+    func groupInvite(nickname: String) -> CommandResult {
+        groupCommands.append(("invite", nickname))
+        return .handled
+    }
+
+    func groupRemove(nickname: String) -> CommandResult {
+        groupCommands.append(("remove", nickname))
+        return .handled
+    }
+
+    func groupLeave() -> CommandResult {
+        groupCommands.append(("leave", ""))
+        return .handled
+    }
+
+    func groupList() -> CommandResult {
+        groupCommands.append(("list", ""))
+        return .handled
+    }
 }
diff --git a/bitchatTests/GossipSyncManagerTests.swift b/bitchatTests/GossipSyncManagerTests.swift
index 5f15e377..de1fa209 100644
--- a/bitchatTests/GossipSyncManagerTests.swift
+++ b/bitchatTests/GossipSyncManagerTests.swift
@@ -208,7 +208,10 @@ struct GossipSyncManagerTests {
         #expect(allTypes.contains(.fragment))
         #expect(allTypes.contains(.fileTransfer))
         #expect(allTypes.contains(.prekeyBundle))
-        #expect(decoded.contains { $0.types == .publicMessages })
+        #expect(allTypes.contains(.groupMessage))
+        // The message schedule also asks for group messages (bit 10);
+        // responders that don't know the bit just ignore it.
+        #expect(decoded.contains { $0.types == SyncTypeFlags.publicMessages.union(.groupMessage) })
         #expect(decoded.contains { $0.types == .fragment })
         #expect(decoded.contains { $0.types == .fileTransfer })
         #expect(decoded.contains { $0.types == .prekeyBundle })
diff --git a/bitchatTests/Services/GroupProtocolTests.swift b/bitchatTests/Services/GroupProtocolTests.swift
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f9f19e7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitchatTests/Services/GroupProtocolTests.swift
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+//
+// GroupProtocolTests.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import CryptoKit
+import Foundation
+import Testing
+import BitFoundation
+@testable import bitchat
+
+struct GroupProtocolTests {
+
+    // MARK: - Fixtures
+
+    /// Deterministic member identity: an Ed25519 keypair plus the 64-hex
+    /// fingerprint the roster pins.
+    private struct TestIdentity {
+        let signingKey: Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey
+        let fingerprint: String
+
+        init(seed: UInt8) {
+            signingKey = Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey()
+            fingerprint = Data(repeating: seed, count: 32).hexEncodedString()
+        }
+
+        var member: GroupMember {
+            GroupMember(
+                fingerprint: fingerprint,
+                signingKey: signingKey.publicKey.rawRepresentation,
+                nickname: "peer-\(fingerprint.prefix(4))"
+            )
+        }
+
+        func sign(_ data: Data) -> Data? {
+            try? signingKey.signature(for: data)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private let creator = TestIdentity(seed: 0xC1)
+    private let member = TestIdentity(seed: 0xA2)
+    private let outsider = TestIdentity(seed: 0xE3)
+
+    private let groupID = Data((0..<16).map { UInt8($0) })
+    private let key = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32)
+
+    private func makeGroup(extraMembers: [GroupMember] = [], epoch: UInt32 = 1) -> BitchatGroup {
+        BitchatGroup(
+            groupID: groupID,
+            name: "trail crew",
+            epoch: epoch,
+            members: [creator.member, member.member] + extraMembers,
+            creatorFingerprint: creator.fingerprint
+        )
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - State payload (invite / key update)
+
+    @Test func statePayloadRoundTripAndSignatureVerify() throws {
+        let group = makeGroup()
+        let payload = try #require(GroupStatePayload.makeSigned(group: group, key: key, sign: creator.sign))
+        let encoded = try #require(payload.encode())
+
+        let decoded = try #require(GroupStatePayload.decode(encoded))
+        #expect(decoded == payload)
+        #expect(decoded.groupID == groupID)
+        #expect(decoded.name == "trail crew")
+        #expect(decoded.key == key)
+        #expect(decoded.epoch == 1)
+        #expect(decoded.members == group.members)
+        #expect(decoded.creatorFingerprint == creator.fingerprint)
+        #expect(decoded.verifyCreatorSignature())
+        #expect(decoded.asGroup == group)
+    }
+
+    @Test func forgedCreatorSignatureIsRejected() throws {
+        let group = makeGroup()
+        // Signed by a member who is in the roster but is NOT the creator.
