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Fix favorites end-to-end: peer-list duplicates, Nostr sync, /fav key corruption (v1.5.4) (#1367)
* Friend-courier store-and-forward: mutual favorites carry sealed messages to offline peers When a private message has no reachable transport, the router now seals it to the recipient's Noise static key (new one-way Noise X pattern) and hands the envelope to up to three connected mutual favorites. Couriers store the opaque ciphertext under strict quotas (20 total, 5 per depositor, 16 KiB, 24 h) and hand it over when the recipient's announce matches a rotating HMAC recipient tag; the recipient opens it and the message flows through the normal private-message pipeline, so dedup and delivery acks just work. - CourierEnvelope TLV + courierEnvelope (0x04) message type in BitFoundation - Noise X one-way pattern reusing the existing handshake machinery, domain-separated by a courier prologue; sender identity authenticated via the ss DH (no forward secrecy - documented tradeoff) - CourierStore with eviction, file persistence, and panic-wipe integration - Rotating recipient tags (HMAC over epoch day) so carried envelopes don't correlate for observers who don't already know the recipient's key - New "carried" delivery status with figure.walk glyph; header indicator while carrying mail for others - Three-node end-to-end test ferrying packets through real BLEService instances, plus codec/crypto/store/router suites (986 tests green) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix courier handoff verification and directed sends * Authenticate courier deposits by ingress peer * Gate courier handover on direct announces and isolate store test Envelopes are removed from the courier store optimistically, so releasing them on a relayed (multi-hop) announce risks losing carried mail to a speculative flood that never reaches the recipient. Handover now also requires the announce to have arrived directly (full TTL), i.e. an actual encounter with a live link; regression test builds a relayed copy of a genuinely signed announce (TTL is excluded from announce signatures). Also make CourierStore's on-disk location injectable so the persistence test round-trips through a temp directory instead of wiping the real Application Support store, and reattach BLEAnnounceHandler's doc comment to the class it describes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Use Xcode-bundled Swift in CI instead of a standalone toolchain The unpinned setup-swift action installs Swift 6.1, which refuses the SDK on runner images that have rolled to Xcode 26.5 ("this SDK is not supported by the compiler"). Jobs passed or failed depending on which image they landed on. The Xcode-bundled toolchain always matches the image's SDK, and matches local development. Cache keys now include the toolchain version so artifacts from one compiler are never restored into builds with another. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Drop couriered mail from blocked senders at envelope open The UI-layer block check (isPeerBlocked in the transport event coordinator) resolves a fingerprint from the live session or peer list, but a couriered message arrives precisely when its sender is absent — no session, no registry entry — so the check failed open and a blocked identity's mail was delivered anyway. Gate in openCourierEnvelope, where the sealed sender's full static key is in hand. End-to-end test ferries a full deposit→carry→handover round and verifies the envelope from a blocked sender never reaches the delegate (confirmed failing without the gate). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix favorites end-to-end: peer-list dedup, Nostr sync, /fav key corruption - UnifiedPeerService: dedup offline favorites against mesh peers by noise key. Phase 2 compared a 64-hex noise-key PeerID against 16-hex mesh IDs (never equal), leaving only a nickname+isConnected heuristic — a mutual favorite that was reachable-but-not-connected or renamed rendered twice, and a same-nick stranger could suppress a favorite entirely. - Nostr inbound: intercept [FAVORITED]/[UNFAVORITED] markers in the live PM handler so they update theyFavoritedUs instead of rendering as chat text; mutual favorites can now form over Nostr. Delete the dead favorite-aware PM variant and ChatNostrCoordinator.handleFavoriteNotification (unwired, parsed a stale FAVORITE:TRUE|… format no sender emits). - NostrTransport.isPeerReachable: match short form regardless of incoming ID width — toggling an offline favorite (addressed by 64-hex noise key) was silently dropped with no reachable transport. - BLEService.sendPrivateMessage: normalize recipient to the short ID like sendFilePrivate, so a 64-hex target hits the existing Noise session instead of initiating a handshake with a 32-byte wire recipient ID. - /fav, /unfav: stop writing Data(hexString: peerID.id) — the 8-byte routing ID for mesh peers — into the favorites store as a "noise key", and stop double-sending the favorite notification; delegate to toggleFavorite with a proper state check. - FavoritesPersistenceService.updatePeerFavoritedUs: keep the stored nickname when the caller passes the "Unknown" placeholder. - Bump marketing version to 1.5.4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Route DMs to mutual favorites via Nostr when a mesh-keyed peer goes offline Field-tested on device: with a DM window opened while the peer was on mesh (conversation keyed by the short 16-hex ID), walking out of range and sending failed instantly with "peer not reachable" even though the header showed the peer as Nostr-reachable (mutual favorite, npub known). sendPrivateMessage derived the favorites key as Data(hexString: peerID.id) — for a short mesh ID that is the 8-byte routing ID, never the noise key — so the mutual-favorite/Nostr-key checks always came up empty and the send failed before reaching MessageRouter. Conversations keyed by the full 64-hex noise-key ID (opened from the offline favorite row) were unaffected, which is why later tests appeared to work. Resolve the noise key properly (peerID.noiseKey, then the unified peer row, then the favorites store by