Authenticate private media capability per Noise session

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/crypto/EncryptionService.kt

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import androidx.security.crypto.EncryptedSharedPreferences
 import androidx.security.crypto.MasterKey
 import com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseEncryptionService
 import com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseDecryptionResult
 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.AsymmetricCipherKeyPair
 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.generators.Ed25519KeyPairGenerator
 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.params.Ed25519KeyGenerationParameters
@@ -191,6 +193,13 @@ open class EncryptionService(private val context: Context) {
         }
         return encrypted
     }
+
+    @Throws(Exception::class)
+    fun encryptForSession(
+        data: ByteArray,
+        peerID: String,
+        expectedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ): ByteArray = noiseService.encryptForSession(data, peerID, expectedSession)
     
     /**
      * Decrypt data from a specific peer using Noise transport encryption
@@ -203,6 +212,12 @@ open class EncryptionService(private val context: Context) {
         }
         return decrypted
     }
+
+    @Throws(Exception::class)
+    fun decryptWithSession(data: ByteArray, peerID: String): NoiseDecryptionResult {
+        return noiseService.decryptWithSession(data, peerID)
+            ?: throw Exception("Failed generation-bound decryption from $peerID")
+    }
     
     /**
      * Sign data using our static identity key
@@ -263,11 +278,17 @@ open class EncryptionService(private val context: Context) {
      * authentication, not a self-certified identity payload.
      */
     fun getAuthenticatedRemoteStaticKey(peerID: String): ByteArray? {
-        if (!noiseService.hasEstablishedSession(peerID)) return null
+        return getAuthenticatedSession(peerID)?.remoteStaticKey?.copyOf()
-        return noiseService.getPeerPublicKeyData(peerID)
-            ?.takeIf { it.size == 32 }
-            ?.copyOf()
     }
+
+    fun getAuthenticatedSession(peerID: String): AuthenticatedNoiseSession? =
+        noiseService.getAuthenticatedSession(peerID)
+
+    fun withAuthenticatedSession(
+        peerID: String,
+        expectedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession,
+        action: () -> Boolean
+    ): Boolean = noiseService.withAuthenticatedSession(peerID, expectedSession, action)
     
     /**
      * Get current peer ID for a fingerprint (for peer ID rotation)

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/identity/SecureIdentityStateManager.kt

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 package com.bitchat.android.identity
 
+import android.annotation.SuppressLint
 import android.content.Context
 import android.content.SharedPreferences
 import androidx.security.crypto.EncryptedSharedPreferences
@@ -7,6 +8,8 @@ import androidx.security.crypto.MasterKey
 import java.security.MessageDigest
 import android.util.Base64
 import android.util.Log
+import com.bitchat.android.model.AuthenticatedPeerState
+import com.bitchat.android.model.PeerCapabilities
 import com.bitchat.android.util.hexEncodedString
 import androidx.core.content.edit
 
@@ -33,6 +36,7 @@ class SecureIdentityStateManager {
         private const val KEY_CACHED_NOISE_FINGERPRINTS = "cached_noise_fingerprints"
         private const val KEY_CACHED_FINGERPRINT_NICKNAMES = "cached_fingerprint_nicknames"
         private const val KEY_PRIVATE_MEDIA_CAPABILITY_PINS = "private_media_capability_pins_v1"
+        private const val KEY_AUTHENTICATED_PEER_STATES = "authenticated_peer_states_v1"
 
         // BLE, Wi-Fi Aware, and Noise services each hold their own manager
         // instance over the same encrypted preferences. Serialize pin updates
@@ -317,25 +321,6 @@ class SecureIdentityStateManager {
 
     // MARK: - Authenticated private-media capability pins
 
-    /**
-     * Persist an HSTS-style private-media capability pin. The caller must
-     * derive [fingerprint] directly from a Noise-authenticated remote static
-     * key after matching it to a signature-verified announcement.
-     */
-    fun markPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint: String) {
-        if (!isValidFingerprint(fingerprint)) return
-        synchronized(privateMediaPinsLock) {
-            // A controller that survived panic must never be able to restore a
-            // pin from an in-flight pre-wipe handshake callback.
-            if (privateMediaPinsEpochAtCreation != privateMediaPinsEpoch) return
-            val current = prefs.getStringSet(KEY_PRIVATE_MEDIA_CAPABILITY_PINS, emptySet())
-                ?.mapTo(mutableSetOf()) { it.lowercase() }
-                ?: mutableSetOf()
-            current.add(fingerprint.lowercase())
-            prefs.edit { putStringSet(KEY_PRIVATE_MEDIA_CAPABILITY_PINS, current) }
-        }
-    }
-
     fun isPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint: String): Boolean {
         if (!isValidFingerprint(fingerprint)) return false
         return synchronized(privateMediaPinsLock) {
@@ -347,13 +332,64 @@ class SecureIdentityStateManager {
         }
     }
 