+        let forged = try #require(GroupStatePayload.makeSigned(group: group, key: key, sign: member.sign))
+        #expect(!forged.verifyCreatorSignature())
+
+        // An outsider signing is equally rejected.
+        let outsiderForged = try #require(GroupStatePayload.makeSigned(group: group, key: key, sign: outsider.sign))
+        #expect(!outsiderForged.verifyCreatorSignature())
+    }
+
+    @Test func tamperedStateFailsSignature() throws {
+        let group = makeGroup()
+        let payload = try #require(GroupStatePayload.makeSigned(group: group, key: key, sign: creator.sign))
+
+        // Bumping the epoch invalidates the signature.
+        let epochTampered = GroupStatePayload(
+            groupID: payload.groupID,
+            name: payload.name,
+            key: payload.key,
+            epoch: payload.epoch + 1,
+            members: payload.members,
+            creatorFingerprint: payload.creatorFingerprint,
+            signature: payload.signature
+        )
+        #expect(!epochTampered.verifyCreatorSignature())
+
+        // So does swapping the key.
+        let keyTampered = GroupStatePayload(
+            groupID: payload.groupID,
+            name: payload.name,
+            key: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32),
+            epoch: payload.epoch,
+            members: payload.members,
+            creatorFingerprint: payload.creatorFingerprint,
+            signature: payload.signature
+        )
+        #expect(!keyTampered.verifyCreatorSignature())
+
+        // And so does adding a member to the roster.
+        let rosterTampered = GroupStatePayload(
+            groupID: payload.groupID,
+            name: payload.name,
+            key: payload.key,
+            epoch: payload.epoch,
+            members: payload.members + [outsider.member],
+            creatorFingerprint: payload.creatorFingerprint,
+            signature: payload.signature
+        )
+        #expect(!rosterTampered.verifyCreatorSignature())
+    }
+
+    @Test func creatorMissingFromRosterIsRejected() throws {
+        // State claiming a creator whose fingerprint is not in the roster has
+        // no key to verify against and must fail closed.
+        let group = BitchatGroup(
+            groupID: groupID,
+            name: "orphan",
+            epoch: 1,
+            members: [member.member],
+            creatorFingerprint: creator.fingerprint
+        )
+        guard let rosterBlob = GroupRosterCoding.encode(group.members) else {
+            Issue.record("roster should encode")
+            return
+        }
+        let content = GroupStatePayload.signingContent(groupID: groupID, epoch: 1, key: key, rosterBlob: rosterBlob, name: group.name)
+        let payload = GroupStatePayload(
+            groupID: groupID,
+            name: group.name,
+            key: key,
+            epoch: 1,
+            members: group.members,
+            creatorFingerprint: creator.fingerprint,
+            signature: creator.sign(content) ?? Data()
+        )
+        #expect(!payload.verifyCreatorSignature())
+    }
+
+    @Test func rosterCapIsEnforcedOnTheWire() {
+        // 17 members cannot be encoded (hard cap is 16)…
+        let seventeen = (0..<17).map { TestIdentity(seed: UInt8($0 + 1)).member }
+        #expect(GroupRosterCoding.encode(seventeen) == nil)
+
+        // …and a hand-built blob claiming 17 members fails to decode.
+        let sixteen = (0..<16).map { TestIdentity(seed: UInt8($0 + 1)).member }
+        guard var blob = GroupRosterCoding.encode(sixteen) else {
+            Issue.record("16-member roster should encode")
+            return
+        }
+        #expect(GroupRosterCoding.decode(blob)?.count == 16)
+        blob[blob.startIndex] = 17
+        #expect(GroupRosterCoding.decode(blob) == nil)
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Message seal / open
+
+    @Test func messageRoundTrip() throws {
+        let group = makeGroup()
+        let timestampMs: UInt64 = 1_750_000_000_000
+        let sealed = try GroupCrypto.sealMessage(
+            content: "summit at noon",
+            messageID: "msg-1",
+            senderNickname: "alice",
+            senderSigningKey: member.member.signingKey,
+            timestampMs: timestampMs,
+            groupID: groupID,
+            epoch: group.epoch,
+            key: key,
+            sign: member.sign
+        )
+
+        let envelope = try #require(GroupMessageEnvelope.decode(sealed))
+        #expect(envelope.groupID == groupID)
+        #expect(envelope.epoch == group.epoch)
+
+        let plaintext = try GroupCrypto.openMessage(envelope, key: key)
+        #expect(plaintext.messageID == "msg-1")
+        #expect(plaintext.content == "summit at noon")
+        #expect(plaintext.senderNickname == "alice")
+        #expect(plaintext.timestampMs == timestampMs)
+        #expect(plaintext.senderSigningKey == member.member.signingKey)
+
+        // The roster resolves the sender; an outsider's key would not.
