Fix ordinary Noise handshake races

This commit is contained in:
jack
2026-07-25 23:00:28 +02:00
parent 797494e075
commit 1820c7ab98
10 changed files with 1850 additions and 129 deletions
+80 -10
View File
@@ -184,11 +184,13 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
private var onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers: [((PeerID, String) -> Void)] = [] // Array of handlers for peer authentication
private var onPeerAuthenticatedWithGenerationHandlers: [((PeerID, String, UUID) -> Void)] = []
var onHandshakeRequired: ((PeerID) -> Void)? // peerID needs handshake
/// Automatic rekey removed the old session and produced XX message 1.
/// The transport must clear session-scoped state and put these exact bytes
/// on the wire; merely reporting "handshake required" strands the partial
/// initiator session because a second initiate call sees it already exists.
var onRekeyHandshakeReady: ((_ peerID: PeerID, _ message: Data) -> Void)?
/// Automatic rekey prepared XX message 1. The transport must claim the
/// exact attempt at its actual BLE handoff; a crossed inbound initiation
/// can invalidate the token before that point.
var onRekeyHandshakeReady:
((_ peerID: PeerID, _ initiation: NoiseHandshakeInitiation) -> Void)?
var onHandshakeRecoveryRequired:
((_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest) -> Void)?
/// An unauthenticated reconnect attempt failed or timed out and the
/// receive-only rollback session became the active transport again.
/// Transport queues must be drained for this exact restored generation.
@@ -225,8 +227,14 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
init(
keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol,
ordinaryHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval =
NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryHandshakeTimeout,
ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval =
NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout
NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout,
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: TimeInterval =
NoiseSecurityConstants.recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod,
ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown: TimeInterval =
NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown
) {
self.keychain = keychain
self.localPrekeys = LocalPrekeyStore(keychain: keychain)
@@ -320,7 +328,13 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
self.sessionManager = NoiseSessionManager(
localStaticKey: staticIdentityKey,
keychain: keychain,
ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout: ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout
ordinaryHandshakeTimeout: ordinaryHandshakeTimeout,
ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout:
ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout,
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod:
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod,
ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown:
ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown
)
// Set up session callbacks
@@ -334,6 +348,9 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
sessionManager.onSessionRestored = { [weak self] peerID, generation in
self?.onSessionRestoredWithGeneration?(peerID, generation)
}
sessionManager.onHandshakeRecoveryRequired = { [weak self] request in
self?.onHandshakeRecoveryRequired?(request)
}
// Start session maintenance timer
startRekeyTimer()
@@ -698,11 +715,41 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
return handshakeData
}
/// Atomically admits and prepares one initial ordinary handshake. Returns
/// nil when another discovery callback already created a session.
func initiateHandshakeIfNeeded(
with peerID: PeerID,
retryOnTimeout: Bool = false
) throws -> NoiseHandshakeInitiation? {
guard peerID.isValid else {
SecureLogger.warning(.authenticationFailed(peerID: peerID.id))
throw NoiseSecurityError.invalidPeerID
}
guard let initiation = try sessionManager.initiateHandshakeIfAbsent(
with: peerID,
notifyOnTimeout: retryOnTimeout,
authorize: { [rateLimiter] in
guard rateLimiter.allowHandshake(from: peerID) else {
SecureLogger.warning(
.authenticationFailed(peerID: "Rate limited: \(peerID)")
)
throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
}
}
) else {
return nil
}
SecureLogger.info(.handshakeStarted(peerID: peerID.id))
return initiation
}
/// Atomically prepares an ordinary reconnect for a peer whose cached
/// transport belongs to an earlier physical link. Failed authorization or
/// handshake setup preserves the established session.
func initiateReconnectHandshake(
with peerID: PeerID
with peerID: PeerID,
retryOnTimeout: Bool = false
) throws -> NoiseHandshakeInitiation {
guard peerID.isValid else {
SecureLogger.warning(.authenticationFailed(peerID: peerID.id))
@@ -711,6 +758,7 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
return try sessionManager.initiateReconnectHandshake(
with: peerID,
notifyOnTimeout: retryOnTimeout,
authorize: { [rateLimiter] in
guard rateLimiter.allowHandshake(from: peerID) else {
SecureLogger.warning(
@@ -722,6 +770,28 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
)
}
func prepareHandshakeRecovery(
_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest
) throws -> NoiseHandshakeRecoveryPreparation? {
try sessionManager.prepareHandshakeRecovery(
request,
authorizeAttempt: { [rateLimiter] in
guard rateLimiter.allowHandshake(from: request.peerID) else {
SecureLogger.warning(
.authenticationFailed(
peerID: "Rate limited: \(request.peerID)"
)
)
throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
}
}
)
}
func cancelHandshakeRecovery(_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest) {
sessionManager.cancelHandshakeRecovery(request)
}
func claimHandshakeInitiation(
_ initiation: NoiseHandshakeInitiation,
for peerID: PeerID
@@ -991,9 +1061,9 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
}
private func initiateAutomaticRekey(for peerID: PeerID) throws {
let handshakeMessage = try sessionManager.initiateRekey(for: peerID)
let initiation = try sessionManager.initiateRekey(for: peerID)
SecureLogger.debug("Key rotation initiated for peer: \(peerID)", category: .security)
onRekeyHandshakeReady?(peerID, handshakeMessage)
onRekeyHandshakeReady?(peerID, initiation)
onHandshakeRequired?(peerID)
}