-    internal fun getPrivateMediaCapabilityPinsForTesting(): Set<String> =
+    /** Persist capabilities and Ed25519 key from a decoded Noise 0x21 proof in one edit. */
-        synchronized(privateMediaPinsLock) {
+    @SuppressLint("UseKtx")
-            if (privateMediaPinsEpochAtCreation != privateMediaPinsEpoch) {
+    fun storeAuthenticatedPeerState(
-                return@synchronized emptySet()
+        fingerprint: String,
+        state: AuthenticatedPeerState,
+        onCommitted: () -> Unit = {}
+    ): Boolean {
+        if (!isValidFingerprint(fingerprint) || state.signingPublicKey.size != 32) return false
+        val normalizedFingerprint = fingerprint.lowercase()
+        return synchronized(privateMediaPinsLock) {
+            // A controller that survived panic must not republish pre-wipe proof state.
+            if (privateMediaPinsEpochAtCreation != privateMediaPinsEpoch) return@synchronized false
+            val records = prefs.getStringSet(KEY_AUTHENTICATED_PEER_STATES, emptySet())
+                ?.toMutableSet() ?: mutableSetOf()
+            records.removeAll { it.startsWith("$normalizedFingerprint:") }
+            val capabilitiesHex = java.lang.Long.toUnsignedString(state.capabilities.rawValue, 16)
+            records.add(
+                "$normalizedFingerprint:$capabilitiesHex:${state.signingPublicKey.hexEncodedString()}"
+            )
+
+            val editor = prefs.edit().putStringSet(KEY_AUTHENTICATED_PEER_STATES, records)
+            if (state.capabilities.contains(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA)) {
+                val pins = prefs.getStringSet(KEY_PRIVATE_MEDIA_CAPABILITY_PINS, emptySet())
+                    ?.mapTo(mutableSetOf()) { it.lowercase() } ?: mutableSetOf()
+                pins.add(normalizedFingerprint)
+                editor.putStringSet(KEY_PRIVATE_MEDIA_CAPABILITY_PINS, pins)
+            }
+            // This result is a security boundary: do not publish the Ed key in memory unless the
+            // encrypted identity record and its HSTS pin were durably committed together.
+            editor.commit().also { committed ->
+                if (committed) onCommitted()
             }
-            prefs.getStringSet(KEY_PRIVATE_MEDIA_CAPABILITY_PINS, emptySet())?.toSet() ?: emptySet()
         }
+    }
+
+    fun getAuthenticatedPeerState(fingerprint: String): AuthenticatedPeerState? {
+        if (!isValidFingerprint(fingerprint)) return null
+        return synchronized(privateMediaPinsLock) {
+            if (privateMediaPinsEpochAtCreation != privateMediaPinsEpoch) return@synchronized null
+            val prefix = "${fingerprint.lowercase()}:"
+            val record = prefs.getStringSet(KEY_AUTHENTICATED_PEER_STATES, emptySet())
+                ?.firstOrNull { it.startsWith(prefix) } ?: return@synchronized null
+            val fields = record.split(':', limit = 3)
+            if (fields.size != 3) return@synchronized null
+            val capabilities = runCatching {
+                PeerCapabilities(java.lang.Long.parseUnsignedLong(fields[1], 16))
+            }.getOrNull() ?: return@synchronized null
+            val signingKeyHex = fields[2]
+            if (!signingKeyHex.matches(Regex("^[0-9a-f]{64}$"))) return@synchronized null
+            val signingKey = runCatching {
+                signingKeyHex.chunked(2).map { it.toInt(16).toByte() }.toByteArray()
+            }.getOrNull() ?: return@synchronized null
+            AuthenticatedPeerState(capabilities, signingKey)
+        }
+    }
+
+    fun getAuthenticatedSigningKey(fingerprint: String): ByteArray? =
+        getAuthenticatedPeerState(fingerprint)?.signingPublicKey?.copyOf()
     