+        #expect(group.member(withSigningKey: plaintext.senderSigningKey) != nil)
+        #expect(group.member(withSigningKey: outsider.member.signingKey) == nil)
+    }
+
+    @Test func wrongKeyFailsToDecrypt() throws {
+        let sealed = try GroupCrypto.sealMessage(
+            content: "hi",
+            messageID: "msg-2",
+            senderNickname: "alice",
+            senderSigningKey: member.member.signingKey,
+            timestampMs: 1,
+            groupID: groupID,
+            epoch: 1,
+            key: key,
+            sign: member.sign
+        )
+        let envelope = try #require(GroupMessageEnvelope.decode(sealed))
+        #expect(throws: GroupCryptoError.decryptionFailed) {
+            _ = try GroupCrypto.openMessage(envelope, key: Data(repeating: 0x7F, count: 32))
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func epochIsBoundIntoTheCiphertext() throws {
+        // Re-labeling an epoch-1 envelope as epoch 2 must break the AEAD:
+        // a rotated-out member cannot replay old ciphertext into a new epoch.
+        let sealed = try GroupCrypto.sealMessage(
+            content: "hi",
+            messageID: "msg-3",
+            senderNickname: "alice",
+            senderSigningKey: member.member.signingKey,
+            timestampMs: 1,
+            groupID: groupID,
+            epoch: 1,
+            key: key,
+            sign: member.sign
+        )
+        let envelope = try #require(GroupMessageEnvelope.decode(sealed))
+        let relabeled = GroupMessageEnvelope(
+            groupID: envelope.groupID,
+            epoch: 2,
+            nonce: envelope.nonce,
+            ciphertext: envelope.ciphertext
+        )
+        #expect(throws: GroupCryptoError.decryptionFailed) {
+            _ = try GroupCrypto.openMessage(relabeled, key: key)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func badSenderSignatureIsRejected() throws {
+        // A key-holder who signs with a key other than the one they claim
+        // (or garbage) is dropped even though decryption succeeds.
+        let sealed = try GroupCrypto.sealMessage(
+            content: "spoof",
+            messageID: "msg-4",
+            senderNickname: "mallory",
+            senderSigningKey: member.member.signingKey, // claims member's key…
+            timestampMs: 1,
+            groupID: groupID,
+            epoch: 1,
+            key: key,
+            sign: outsider.sign // …but signs with the outsider's
+        )
+        let envelope = try #require(GroupMessageEnvelope.decode(sealed))
+        #expect(throws: GroupCryptoError.badSenderSignature) {
+            _ = try GroupCrypto.openMessage(envelope, key: key)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func tamperedCiphertextFailsToOpen() throws {
+        let sealed = try GroupCrypto.sealMessage(
+            content: "hi",
+            messageID: "msg-5",
+            senderNickname: "alice",
+            senderSigningKey: member.member.signingKey,
+            timestampMs: 1,
+            groupID: groupID,
+            epoch: 1,
+            key: key,
+            sign: member.sign
+        )
+        let envelope = try #require(GroupMessageEnvelope.decode(sealed))
+        var flipped = envelope.ciphertext
+        flipped[flipped.startIndex] ^= 0x01
+        let tampered = GroupMessageEnvelope(
+            groupID: envelope.groupID,
+            epoch: envelope.epoch,
+            nonce: envelope.nonce,
+            ciphertext: flipped
+        )
+        #expect(throws: GroupCryptoError.decryptionFailed) {
+            _ = try GroupCrypto.openMessage(tampered, key: key)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func malformedEnvelopesAreRejected() {
+        #expect(GroupMessageEnvelope.decode(Data()) == nil)
+        #expect(GroupMessageEnvelope.decode(Data([0x01, 0x00])) == nil)
+        #expect(GroupStatePayload.decode(Data([0xFF, 0x00, 0x01])) == nil)
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Oversize / UTF-8 safety (Codex findings)
+
+    @Test func oversizeMessageContentFailsToSealInsteadOfTruncating() {
+        // A content whose UTF-8 exceeds the 16-bit TLV length must fail to
+        // seal (surfacing send_failed) rather than silently truncate into a
+        // ciphertext recipients would drop.