derived short ID) and add a regression test for the mesh-keyed-peer-goes-offline case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Label Nostr DMs from favorites with their stored nickname Field-tested: a DM delivered over the Nostr fallback rendered as "anon#678e" instead of the sender's name. The inbound handler named the sender via displayNameForNostrPubkey, which only knows geohash-scoped names — even though the pipeline had already resolved the sender's noise key (the conversation is keyed by it). When the conversation key carries a noise key, prefer the favorite's stored nickname; geohash DMs (nostr_ keys) keep the anon geo name. This also stops an inbound Nostr [FAVORITED] from overwriting the stored nickname with the anon fallback, since the same name feeds updatePeerFavoritedUs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix courier path for offline favorites addressed by noise-key IDs Two Codex review findings, both the same ID-width confusion this PR targets, in the courier flow: - CourierDirectory.favoritesBacked resolved recipients only via getFavoriteStatus(forPeerID:), which requires a short 16-hex ID — offline favorites are addressed by the full 64-hex noise-key ID, so attemptCourierDeposit silently bailed for exactly the peers couriers exist to serve. The 64-hex ID now yields its own key directly. - openCourierEnvelope emitted the derived short mesh ID even when the sender has no live mesh identity, landing couriered mail in an unresolvable short-ID thread labeled "Unknown". Absent senders now emit the full noise-key ID so the message joins the stable favorite conversation; present senders keep the live short-ID thread. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
jack
co-authored by
jack
Claude Fable 5
jack
Claude Fable 5
parent
d285c6ad53
commit
75da63c9d7
@@ -46,6 +46,20 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
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// 4. Efficient Message Deduplication
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private let messageDeduplicator = MessageDeduplicator()
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// Courier store-and-forward: envelopes this device carries for offline
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// third parties, and the trust gate for accepting deposits. Injectable
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// for tests; main-actor policy because favorites live on the main actor.
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var courierStore: CourierStore = .shared
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var courierDepositPolicy: @MainActor (Data) -> Bool = { depositorNoiseKey in
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FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.isMutualFavorite(depositorNoiseKey)
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}
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#if DEBUG
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// Test-only tap on the outbound pipeline so multi-node tests can ferry
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// packets between in-process service instances.
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var _test_onOutboundPacket: ((BitchatPacket) -> Void)?
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#endif
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private var selfBroadcastTracker = BLESelfBroadcastTracker()
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private let meshTopology = MeshTopologyTracker()
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@@ -888,6 +902,10 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
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} else {
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packetToSend = packet
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}
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#if DEBUG
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_test_onOutboundPacket?(packetToSend)
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#endif
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// Encode once using a small per-type padding policy, then delegate by type
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let padForBLE = BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.padsBLEFrame(for: packetToSend.type)
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@@ -1047,6 +1065,9 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
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// Directed send helper (unicast to a specific peerID) without altering packet contents
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private func sendPacketDirected(_ packet: BitchatPacket, to peerID: PeerID) {
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#if DEBUG
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_test_onOutboundPacket?(packet)
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#endif
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guard let data = packet.toBinaryData(padding: false) else { return }
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sendOnAllLinks(packet: packet, data: data, pad: false, directedOnlyPeer: peerID)
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}
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@@ -2468,7 +2489,147 @@ extension BLEService {
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ttl: messageTTL
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)
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}
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// MARK: Courier Store-and-Forward
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/// Seal `content` to the recipient's static key (one-way Noise X) and hand
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/// the envelope to the given couriers for physical delivery. Returns false
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/// when no courier is connected, the payload cannot be built, or sealing
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/// fails; link writes are queued asynchronously after the envelope is ready.