     // MARK: - Peer ID Rotation Management (removed)
     // Android now derives peer ID from the persisted Noise identity fingerprint.
@@ -429,12 +465,15 @@ class SecureIdentityStateManager {
     /**
      * Clear all identity data (for panic mode)
      */
+    @SuppressLint("UseKtx")
     fun clearIdentityData() {
         try {
             synchronized(privateMediaPinsLock) {
                 privateMediaPinsEpoch += 1
                 privateMediaPinsEpochAtCreation = privateMediaPinsEpoch
-                prefs.edit().clear().apply()
+                if (!prefs.edit().clear().commit()) {
+                    Log.e(TAG, "Identity preference wipe could not be committed")
+                }
             }
             Log.w(TAG, "All identity data cleared")
         } catch (e: Exception) {

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinator.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+package com.bitchat.android.mesh
+
+import android.content.Context
+import com.bitchat.android.identity.SecureIdentityStateManager
+import com.bitchat.android.model.AuthenticatedPeerState
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.NoisePeerIdentity
+import java.security.MessageDigest
+import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
+import kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineScope
+import kotlinx.coroutines.Job
+import kotlinx.coroutines.delay
+import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
+
+internal interface AuthenticatedPeerStateStore {
+    fun load(fingerprint: String): AuthenticatedPeerState?
+    fun persist(
+        fingerprint: String,
+        state: AuthenticatedPeerState,
+        onCommitted: () -> Unit
+    ): Boolean
+    fun isPrivateMediaPinned(fingerprint: String): Boolean
+}
+
+internal class SecureAuthenticatedPeerStateStore(context: Context) : AuthenticatedPeerStateStore {
+    private val identityState = SecureIdentityStateManager(context.applicationContext)
+
+    override fun load(fingerprint: String): AuthenticatedPeerState? =
+        identityState.getAuthenticatedPeerState(fingerprint)
+
+    override fun persist(
+        fingerprint: String,
+        state: AuthenticatedPeerState,
+        onCommitted: () -> Unit
+    ): Boolean = identityState.storeAuthenticatedPeerState(fingerprint, state, onCommitted)
+
+    override fun isPrivateMediaPinned(fingerprint: String): Boolean =
+        identityState.isPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint)
+}
+
+internal sealed interface AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus {
+    data object Missing : AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus
+    data object Awaiting : AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus
+    data object TimedOut : AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus
+    data class Proven(val state: AuthenticatedPeerState) : AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus
+}
+
+/** Fresh, generation-scoped authenticated peer-state exchange for Noise payload 0x21. */
+internal class AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinator(
+    private val scope: CoroutineScope,
+    private val authenticatedSessionProvider: (String) -> AuthenticatedNoiseSession?,
+    private val withAuthenticatedSession: (
+        String,
+        AuthenticatedNoiseSession,
+        () -> Boolean
+    ) -> Boolean,
+    private val store: AuthenticatedPeerStateStore,
+    private val localStateProvider: () -> AuthenticatedPeerState,
+    private val applyAuthenticatedState: (String, ByteArray, AuthenticatedPeerState) -> Unit,
+    private val sendState: (String, AuthenticatedPeerState, AuthenticatedNoiseSession) -> Boolean,
+    private val onResolution: (String) -> Unit,
+    private val proofTimeoutMs: Long = 5_000L
+) {
+    private data class SessionState(
+        val authenticatedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession,
+        val fingerprint: String,
+        var status: AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus,
+        var echoSent: Boolean,
+        var timeoutJob: Job? = null
+    )
+
+    private val lock = Any()
+    private val sessions = ConcurrentHashMap<String, SessionState>()
+
+    fun onSessionAuthenticated(
+        peerID: String,
+        authenticatedRemoteStatic: ByteArray,
+        authenticatedSessionToken: ByteArray
+    ) {
+        if (!NoisePeerIdentity.matchesClaimedPeerID(peerID, authenticatedRemoteStatic)) return
+        if (authenticatedSessionToken.size != 32 ||
+            authenticatedSessionToken.all { it == 0.toByte() }
+        ) return
+        val authenticatedSession = AuthenticatedNoiseSession(
+            authenticatedRemoteStatic.copyOf(),
+            authenticatedSessionToken.copyOf()
+        )
+        ensureSession(peerID, authenticatedSession)
+    }
+
+    /** Install one watchdog/exchange for this exact live generation, without resetting it. */
+    private fun ensureSession(
+        peerID: String,
+        authenticatedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ): SessionState? {
+        val authenticatedRemoteStatic = authenticatedSession.remoteStaticKey
+        if (!NoisePeerIdentity.matchesClaimedPeerID(peerID, authenticatedRemoteStatic)) return null
+        if (authenticatedSession.sessionToken.size != 32 ||
+            authenticatedSession.sessionToken.all { it == 0.toByte() }
+        ) return null
+        // Ignore a delayed callback or policy snapshot if a later generation is already active.
+        if (authenticatedSessionProvider(peerID) != authenticatedSession) return null
+        val session = SessionState(
+            authenticatedSession = authenticatedSession,
+            fingerprint = fingerprint(authenticatedRemoteStatic),
+            status = AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Awaiting,
+            echoSent = false