+        let oversize = String(repeating: "a", count: 70_000)
+        #expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
+            _ = try GroupCrypto.sealMessage(
+                content: oversize,
+                messageID: "big",
+                senderNickname: "alice",
+                senderSigningKey: member.member.signingKey,
+                timestampMs: 1,
+                groupID: groupID,
+                epoch: 1,
+                key: key,
+                sign: member.sign
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func multiByteNicknameTruncatesOnScalarBoundary() throws {
+        // 40 euro signs = 120 UTF-8 bytes; a raw 64-byte prefix would split
+        // the 21st scalar and make the roster undecodable. Truncation must
+        // land on a Character boundary so the blob round-trips.
+        let euros = String(repeating: "€", count: 40)
+        let wide = GroupMember(
+            fingerprint: creator.fingerprint,
+            signingKey: creator.member.signingKey,
+            nickname: euros
+        )
+        let blob = try #require(GroupRosterCoding.encode([wide]))
+        let decoded = try #require(GroupRosterCoding.decode(blob))
+        #expect(decoded.count == 1)
+        #expect(Data(decoded[0].nickname.utf8).count <= 64)
+        #expect(decoded[0].nickname.allSatisfy { $0 == "€" })
+        #expect(!decoded[0].nickname.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Signable-bytes forward-proofing
+
+    @Test func creatorSignatureCoversName() throws {
+        let group = makeGroup()
+        let payload = try #require(GroupStatePayload.makeSigned(group: group, key: key, sign: creator.sign))
+        #expect(payload.verifyCreatorSignature())
+
+        // Swapping only the display name must invalidate the creator signature.
+        let renamed = GroupStatePayload(
+            groupID: payload.groupID,
+            name: "totally different name",
+            key: payload.key,
+            epoch: payload.epoch,
+            members: payload.members,
+            creatorFingerprint: payload.creatorFingerprint,
+            signature: payload.signature
+        )
+        #expect(!renamed.verifyCreatorSignature())
+    }
+
+    @Test func messageSignatureCoversEpoch() {
+        // The signed bytes differ by epoch, so a signature captured at one
+        // epoch cannot verify when re-sealed under a later epoch key.
+        let atEpoch1 = GroupCrypto.messageSigningContent(
+            groupID: groupID, epoch: 1, messageID: "m", timestampMs: 1, content: "x"
+        )
+        let atEpoch2 = GroupCrypto.messageSigningContent(
+            groupID: groupID, epoch: 2, messageID: "m", timestampMs: 1, content: "x"
+        )
+        #expect(atEpoch1 != atEpoch2)
+    }
+}
diff --git a/bitchatTests/Services/GroupStoreTests.swift b/bitchatTests/Services/GroupStoreTests.swift
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..adf04806
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitchatTests/Services/GroupStoreTests.swift
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+//
+// GroupStoreTests.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import Foundation
+import Testing
+import BitFoundation
+@testable import bitchat
+
+@MainActor
+struct GroupStoreTests {
+
+    private func makeMember(seed: UInt8, nickname: String = "peer") -> GroupMember {
+        GroupMember(
+            fingerprint: Data(repeating: seed, count: 32).hexEncodedString(),
+            signingKey: Data(repeating: seed &+ 1, count: 32),
+            nickname: nickname
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func tempFileURL() -> URL {
+        FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
+            .appendingPathComponent("group-store-tests-\(UUID().uuidString)", isDirectory: true)
+            .appendingPathComponent("groups.json")
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Create / read
+
+    @Test func createGroupStoresMetadataAndKey() throws {
+        let store = GroupStore(keychain: MockKeychain(), persistsToDisk: false)
+        let creator = makeMember(seed: 0xC1, nickname: "me")
+
+        let group = try #require(store.createGroup(named: "ops", creator: creator))
+        #expect(group.groupID.count == BitchatGroup.groupIDLength)
+        #expect(group.epoch == 1)
+        #expect(group.members == [creator])
+        #expect(group.creatorFingerprint == creator.fingerprint)
+
+        #expect(store.group(withID: group.groupID) == group)
+        #expect(store.group(for: group.peerID) == group)
+        let key = try #require(store.key(forGroupID: group.groupID))
+        #expect(key.count == BitchatGroup.keyLength)
+        #expect(group.peerID.isGroup)
+        #expect(group.peerID.groupIDData == group.groupID)
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Roster cap
+
+    @Test func rosterCapIsEnforced() throws {
+        let store = GroupStore(keychain: MockKeychain(), persistsToDisk: false)
+        let creator = makeMember(seed: 0xC1)
+        let group = try #require(store.createGroup(named: "big", creator: creator))
+
+        // Filling to the cap works…
+        let fifteen = (1...15).map { makeMember(seed: UInt8($0)) }
+        #expect(store.updateRoster(groupID: group.groupID, members: [creator] + fifteen) != nil)
+        #expect(store.group(withID: group.groupID)?.members.count == BitchatGroup.maxMembers)
+
+        // …one more is rejected.
