Encrypt private media before BLE fragmentation (#1434)

Closes the last cleartext private-content path over BLE: private DM images/voice were sent as plaintext signed fileTransfer packets, TTL-relayed across the mesh, so every relay saw the full bytes. Now the complete BitchatFilePacket is encrypted as a single Noise AEAD message (inner type 0x20, matching Android) and the opaque ciphertext is fragmented. Adds an authenticated in-session capability proof (0x21 TLV: capabilities + Ed25519 key), TOFU-style downgrade pinning, a per-send consent dialog for the signed-cleartext fallback to legacy peers, and a cancellation/admission registry so cancel/delete cannot race a deferred cleartext send.

Android wire constants (0x20 / 0x21 / capability bit 8) confirmed shipping. The 256-fragment preflight cap applies only to the directed fileTransfer migration fallback; encrypted media to capable peers uses the full receiver ceiling.

Rebased over #1428/#1349: identity reads go through BLELocalIdentityStateStore; the session-bound authenticated signing-key check and the announce-path TOFU pin are kept as complementary checks. Full local suite green (1744+197 tests).
This commit is contained in:
jack
2026-07-26 12:17:22 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 10886428ca
commit 2d96fd99a1
55 changed files with 5428 additions and 255 deletions
+83
View File
@@ -156,6 +156,89 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
}
}
/// State that is authoritative only because it is carried inside an
/// established Noise session. The public announce remains useful for
/// discovery, but its self-signature cannot prove possession of the copied
/// Noise public key it contains.
///
/// Wire format (v1):
/// `[version=0x01][type][length][value]...`
/// - TLV `0x01`: canonical minimal little-endian `PeerCapabilities`
/// - TLV `0x02`: 32-byte Ed25519 signing public key
///
/// Unknown TLVs are skipped for forward compatibility. Unknown versions,
/// duplicates, non-canonical capability fields, and malformed lengths are
/// rejected without changing authenticated state.
struct AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket: Equatable {
static let currentVersion: UInt8 = 1
static let signingPublicKeyLength = 32
let capabilities: PeerCapabilities
let signingPublicKey: Data
private enum TLVType: UInt8 {
case capabilities = 0x01
case signingPublicKey = 0x02
}
func encode() -> Data? {
guard signingPublicKey.count == Self.signingPublicKeyLength else { return nil }
let capabilityBytes = capabilities.encoded()
guard !capabilityBytes.isEmpty, capabilityBytes.count <= 8 else { return nil }
var data = Data([Self.currentVersion])
data.append(TLVType.capabilities.rawValue)
data.append(UInt8(capabilityBytes.count))
data.append(capabilityBytes)
data.append(TLVType.signingPublicKey.rawValue)
data.append(UInt8(signingPublicKey.count))
data.append(signingPublicKey)
return data
}
static func decode(from data: Data) -> AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket? {
guard data.first == Self.currentVersion else { return nil }
var offset = 1
var capabilities: PeerCapabilities?
var signingPublicKey: Data?
while offset < data.count {
guard offset + 2 <= data.count else { return nil }
let typeRaw = data[offset]
let length = Int(data[offset + 1])
offset += 2
guard offset + length <= data.count else { return nil }
let value = Data(data[offset..<(offset + length)])
offset += length
guard let type = TLVType(rawValue: typeRaw) else {
continue
}
switch type {
case .capabilities:
guard capabilities == nil,
!value.isEmpty,
value.count <= 8 else { return nil }
let decoded = PeerCapabilities(encoded: value)
guard decoded.encoded() == value else { return nil }
capabilities = decoded
case .signingPublicKey:
guard signingPublicKey == nil,
value.count == Self.signingPublicKeyLength else { return nil }
signingPublicKey = value
}
}
guard let capabilities, let signingPublicKey else { return nil }
return AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket(
capabilities: capabilities,
signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey
)
}
}
struct PrivateMessagePacket {
let messageID: String
let content: String