+        )
+        val installed = withAuthenticatedSession(peerID, authenticatedSession) {
+            synchronized(lock) {
+                val existing = sessions[peerID]
+                if (existing?.authenticatedSession == authenticatedSession) {
+                    return@synchronized false
+                }
+                sessions.put(peerID, session)?.timeoutJob?.cancel()
+                true
+            }
+        }
+        if (!installed) return synchronized(lock) { sessions[peerID] }
+
+        // Emit for every authenticated generation/rekey. Failure does not relax the watchdog.
+        runCatching { sendState(peerID, localStateProvider(), authenticatedSession) }
+
+        val timeout = scope.launch {
+            delay(proofTimeoutMs)
+            val resolved = synchronized(lock) {
+                val current = sessions[peerID]
+                if (current !== session || current.status !is AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Awaiting) {
+                    false
+                } else {
+                    current.status = AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.TimedOut
+                    true
+                }
+            }
+            if (resolved) onResolution(peerID)
+        }
+        synchronized(lock) {
+            if (sessions[peerID] === session && session.status is AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Awaiting) {
+                session.timeoutJob = timeout
+            } else {
+                timeout.cancel()
+            }
+        }
+        return session
+    }
+
+    /** Accept the first valid proof for this generation; repeated equal proofs are idempotent. */
+    fun receive(
+        peerID: String,
+        state: AuthenticatedPeerState,
+        decryptedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ): Boolean {
+        val remoteStatic = decryptedSession.remoteStaticKey
+        if (!NoisePeerIdentity.matchesClaimedPeerID(peerID, remoteStatic)) return false
+        if (decryptedSession.sessionToken.size != 32 ||
+            decryptedSession.sessionToken.all { it == 0.toByte() }
+        ) return false
+        val currentFingerprint = fingerprint(remoteStatic)
+
+        var shouldEcho = false
+        var echoSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession? = null
+        val accepted = withAuthenticatedSession(peerID, decryptedSession) {
+            synchronized(lock) {
+                val current = sessions[peerID] ?: return@synchronized false
+                if (current.fingerprint != currentFingerprint ||
+                    current.authenticatedSession != decryptedSession
+                ) return@synchronized false
+                val proven = current.status as? AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Proven
+                if (proven != null) return@synchronized proven.state == state
+                try {
+                    // Persist before publishing the replacement Ed key in memory, so a restart
+                    // cannot reopen copied-static first-announce poisoning. The Noise manager
+                    // lease prevents this generation from being replaced during the transition.
+                    if (!store.persist(currentFingerprint, state) {
+                            // Publish while the persistence epoch lock is still held. A panic wipe
+                            // can therefore happen before both operations or after both, never between.
+                            applyAuthenticatedState(peerID, remoteStatic, state)
+                        }
+                    ) return@synchronized false
+                    current.timeoutJob?.cancel()
+                    current.status = AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Proven(state)
+                    if (!current.echoSent) {
+                        current.echoSent = true
+                        shouldEcho = true
+                        echoSession = current.authenticatedSession
+                    }
+                    true
+                } catch (_: Exception) {
+                    false
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (!accepted) return false
+        if (shouldEcho) {
+            val exactSession = echoSession ?: return false
+            runCatching { sendState(peerID, localStateProvider(), exactSession) }
+        }
+        onResolution(peerID)
+        return true
+    }
+
+    fun status(
+        peerID: String,
+        authenticatedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ): AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus {
+        ensureSession(peerID, authenticatedSession)
+        val currentFingerprint = fingerprint(authenticatedSession.remoteStaticKey)
+        return synchronized(lock) {
+            sessions[peerID]?.takeIf {
+                it.fingerprint == currentFingerprint &&
+                    it.authenticatedSession == authenticatedSession
+            }?.status
+                ?: AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Missing
+        }
+    }
+
+    fun persistedSigningKeyFor(noisePublicKey: ByteArray): ByteArray? {
+        if (noisePublicKey.size != 32) return null
+        return store.load(fingerprint(noisePublicKey))?.signingPublicKey?.copyOf()
+    }
+
+    fun isPrivateMediaPinned(peerID: String): Boolean {
+        val authenticatedSession = authenticatedSessionProvider(peerID) ?: return false
+        return store.isPrivateMediaPinned(fingerprint(authenticatedSession.remoteStaticKey))
+    }
+
+    fun clear(peerID: String) {
+        synchronized(lock) { sessions.remove(peerID)?.timeoutJob?.cancel() }
+    }
+
+    private fun fingerprint(publicKey: ByteArray): String =
+        MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")
+            .digest(publicKey)
+            .joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) }
+}