+        let overflow = [creator] + fifteen + [makeMember(seed: 0x99)]
+        #expect(store.updateRoster(groupID: group.groupID, members: overflow) == nil)
+        #expect(store.group(withID: group.groupID)?.members.count == BitchatGroup.maxMembers)
+
+        // Direct upsert past the cap is rejected too.
+        var oversized = group
+        oversized.members = overflow
+        #expect(!store.upsert(oversized, key: Data(repeating: 1, count: 32)))
+    }
+
+    @Test func rosterMustRetainCreator() throws {
+        let store = GroupStore(keychain: MockKeychain(), persistsToDisk: false)
+        let creator = makeMember(seed: 0xC1)
+        let other = makeMember(seed: 0xA1)
+        let group = try #require(store.createGroup(named: "crew", creator: creator))
+
+        #expect(store.updateRoster(groupID: group.groupID, members: [other]) == nil)
+        #expect(store.group(withID: group.groupID)?.members == [creator])
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Rotation
+
+    @Test func rotateKeyBumpsEpochAndReplacesKey() throws {
+        let store = GroupStore(keychain: MockKeychain(), persistsToDisk: false)
+        let creator = makeMember(seed: 0xC1)
+        let removed = makeMember(seed: 0xA1)
+        let group = try #require(store.createGroup(named: "crew", creator: creator))
+        #expect(store.updateRoster(groupID: group.groupID, members: [creator, removed]) != nil)
+        let oldKey = try #require(store.key(forGroupID: group.groupID))
+
+        let rotation = try #require(store.rotateKey(groupID: group.groupID, members: [creator]))
+        #expect(rotation.group.epoch == 2)
+        #expect(rotation.group.members == [creator])
+        #expect(rotation.key != oldKey)
+        #expect(store.key(forGroupID: group.groupID) == rotation.key)
+        #expect(store.group(withID: group.groupID)?.epoch == 2)
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Persistence
+
+    @Test func persistsAcrossInstances() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let fileURL = tempFileURL()
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: fileURL.deletingLastPathComponent()) }
+
+        let creator = makeMember(seed: 0xC1, nickname: "me")
+        let group: BitchatGroup
+        do {
+            let store = GroupStore(keychain: keychain, fileURL: fileURL)
+            group = try #require(store.createGroup(named: "hike", creator: creator))
+        }
+
+        let reloaded = GroupStore(keychain: keychain, fileURL: fileURL)
+        #expect(reloaded.groups == [group])
+        #expect(reloaded.key(forGroupID: group.groupID) != nil)
+    }
+
+    @Test func groupsWithoutKeysAreDroppedOnLoad() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let fileURL = tempFileURL()
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: fileURL.deletingLastPathComponent()) }
+
+        let group: BitchatGroup
+        do {
+            let store = GroupStore(keychain: keychain, fileURL: fileURL)
+            group = try #require(store.createGroup(named: "stale", creator: makeMember(seed: 0xC1)))
+        }
+        // Simulate a keychain wipe without the metadata file being removed.