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func sendCourierMessage(_ content: String, messageID: String, recipientNoiseKey: Data, via couriers: [PeerID]) -> Bool {
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let connected = couriers.filter { isPeerConnected($0) }
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guard !connected.isEmpty,
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let typedPayload = BLENoisePayloadFactory.privateMessage(content: content, messageID: messageID) else {
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return false
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}
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let payload: Data
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do {
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let now = Date()
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let sealed = try noiseService.sealCourierPayload(typedPayload, recipientStaticKey: recipientNoiseKey)
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let envelope = CourierEnvelope(
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recipientTag: CourierEnvelope.recipientTag(
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noiseStaticKey: recipientNoiseKey,
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epochDay: CourierEnvelope.epochDay(for: now)
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),
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expiry: UInt64((now.timeIntervalSince1970 + CourierEnvelope.maxLifetimeSeconds) * 1000),
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ciphertext: sealed
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)
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guard let encoded = envelope.encode() else { return false }
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payload = encoded
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} catch {
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SecureLogger.error("Failed to seal courier envelope: \(error)", category: .encryption)
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return false
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}
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messageQueue.async { [weak self] in
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guard let self else { return }
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for courier in connected {
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SecureLogger.debug("📦 Depositing courier envelope with \(courier.id.prefix(8))… id=\(messageID.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
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self.sendPacketDirected(self.makeCourierPacket(payload, to: courier), to: courier)
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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private func makeCourierPacket(_ payload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) -> BitchatPacket {
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BitchatPacket(
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type: MessageType.courierEnvelope.rawValue,
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senderID: myPeerIDData,
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recipientID: Data(hexString: peerID.id),
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timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
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payload: payload,
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signature: nil,
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ttl: messageTTL
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)
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}
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/// Handles both courier roles for an incoming envelope addressed to us:
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/// recipient (the rotating tag matches our static key → open and deliver)
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/// or courier (a trusted peer is depositing mail for someone else → store).
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private func handleCourierEnvelope(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
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// Directed packets only; envelopes addressed elsewhere ride the
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// generic relay path untouched.
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guard packet.recipientID == myPeerIDData else { return }
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guard let envelope = CourierEnvelope.decode(packet.payload), !envelope.isExpired else { return }
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let myKey = noiseService.getStaticPublicKeyData()
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if CourierEnvelope.candidateTags(noiseStaticKey: myKey, around: Date()).contains(envelope.recipientTag) {
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openCourierEnvelope(envelope)
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} else {
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acceptCourierDeposit(envelope, from: peerID)
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}
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}
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private func openCourierEnvelope(_ envelope: CourierEnvelope) {
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do {
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let (typedPayload, senderStaticKey) = try noiseService.openCourierPayload(envelope.ciphertext)
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guard let typeRaw = typedPayload.first,
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let payloadType = NoisePayloadType(rawValue: typeRaw),
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payloadType == .privateMessage else {
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SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Courier envelope carried unsupported payload type", category: .session)
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return
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}
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// Couriered mail arrives while the sender is absent, so the UI's
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// block check can't resolve their fingerprint from a live session.
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// Gate here, where the full static key is in hand.
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guard !identityManager.isBlocked(fingerprint: senderStaticKey.sha256Fingerprint()) else {
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SecureLogger.debug("🚫 Dropping courier envelope from blocked sender", category: .security)
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return
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}
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// A present sender resolves to their live mesh thread via the
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// derived short ID. An absent sender — the usual courier case —
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// uses the full noise-key ID so the message lands on the stable
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// favorite conversation instead of an unresolvable short-ID
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// thread labeled "Unknown".