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/BluetoothMeshService.kt

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import android.content.Context
 import android.util.Log
 import com.bitchat.android.crypto.EncryptionService
 import com.bitchat.android.model.BitchatMessage
+import com.bitchat.android.model.AuthenticatedPeerState
+import com.bitchat.android.model.PeerCapabilities
 import com.bitchat.android.protocol.MessagePadding
 import com.bitchat.android.model.RoutedPacket
 import com.bitchat.android.model.IdentityAnnouncement
@@ -50,18 +52,53 @@ class BluetoothMeshService(private val context: Context) : TransportBridgeServic
     val myPeerID: String = encryptionService.getIdentityFingerprint().take(16)
     private val peerManager = PeerManager()
     private val fragmentManager = FragmentManager()
-    private val privateMediaSecurity = PrivateMediaSecurityController(
+    private val serviceScope = CoroutineScope(Dispatchers.IO + SupervisorJob())
-        peerInfoProvider = peerManager::getPeerInfo,
+    private val authenticatedPeerStateStore = SecureAuthenticatedPeerStateStore(context)
-        authenticatedRemoteStaticProvider = encryptionService::getAuthenticatedRemoteStaticKey,
+    private val authenticatedPeerState by lazy {
-        pinStore = SecurePrivateMediaCapabilityPinStore(context)
+        AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinator(
-    )
+            scope = serviceScope,
+            authenticatedSessionProvider = encryptionService::getAuthenticatedSession,
+            withAuthenticatedSession = encryptionService::withAuthenticatedSession,
+            store = authenticatedPeerStateStore,
+            localStateProvider = {
+                AuthenticatedPeerState(
+                    PeerCapabilities.LOCAL_SUPPORTED,
+                    requireNotNull(encryptionService.getSigningPublicKey())
+                )
+            },
+            applyAuthenticatedState = peerManager::applyAuthenticatedPeerState,
+            sendState = ::sendAuthenticatedPeerState,
+            onResolution = { peerID -> delegate?.didResolvePrivateMediaPolicy(peerID) }
+        )
+    }
+    private val privateMediaSecurity by lazy { PrivateMediaSecurityController(
+        authenticatedSessionProvider = encryptionService::getAuthenticatedSession,
+        peerStateStatusProvider = authenticatedPeerState::status,
+        isPrivateMediaPinned = authenticatedPeerState::isPrivateMediaPinned
+    ) }
     private val privateMediaPreparer by lazy {
         PrivateMediaTransferPreparer(
             senderID = hexStringToByteArray(myPeerID),
             ttl = MAX_TTL,
             policyProvider = privateMediaSecurity::sendPolicy,
-            encrypt = { plaintext, peerID ->
+            encrypt = { plaintext, peerID, authenticatedSession ->
-                runCatching { encryptionService.encrypt(plaintext, peerID) }.getOrNull()
+                try {
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.Success(
+                        encryptionService.encryptForSession(
+                            plaintext,
+                            peerID,
+                            authenticatedSession
+                        )
+                    )
+                } catch (_: com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseSessionError.SessionGenerationChanged) {
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.GenerationChanged
+                } catch (_: com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseSessionError.SessionNotFound) {
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.GenerationChanged
+                } catch (_: com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseSessionError.SessionNotEstablished) {
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.GenerationChanged
+                } catch (_: Exception) {
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.Failed
+                }
             },
             finalizeRoutedAndSigned = ::routeAndSignPrivateMediaStrict,
             fragment = fragmentManager::createFragments
@@ -87,7 +124,6 @@ class BluetoothMeshService(private val context: Context) : TransportBridgeServic
     var delegate: BluetoothMeshDelegate? = null
     