+        _ = keychain.deleteAllKeychainData()
+
+        let reloaded = GroupStore(keychain: keychain, fileURL: fileURL)
+        #expect(reloaded.groups.isEmpty)
+        #expect(reloaded.group(withID: group.groupID) == nil)
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Panic wipe
+
+    @Test func wipeRemovesMetadataAndKeys() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let fileURL = tempFileURL()
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: fileURL.deletingLastPathComponent()) }
+
+        let store = GroupStore(keychain: keychain, fileURL: fileURL)
+        let group = try #require(store.createGroup(named: "gone", creator: makeMember(seed: 0xC1)))
+        #expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: fileURL.path))
+
+        store.wipe()
+
+        #expect(store.groups.isEmpty)
+        #expect(store.key(forGroupID: group.groupID) == nil)
+        #expect(!FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: fileURL.path))
+
+        // A fresh instance sees nothing either.
+        let reloaded = GroupStore(keychain: keychain, fileURL: fileURL)
+        #expect(reloaded.groups.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test func removeGroupDeletesItsKey() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let store = GroupStore(keychain: keychain, persistsToDisk: false)
+        let group = try #require(store.createGroup(named: "bye", creator: makeMember(seed: 0xC1)))
+
+        store.removeGroup(withID: group.groupID)
+        #expect(store.groups.isEmpty)
+        #expect(store.key(forGroupID: group.groupID) == nil)
+    }
+}
diff --git a/bitchatTests/Services/MeshDiagnosticsTests.swift b/bitchatTests/Services/MeshDiagnosticsTests.swift
index ced8a92e..b565840d 100644
--- a/bitchatTests/Services/MeshDiagnosticsTests.swift
+++ b/bitchatTests/Services/MeshDiagnosticsTests.swift
@@ -277,6 +277,11 @@ private final class DiagnosticsMockContext: CommandContextProvider {
     func clearPrivateChat(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
     func sendPublicRaw(_ content: String) {}
     func sendPublicMessage(_ content: String) {}
+    func groupCreate(named name: String) -> CommandResult { .handled }
+    func groupInvite(nickname: String) -> CommandResult { .handled }
+    func groupRemove(nickname: String) -> CommandResult { .handled }
+    func groupLeave() -> CommandResult { .handled }
+    func groupList() -> CommandResult { .handled }
     func addLocalPrivateSystemMessage(_ content: String, to peerID: PeerID) {}
     func addPublicSystemMessage(_ content: String) {}
     func toggleFavorite(peerID: PeerID) {}
diff --git a/bitchatTests/Sync/SyncTypeFlagsBoardTests.swift b/bitchatTests/Sync/SyncTypeFlagsBoardTests.swift
index 75cbbd54..829bfd4d 100644
--- a/bitchatTests/Sync/SyncTypeFlagsBoardTests.swift
+++ b/bitchatTests/Sync/SyncTypeFlagsBoardTests.swift
@@ -38,19 +38,19 @@ struct SyncTypeFlagsBoardTests {
     /// decode path accepts the bytes and simply maps unknown bits to no
     /// message type, so a board-only request reads as "nothing I can serve".
     @Test func unknownBitsDecodeToNoTypes() throws {
-        // Bits 10-15 are unassigned (bit 8 = board, bit 9 = prekeyBundle); a
-        // future (or unknown) two-byte bitfield must decode without error and
-        // yield no known types.
-        let decoded = try #require(SyncTypeFlags.decode(Data([0x00, 0xFC])))
+        // Bits 11-15 are unassigned (bit 8 = board, bit 9 = prekeyBundle,
+        // bit 10 = groupMessage); a future (or unknown) two-byte bitfield must
+        // decode without error and yield no known types.
+        let decoded = try #require(SyncTypeFlags.decode(Data([0x00, 0xF8])))
         #expect(decoded.toMessageTypes().isEmpty)
-        for type in [MessageType.announce, .message, .fragment, .fileTransfer, .boardPost, .prekeyBundle] {
+        for type in [MessageType.announce, .message, .fragment, .fileTransfer, .boardPost, .prekeyBundle, .groupMessage] {
             #expect(!decoded.contains(type))
         }
     }
 
     @Test func mixedKnownAndUnknownBitsKeepKnownTypes() throws {
-        // Known low-byte flags survive alongside unknown high bits (10-15).
-        let decoded = try #require(SyncTypeFlags.decode(Data([0x03, 0xFC])))
+        // Known low-byte flags survive alongside unknown high bits (11-15).
