[codex] Extract BLE service policy helpers (#1321)

* Extract BLE service policy helpers * Stabilize image media transfer test --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-25 04:05:20 +00:00 · 2026-06-01 14:16:44 +02:00
parent ffa0d7aa4f
commit 193cfdc06a
16 changed files with 1565 additions and 486 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+import Testing
+@testable import bitchat
+
+@Suite("BLE ingress packet guard tests")
+struct BLEIngressPacketGuardTests {
+    @Test("valid packets return the received and validation peer context")
+    func validPacketsReturnContext() throws {
+        let local = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
+        let bound = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        let sender = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
+        let packet = makePacket(sender: sender, timestamp: 1_000)
+
+        let context = try #require(success(BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
+            packet: packet,
+            claimedSenderID: sender,
+            boundPeerID: bound,
+            localPeerID: local,
+            directAnnounceTTL: 7,
+            nowMs: 1_000,
+            isValidSyncResponse: { _ in false }
+        )))
+
+        #expect(context.receivedFromPeerID == bound)
+        #expect(context.validationPeerID == sender)
+    }
+
+    @Test("self loopback and direct announce spoofing are rejected before timestamp checks")
+    func linkBindingRejectionsWinBeforeTimestampChecks() {
+        let local = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
+        let bound = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        let claimed = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
+        let selfPacket = makePacket(sender: local, timestamp: 0)
+        let spoofedAnnounce = makePacket(type: .announce, sender: claimed, timestamp: 0, ttl: 7)
+
+        let selfResult = BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
+            packet: selfPacket,
+            claimedSenderID: local,
+            boundPeerID: bound,
+            localPeerID: local,
+            directAnnounceTTL: 7,
+            nowMs: 1_000_000,
+            isValidSyncResponse: { _ in false }
+        )
+        let spoofResult = BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
+            packet: spoofedAnnounce,
+            claimedSenderID: claimed,
+            boundPeerID: bound,
+            localPeerID: local,
+            directAnnounceTTL: 7,
+            nowMs: 1_000_000,
+            isValidSyncResponse: { _ in false }
+        )
+
+        #expect(selfResult == .failure(.selfLoopback(packetType: MessageType.message.rawValue)))
+        #expect(spoofResult == .failure(.directSenderMismatch(boundPeerID: bound, claimedSenderID: claimed)))
+    }
+
+    @Test("timestamp skew outside the window is rejected")
+    func timestampSkewIsRejected() {
+        let local = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
+        let sender = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        let packet = makePacket(sender: sender, timestamp: 1_000)
+
+        let result = BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
+            packet: packet,
+            claimedSenderID: sender,
+            boundPeerID: nil,
+            localPeerID: local,
+            directAnnounceTTL: 7,
+            nowMs: 200_000,
+            maxTimestampSkewMs: 120_000,
+            isValidSyncResponse: { _ in false }
+        )
+
+        #expect(result == .failure(.timestampSkew(
+            peerID: sender,
+            skewMs: 199_000,
+            maxSkewMs: 120_000
+        )))
+    }
+
+    @Test("valid RSR packets use bound peer validation and bypass timestamp skew")
+    func validRSRUsesBoundPeerAndBypassesTimestamp() throws {
+        let local = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
+        let bound = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        let sender = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
+        var packet = makePacket(sender: sender, timestamp: 1)
+        packet.isRSR = true
+
+        let context = try #require(success(BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
+            packet: packet,
+            claimedSenderID: sender,
+            boundPeerID: bound,
+            localPeerID: local,
+            directAnnounceTTL: 7,
+            nowMs: 1_000_000,
+            isValidSyncResponse: { $0 == bound }
+        )))
+
+        #expect(context.receivedFromPeerID == bound)
+        #expect(context.validationPeerID == bound)
+    }
+
+    @Test("invalid RSR packets are rejected")
+    func invalidRSRIsRejected() {
+        let local = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
+        let bound = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        let sender = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
+        var packet = makePacket(sender: sender, timestamp: 1)
+        packet.isRSR = true
+
+        let result = BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
+            packet: packet,
+            claimedSenderID: sender,
+            boundPeerID: bound,
+            localPeerID: local,
+            directAnnounceTTL: 7,
+            nowMs: 1_000_000,
+            isValidSyncResponse: { _ in false }
+        )
+
+        #expect(result == .failure(.invalidRSR(peerID: bound)))
+    }
+
+    private func makePacket(
+        type: MessageType = .message,
+        sender: PeerID,
+        timestamp: UInt64,
+        ttl: UInt8 = 3
+    ) -> BitchatPacket {
+        BitchatPacket(
+            type: type.rawValue,
+            senderID: Data(hexString: sender.id) ?? Data(),
+            recipientID: nil,
+            timestamp: timestamp,
+            payload: Data([0x01, 0x02, 0x03]),
+            signature: nil,
+            ttl: ttl
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func success(_ result: Result<BLEIngressPacketContext, BLEIngressPacketGuard.Rejection>) -> BLEIngressPacketContext? {
+        guard case .success(let context) = result else { return nil }
+        return context
+    }
+}