     // Coroutines
-    private val serviceScope = CoroutineScope(Dispatchers.IO + SupervisorJob())
     private var announceJob: Job? = null
     // Tracks whether this instance has been terminated via stopServices()
     private var terminated = false
@@ -218,6 +254,7 @@ class BluetoothMeshService(private val context: Context) : TransportBridgeServic
                 delegate?.didUpdatePeerList(peerIDs)
             }
             override fun onPeerRemoved(peerID: String) {
+                authenticatedPeerState.clear(peerID)
                 try { gossipSyncManager.removeAnnouncementForPeer(peerID) } catch (_: Exception) { }
                 // Remove from mesh graph topology to prevent routing through stale peers
                 try { com.bitchat.android.services.meshgraph.MeshGraphService.getInstance().removePeer(peerID) } catch (_: Exception) { }
@@ -237,9 +274,15 @@ class BluetoothMeshService(private val context: Context) : TransportBridgeServic
             override fun onKeyExchangeCompleted(
                 peerID: String,
                 authenticatedRemoteStaticKey: ByteArray,
+                authenticatedSessionToken: ByteArray,
                 directRelayAddress: String?,
                 ingressLinkID: String?
             ) {
+                authenticatedPeerState.onSessionAuthenticated(
+                    peerID,
+                    authenticatedRemoteStaticKey,
+                    authenticatedSessionToken
+                )
                 // Send announcement and cached messages after key exchange
                 serviceScope.launch {
                     Log.d(TAG, "Key exchange completed with $peerID; sending follow-ups")
@@ -271,6 +314,9 @@ class BluetoothMeshService(private val context: Context) : TransportBridgeServic
             override fun getPeerInfo(peerID: String): PeerInfo? {
                 return peerManager.getPeerInfo(peerID)
             }
+
+            override fun getAuthenticatedSigningKey(noisePublicKey: ByteArray): ByteArray? =
+                authenticatedPeerState.persistedSigningKeyFor(noisePublicKey)
         }
         
         // StoreForwardManager delegates
@@ -330,10 +376,6 @@ class BluetoothMeshService(private val context: Context) : TransportBridgeServic
                 )
             }
 
-            override fun onVerifiedAnnouncementProcessed(peerID: String) {
-                privateMediaSecurity.refreshAuthenticatedCapability(peerID)
-            }
-            
             // Packet operations
             override fun sendPacket(packet: BitchatPacket) {
                 // Sign the packet before broadcasting
@@ -358,13 +400,19 @@ class BluetoothMeshService(private val context: Context) : TransportBridgeServic
                 return securityManager.encryptForPeer(data, recipientPeerID)
             }
             
-            override fun decryptFromPeer(encryptedData: ByteArray, senderPeerID: String): ByteArray? {
+            override fun decryptFromPeer(
+                encryptedData: ByteArray,
+                senderPeerID: String
+            ): com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseDecryptionResult? {
                 return securityManager.decryptFromPeer(encryptedData, senderPeerID)
             }
             
             override fun verifyEd25519Signature(signature: ByteArray, data: ByteArray, publicKey: ByteArray): Boolean {
                 return encryptionService.verifyEd25519Signature(signature, data, publicKey)
             }
+
+            override fun getAuthenticatedSigningKey(noisePublicKey: ByteArray): ByteArray? =
+                authenticatedPeerState.persistedSigningKeyFor(noisePublicKey)
             
             // Noise protocol operations
             override fun hasNoiseSession(peerID: String): Boolean {
@@ -408,6 +456,14 @@ class BluetoothMeshService(private val context: Context) : TransportBridgeServic
                     null
                 }
             }
+
+            override fun onAuthenticatedPeerStateReceived(
+                peerID: String,
+                state: AuthenticatedPeerState,
+                authenticatedSession: com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+            ) {
+                authenticatedPeerState.receive(peerID, state, authenticatedSession)
+            }
             
