Fix decompression size limit to support max-sized file transfers

Root cause: BinaryProtocol.decode() was rejecting decompressed payloads
larger than maxPayloadBytes (1 MB), but TLV-encoded file transfers are
slightly larger due to metadata overhead.

Fixes:
- Changed decompression limit from maxPayloadBytes to maxFramedFileBytes
- This accounts for TLV overhead (~50 bytes) + binary protocol headers
- Now allows ~1.12 MB decompressed payloads (1 MB + overhead budget)

The failing test was:
- Creating 1 MB file content
- TLV encoding adds ~50 bytes (1,048,627 total)
- Compression reduces to ~1,084 bytes (highly repetitive data)
- During decode, decompression was rejecting the 1,048,627 byte output
- Now correctly allows it since 1,048,627 < 1,179,760 (maxFramedFileBytes)

All 154 tests now pass including 'Max-sized file transfer survives reassembly'

bitchat/Protocols/BinaryProtocol.swift

@@ -333,7 +333,8 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
                     originalSize = Int(rawSize)
                 }
                 // Guard to keep decompression bounded to sane BLE payload limits
-                guard originalSize >= 0 && originalSize <= FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes else { return nil }
+                // Use maxFramedFileBytes to account for TLV overhead in file transfer payloads
+                guard originalSize >= 0 && originalSize <= FileTransferLimits.maxFramedFileBytes else { return nil }
                 let compressedSize = payloadLength - lengthFieldBytes
                 guard compressedSize >= 0, let compressed = readData(compressedSize) else { return nil }
 

bitchat/Services/BLEService.swift

@@ -3441,10 +3441,11 @@ extension BLEService {
             }
             return FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes
         }()
-        guard currentSize + fragmentData.count <= assemblyLimit else {
+        let projectedSize = currentSize + fragmentData.count
+        guard projectedSize <= assemblyLimit else {
             // Exceeds size limit - evict this assembly
             SecureLogger.warning(
-                "🚫 Fragment assembly exceeds size limit (\(currentSize + fragmentData.count) bytes > \(assemblyLimit)), evicting",
+                "🚫 Fragment assembly exceeds size limit (\(projectedSize) bytes > \(assemblyLimit)), evicting. Type=\(originalType) Index=\(index)/\(total)",
                 category: .security
             )
             incomingFragments.removeValue(forKey: key)