+        let decoded = try #require(SyncTypeFlags.decode(Data([0x03, 0xF8])))
         #expect(decoded.contains(.announce))
         #expect(decoded.contains(.message))
         #expect(Set(decoded.toMessageTypes()) == Set([.announce, .message]))
diff --git a/bitchatTests/Sync/SyncTypeFlagsGroupTests.swift b/bitchatTests/Sync/SyncTypeFlagsGroupTests.swift
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2bd9d53b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitchatTests/Sync/SyncTypeFlagsGroupTests.swift
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+//
+// SyncTypeFlagsGroupTests.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// Wire-compat proof for the groupMessage sync bit (bit 10): the types
+// bitfield widens from 1 to 2 bytes, and clients that don't know the bit
+// simply ignore it.
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import Foundation
+import Testing
+import BitFoundation
+@testable import bitchat
+
+struct SyncTypeFlagsGroupTests {
+
+    @Test func groupMessageOccupiesBitTen() {
+        #expect(SyncTypeFlags.groupMessage.rawValue == 1 << 10)
+        #expect(SyncTypeFlags.groupMessage.contains(.groupMessage))
+        #expect(!SyncTypeFlags.publicMessages.contains(.groupMessage))
+    }
+
+    @Test func extendedBitfieldWidensToTwoBytes() throws {
+        // Legacy flags fit one byte…
+        #expect(SyncTypeFlags.publicMessages.toData() == Data([0x03]))
+
+        // …the group bit widens the little-endian encoding to two bytes.
+        let combined = SyncTypeFlags.publicMessages.union(.groupMessage)
+        let encoded = try #require(combined.toData())
+        #expect(encoded == Data([0x03, 0x04]))
+
+        let decoded = try #require(SyncTypeFlags.decode(encoded))
+        #expect(decoded == combined)
+        #expect(Set(decoded.toMessageTypes()) == Set([.announce, .message, .groupMessage]))
+    }
+
+    @Test func unknownBitsAreIgnoredNotRejected() throws {
+        // An "old client" reading a 2-byte field keeps the raw bits but maps
+        // unknown bit indices to no message type — it answers with the types
+        // it knows instead of dropping the request.
+        let futuristic = try #require(SyncTypeFlags.decode(Data([0x03, 0xFC])))
+        #expect(Set(futuristic.toMessageTypes()) == Set([.announce, .message, .groupMessage]))
+        #expect(futuristic.contains(.announce))
+        #expect(futuristic.contains(.message))
+    }
+
+    @Test func requestSyncPacketRoundTripsGroupFlag() throws {
+        let types = SyncTypeFlags.publicMessages.union(.groupMessage)
+        let packet = RequestSyncPacket(p: 8, m: 1024, data: Data([0xAB, 0xCD]), types: types)
+        let encoded = packet.encode()
+
+        let decoded = try #require(RequestSyncPacket.decode(from: encoded))
+        #expect(decoded.types == types)
+        #expect(decoded.types?.contains(.groupMessage) == true)
+        #expect(decoded.p == 8)
+        #expect(decoded.m == 1024)
+        #expect(decoded.data == Data([0xAB, 0xCD]))
+    }
+}
diff --git a/bitchatTests/Sync/SyncTypeFlagsTests.swift b/bitchatTests/Sync/SyncTypeFlagsTests.swift
index 45dee06a..8c400119 100644
--- a/bitchatTests/Sync/SyncTypeFlagsTests.swift
+++ b/bitchatTests/Sync/SyncTypeFlagsTests.swift
@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@ struct SyncTypeFlagsTests {
     }
 
     @Test func decodeDropsPhantomBits() {
-        // Bits 10+ map to no message type (bit 8 = boardPost, bit 9 =
-        // prekeyBundle). They must not survive decode as phantom membership.
-        let phantom = Data([0x00, 0xFC]) // bits 10..15 set, no known type
+        // Bits 11+ map to no message type (bit 8 = boardPost, bit 9 =
+        // prekeyBundle, bit 10 = groupMessage). They must not survive decode
+        // as phantom membership.