             // Message operations  
             override fun decryptChannelMessage(encryptedContent: ByteArray, channel: String): String? {
@@ -786,6 +842,32 @@ class BluetoothMeshService(private val context: Context) : TransportBridgeServic
     /**
      * Send a file over mesh as a broadcast MESSAGE (public mesh timeline/channels).
      */
+    private fun sendAuthenticatedPeerState(
+        peerID: String,
+        state: AuthenticatedPeerState,
+        authenticatedSession: com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ): Boolean {
+        val plaintext = NoisePayload(NoisePayloadType.PEER_STATE, state.encode()).encode()
+        val ciphertext = securityManager.encryptForPeer(
+            plaintext,
+            peerID,
+            authenticatedSession
+        ) ?: return false
+        val packet = BitchatPacket(
+            version = if (ciphertext.size > 0xFFFF) 2u else 1u,
+            type = MessageType.NOISE_ENCRYPTED.value,
+            senderID = hexStringToByteArray(myPeerID),
+            recipientID = hexStringToByteArray(peerID),
+            timestamp = System.currentTimeMillis().toULong(),
+            payload = ciphertext,
+            ttl = MAX_TTL
+        )
+        val signed = signPacketBeforeBroadcast(packet)
+        if (signed.signature?.size != 64) return false
+        broadcastRoutedPacket(RoutedPacket(signed))
+        return true
+    }
+
     fun sendFileBroadcast(file: com.bitchat.android.model.BitchatFilePacket) {
         try {
             Log.d(TAG, "📤 sendFileBroadcast: name=${file.fileName}, size=${file.fileSize}")
@@ -834,6 +916,7 @@ class BluetoothMeshService(private val context: Context) : TransportBridgeServic
                 Log.i(TAG, "Private media needs a Noise handshake; initiating without sending")
                 initiateNoiseHandshake(recipientPeerID)
             }
+            PrivateMediaPreparation.AwaitingPeerState -> Unit
             is PrivateMediaPreparation.Rejected ->
                 Log.w(TAG, "Private media blocked: ${prepared.reason}")
         }
@@ -855,6 +938,8 @@ class BluetoothMeshService(private val context: Context) : TransportBridgeServic
                 PrivateMediaPreparation.RequiresLegacyConsent(outcome.warning)
             PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.NeedsHandshake ->
                 PrivateMediaPreparation.NeedsHandshake
+            PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.AwaitingPeerState ->
+                PrivateMediaPreparation.AwaitingPeerState
             is PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.Rejected ->
                 PrivateMediaPreparation.Rejected(outcome.reason)
             is PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.Ready -> {

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/MeshCore.kt

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import android.util.Log
 import com.bitchat.android.crypto.EncryptionService
 import com.bitchat.android.model.BitchatMessage
 import com.bitchat.android.model.BitchatFilePacket
+import com.bitchat.android.model.AuthenticatedPeerState
+import com.bitchat.android.model.PeerCapabilities
 import com.bitchat.android.model.IdentityAnnouncement
 import com.bitchat.android.model.NoisePayload
 import com.bitchat.android.model.NoisePayloadType
@@ -51,18 +53,52 @@ class MeshCore(
 
