Bind capability state to Noise generations

This commit is contained in:
jack
2026-07-25 23:00:28 +02:00
committed by jack
parent 71e5d8da10
commit 39e13104b9
9 changed files with 569 additions and 137 deletions
+69 -9
View File
@@ -165,7 +165,6 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
// Peer fingerprints (SHA256 hash of static public key)
private var peerFingerprints: [PeerID: String] = [:]
private var fingerprintToPeerID: [String: PeerID] = [:]
// Thread safety
private let serviceQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.service", attributes: .concurrent)
@@ -183,6 +182,7 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
// Callbacks
private var onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers: [((PeerID, String) -> Void)] = [] // Array of handlers for peer authentication
private var onPeerAuthenticatedWithGenerationHandlers: [((PeerID, String, UUID) -> Void)] = []
var onHandshakeRequired: ((PeerID) -> Void)? // peerID needs handshake
/// Automatic rekey removed the old session and produced XX message 1.
/// The transport must clear session-scoped state and put these exact bytes
@@ -206,6 +206,18 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
}
}
}
/// Generation-aware authentication notifications are used by protocols
/// whose state must be bound to one exact Noise transport session.
var onPeerAuthenticatedWithGeneration: ((PeerID, String, UUID) -> Void)? {
get { nil }
set {
guard let handler = newValue else { return }
serviceQueue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
self?.onPeerAuthenticatedWithGenerationHandlers.append(handler)
}
}
}
init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
self.keychain = keychain
@@ -300,8 +312,12 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
self.sessionManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: staticIdentityKey, keychain: keychain)
// Set up session callbacks
sessionManager.onSessionEstablished = { [weak self] peerID, remoteStaticKey in
self?.handleSessionEstablished(peerID: peerID, remoteStaticKey: remoteStaticKey)
sessionManager.onSessionEstablished = { [weak self] peerID, remoteStaticKey, generation in
self?.handleSessionEstablished(
peerID: peerID,
remoteStaticKey: remoteStaticKey,
sessionGeneration: generation
)
}
// Start session maintenance timer
@@ -750,7 +766,11 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
/// messages retain the 64 KiB ceiling; this purpose-specific path permits
/// the bounded `BitchatFilePacket` envelope and refuses every other typed
/// payload so the larger allocation budget cannot become a generic bypass.
func encryptPrivateFilePayload(_ data: Data, for peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
func encryptPrivateFilePayload(
_ data: Data,
for peerID: PeerID,
sessionGeneration: UUID? = nil
) throws -> Data {
guard NoisePayloadType.isPrivateFile(rawValue: data.first),
NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileMessageSize(data) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
@@ -767,11 +787,25 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
// `maxPrivateFilePlaintextSize` already subtracts the cipher's fixed
// nonce/tag overhead, so the result is bounded without a second copy.
if let sessionGeneration {
return try sessionManager.encrypt(
data,
for: peerID,
expectedSessionGeneration: sessionGeneration
)
}
return try sessionManager.encrypt(data, for: peerID)
}
/// Decrypt data from a specific peer
func decrypt(_ data: Data, from peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
try decryptWithSessionGeneration(data, from: peerID).plaintext
}
func decryptWithSessionGeneration(
_ data: Data,
from peerID: PeerID
) throws -> (plaintext: Data, sessionGeneration: UUID) {
// Standard transport ciphertext has 20 bytes of nonce/tag overhead.
// A larger candidate is admitted only up to the framed-file ceiling;
// after authenticated decryption it must prove it is `.privateFile`.
@@ -790,14 +824,14 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
throw NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished
}
let decrypted = try sessionManager.decrypt(data, from: peerID)
let result = try sessionManager.decryptWithSessionGeneration(data, from: peerID)
if !isStandardCiphertext {
guard NoisePayloadType.isPrivateFile(rawValue: decrypted.first),
NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileMessageSize(decrypted) else {
guard NoisePayloadType.isPrivateFile(rawValue: result.plaintext.first),
NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileMessageSize(result.plaintext) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
}
}
return decrypted
return result
}
// MARK: - Peer Management
@@ -809,6 +843,25 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
}
}
func sessionGeneration(for peerID: PeerID) -> UUID? {
sessionManager.sessionGeneration(for: peerID)
}
/// Runs `body` while holding a read lease on the exact session generation.
/// Session insertion, replacement, and removal use the same manager
/// barrier, so they cannot interleave with an authenticated-state commit.
func withCurrentSessionGeneration<Result>(
for peerID: PeerID,
expected: UUID,
_ body: () -> Result
) -> Result? {
sessionManager.withCurrentSessionGeneration(
for: peerID,
expected: expected,
body
)
}
func clearEphemeralStateForPanic() {
sessionManager.removeAllSessions()
serviceQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
@@ -831,7 +884,11 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
// MARK: - Private Helpers
private func handleSessionEstablished(peerID: PeerID, remoteStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey) {
private func handleSessionEstablished(
peerID: PeerID,
remoteStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey,
sessionGeneration: UUID
) {
// Calculate fingerprint
let fingerprint = remoteStaticKey.rawRepresentation.sha256Fingerprint()
@@ -846,6 +903,9 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
// Notify all handlers about authentication
serviceQueue.async { [weak self] in
self?.onPeerAuthenticatedWithGenerationHandlers.forEach { handler in
handler(peerID, fingerprint, sessionGeneration)
}
self?.onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers.forEach { handler in
handler(peerID, fingerprint)
}