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let shortID = PeerID(publicKey: senderStaticKey)
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let isKnownOnMesh = collectionsQueue.sync { peerRegistry.info(for: shortID) != nil }
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let senderPeerID = isKnownOnMesh ? shortID : PeerID(hexData: senderStaticKey)
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let payload = Data(typedPayload.dropFirst())
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SecureLogger.debug("📦 Opened courier envelope from \(senderPeerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
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notifyUI { [weak self] in
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self?.deliverTransportEvent(.noisePayloadReceived(
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peerID: senderPeerID,
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type: payloadType,
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payload: payload,
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timestamp: Date()
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))
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}
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} catch {
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// Tag collision or stale key: not addressed to us after all.
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SecureLogger.debug("📦 Courier envelope failed to open: \(error)", category: .encryption)
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}
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}
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private func acceptCourierDeposit(_ envelope: CourierEnvelope, from peerID: PeerID) {
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guard let depositorKey = collectionsQueue.sync(execute: { peerRegistry.info(for: peerID)?.noisePublicKey }) else {
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SecureLogger.debug("📦 Courier deposit from unknown peer \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… rejected", category: .session)
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return
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}
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let store = courierStore
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let policy = courierDepositPolicy
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Task { @MainActor in
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guard policy(depositorKey) else {
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SecureLogger.debug("📦 Courier deposit from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… rejected (not a mutual favorite)", category: .session)
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return
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}
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if store.deposit(envelope, from: depositorKey) {
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SecureLogger.debug("📦 Carrying courier envelope deposited by \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
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}
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}
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}
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/// Hand over any carried envelopes addressed to a peer we just heard from.
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private func deliverCourierMail(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKey: Data) {
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let envelopes = courierStore.takeEnvelopes(for: noiseKey)
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guard !envelopes.isEmpty else { return }
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SecureLogger.debug("📦 Handing over \(envelopes.count) courier envelope(s) to \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
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for envelope in envelopes {
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guard let payload = envelope.encode() else { continue }
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sendPacketDirected(makeCourierPacket(payload, to: peerID), to: peerID)
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}
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}
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// MARK: Link capability snapshots (thread-safe via bleQueue)
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private func readLinkState<T>(_ body: (BLELinkStateStore) -> T) -> T {
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@@ -2601,8 +2762,11 @@ extension BLEService {
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// MARK: Private Message Handling
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private func sendPrivateMessage(_ content: String, to recipientID: PeerID, messageID: String) {
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// Sessions and wire recipient IDs are keyed by the short 16-hex form;
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// callers may pass the full 64-hex noise key (mirrors sendFilePrivate).
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let recipientID = recipientID.toShort()
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SecureLogger.debug("📨 Sending PM to \(recipientID.id.prefix(8))… id=\(messageID.prefix(8))… chars=\(content.count) bytes=\(content.utf8.count)", category: .session)
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// Check if we have an established Noise session
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if noiseService.hasEstablishedSession(with: recipientID) {
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// Encrypt and send
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@@ -2953,7 +3117,10 @@ extension BLEService {
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case .fileTransfer:
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handleFileTransfer(packet, from: senderID)
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case .courierEnvelope:
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handleCourierEnvelope(packet, from: peerID)
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case .leave:
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handleLeave(packet, from: senderID)
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@@ -3015,7 +3182,18 @@ extension BLEService {
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}
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private func handleAnnounce(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
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announceHandler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
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let result = announceHandler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
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// Courier handover: an announce is the moment we learn a peer's Noise
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// static key, so check whether we're carrying mail addressed to them.
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// Direct announces only: envelopes are removed from the store
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// optimistically, so handover must ride an established link rather
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// than a speculative multi-hop send toward a relayed announce.
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guard !courierStore.isEmpty,
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let result,
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result.isVerified,
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result.isDirectAnnounce else { return }
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deliverCourierMail(to: result.peerID, noiseKey: result.announcement.noisePublicKey)
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}
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/// Builds the announce handler environment. All queue hops stay here so
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