+        let phantom = Data([0x00, 0xF8]) // bits 11..15 set, no known type
         let decoded = SyncTypeFlags.decode(phantom)
         #expect(decoded?.rawValue == 0)
         #expect(decoded?.toMessageTypes().isEmpty == true)
@@ -23,17 +24,18 @@ struct SyncTypeFlagsTests {
 
     @Test func boardBitSurvivesDecode() {
         // Bit 8 maps to boardPost and spills the field into a second byte;
-        // it must survive decode while the phantom high bits (10+) are
-        // stripped. Bit 9 (prekeyBundle) is cleared to isolate the board bit.
-        let mixed = Data([0x00, 0xFD]) // bit 8 (board) known, bits 10..15 phantom
+        // it must survive decode while the phantom high bits (11+) are
+        // stripped. Bits 9 (prekeyBundle) and 10 (groupMessage) are cleared
+        // to isolate the board bit.
+        let mixed = Data([0x00, 0xF9]) // bit 8 (board) known, bits 11..15 phantom
         let decoded = SyncTypeFlags.decode(mixed)
         #expect(decoded?.contains(.board) == true)
         #expect(decoded?.rawValue == 0b1_0000_0000)
     }
 
     @Test func phantomBitsAreStrippedButKnownBitsSurvive() {
-        // Low byte = announce(0) + message(1); high byte bits 10+ are phantom.
-        let mixed = Data([0b0000_0011, 0xFC])
+        // Low byte = announce(0) + message(1); high byte bits 11+ are phantom.
+        let mixed = Data([0b0000_0011, 0xF8])
         let decoded = SyncTypeFlags.decode(mixed)
         #expect(decoded?.contains(.announce) == true)
         #expect(decoded?.contains(.message) == true)
diff --git a/localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/MessageType.swift b/localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/MessageType.swift
index 47f46b85..4ddf5ab1 100644
--- a/localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/MessageType.swift
+++ b/localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/MessageType.swift
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ public enum MessageType: UInt8 {
     case fileTransfer = 0x22    // Binary file/audio/image payloads
     case boardPost = 0x23       // Signed geohash bulletin-board post or tombstone
     case prekeyBundle = 0x24    // Signed batch of one-time prekeys (gossiped)
+    case groupMessage = 0x25    // Group-encrypted broadcast (cleartext group ID, ChaChaPoly body)
 
     // Mesh diagnostics
     case ping = 0x26            // Directed echo request (nonce + origin TTL)
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ public enum MessageType: UInt8 {
         case .fileTransfer: return "fileTransfer"
         case .boardPost: return "boardPost"
         case .prekeyBundle: return "prekeyBundle"
+        case .groupMessage: return "groupMessage"
         case .ping: return "ping"
         case .pong: return "pong"
         case .nostrCarrier: return "nostrCarrier"
diff --git a/localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/PeerID.swift b/localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/PeerID.swift
index 0b2721c2..f22fac18 100644
--- a/localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/PeerID.swift
+++ b/localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/PeerID.swift
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ public struct PeerID: Equatable, Hashable, Sendable {
         case geoDM = "nostr_"
         /// `"nostr:"` (+ 8 characters hex)
         case geoChat = "nostr:"
+        /// `"group_"` (+ 32 characters hex) — virtual conversation ID for a
+        /// private group (16-byte group ID). Never routed to a single peer.
+        case group = "group_"
     }
 
     public let prefix: Prefix
@@ -96,6 +99,22 @@ public extension PeerID {
     }
 }
 
+// MARK: - Group Conversation Helpers
+
+public extension PeerID {
+    /// Convenience init to create a virtual group conversation PeerID from a
+    /// 16-byte group ID ("group_" + 32 hex characters).
+    init(groupID: Data) {
+        self.init(str: Prefix.group.rawValue + groupID.hexEncodedString())
+    }
+
+    /// The 16-byte group ID behind a "group_" PeerID, if this is one.
+    var groupIDData: Data? {
+        guard isGroup, bare.count == 32 else { return nil }
+        return Data(hexString: bare)
+    }
+}
+
 // MARK: - Noise Public Key Helpers
 
 public extension PeerID {
@@ -143,6 +162,11 @@ public extension PeerID {
         prefix == .geoDM
     }
 
+    /// Returns true if `id` starts with "`group_`"
+    var isGroup: Bool {
+        prefix == .group
+    }
+
     func toPercentEncoded() -> String {
         id.addingPercentEncoding(withAllowedCharacters: .urlPathAllowed) ?? id
     }