     private val peerManager = PeerManager()
     val fragmentManager = FragmentManager()
-    private val privateMediaSecurity = PrivateMediaSecurityController(
+    private val authenticatedPeerStateStore = SecureAuthenticatedPeerStateStore(context)
-        peerInfoProvider = peerManager::getPeerInfo,
+    private val authenticatedPeerState by lazy {
-        authenticatedRemoteStaticProvider = encryptionService::getAuthenticatedRemoteStaticKey,
+        AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinator(
-        pinStore = SecurePrivateMediaCapabilityPinStore(context)
+            scope = scope,
-    )
+            authenticatedSessionProvider = encryptionService::getAuthenticatedSession,
+            withAuthenticatedSession = encryptionService::withAuthenticatedSession,
+            store = authenticatedPeerStateStore,
+            localStateProvider = {
+                AuthenticatedPeerState(
+                    PeerCapabilities.LOCAL_SUPPORTED,
+                    requireNotNull(encryptionService.getSigningPublicKey())
+                )
+            },
+            applyAuthenticatedState = peerManager::applyAuthenticatedPeerState,
+            sendState = ::sendAuthenticatedPeerState,
+            onResolution = { peerID -> delegate?.didResolvePrivateMediaPolicy(peerID) }
+        )
+    }
+    private val privateMediaSecurity by lazy { PrivateMediaSecurityController(
+        authenticatedSessionProvider = encryptionService::getAuthenticatedSession,
+        peerStateStatusProvider = authenticatedPeerState::status,
+        isPrivateMediaPinned = authenticatedPeerState::isPrivateMediaPinned
+    ) }
     private val privateMediaPreparer by lazy {
         PrivateMediaTransferPreparer(
             senderID = MeshPacketUtils.hexStringToByteArray(myPeerID),
             ttl = maxTtl,
             policyProvider = privateMediaSecurity::sendPolicy,
-            encrypt = { plaintext, peerID ->
+            encrypt = { plaintext, peerID, authenticatedSession ->
-                runCatching { encryptionService.encrypt(plaintext, peerID) }.getOrNull()
+                try {
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.Success(
+                        encryptionService.encryptForSession(
+                            plaintext,
+                            peerID,
+                            authenticatedSession
+                        )
+                    )
+                } catch (_: com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseSessionError.SessionGenerationChanged) {
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.GenerationChanged
+                } catch (_: com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseSessionError.SessionNotFound) {
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.GenerationChanged
+                } catch (_: com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseSessionError.SessionNotEstablished) {
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.GenerationChanged
+                } catch (_: Exception) {
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.Failed
+                }
             },
             finalizeRoutedAndSigned = ::routeAndSignPrivateMediaStrict,
             fragment = fragmentManager::createFragments
@@ -179,6 +215,7 @@ class MeshCore(
             }
 
             override fun onPeerRemoved(peerID: String) {
+                authenticatedPeerState.clear(peerID)
                 try { gossipSyncManager.removeAnnouncementForPeer(peerID) } catch (_: Exception) { }
                 try { encryptionService.removePeer(peerID) } catch (_: Exception) { }
                 try { peerManager.refreshPeerList() } catch (_: Exception) { }
@@ -189,9 +226,15 @@ class MeshCore(
             override fun onKeyExchangeCompleted(
                 peerID: String,
                 authenticatedRemoteStaticKey: ByteArray,
+                authenticatedSessionToken: ByteArray,
                 directRelayAddress: String?,
                 ingressLinkID: String?
             ) {
+                authenticatedPeerState.onSessionAuthenticated(
+                    peerID,
+                    authenticatedRemoteStaticKey,
+                    authenticatedSessionToken
+                )
                 if (directRelayAddress != null && ingressLinkID != null) {
                     hooks.onDirectNoiseAuthenticated?.invoke(
                         peerID,
@@ -222,6 +265,9 @@ class MeshCore(
             }
 
             override fun getPeerInfo(peerID: String): PeerInfo? = peerManager.getPeerInfo(peerID)
+
+            override fun getAuthenticatedSigningKey(noisePublicKey: ByteArray): ByteArray? =
+                authenticatedPeerState.persistedSigningKeyFor(noisePublicKey)
         }
 
         storeForwardManager.delegate = object : StoreForwardManagerDelegate {
@@ -285,10 +331,6 @@ class MeshCore(
                 )
             }
 
-            override fun onVerifiedAnnouncementProcessed(peerID: String) {
-                privateMediaSecurity.refreshAuthenticatedCapability(peerID)
-            }
-
             override fun sendPacket(packet: BitchatPacket) {
                 val signedPacket = signPacketBeforeBroadcast(packet)
                 dispatchGlobal(RoutedPacket(signedPacket))
@@ -310,7 +352,10 @@ class MeshCore(
                 return securityManager.encryptForPeer(data, recipientPeerID)
             }
 
-            override fun decryptFromPeer(encryptedData: ByteArray, senderPeerID: String): ByteArray? {
+            override fun decryptFromPeer(
+                encryptedData: ByteArray,
+                senderPeerID: String
+            ): com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseDecryptionResult? {
                 return securityManager.decryptFromPeer(encryptedData, senderPeerID)
             }
 
@@ -318,6 +363,9 @@ class MeshCore(
                 return encryptionService.verifyEd25519Signature(signature, data, publicKey)
             }
 
+            override fun getAuthenticatedSigningKey(noisePublicKey: ByteArray): ByteArray? =
+                authenticatedPeerState.persistedSigningKeyFor(noisePublicKey)
+
             override fun hasNoiseSession(peerID: String): Boolean {
                 return encryptionService.hasEstablishedSession(peerID)
             }
@@ -334,6 +382,14 @@ class MeshCore(
                 }
             }
 
+            override fun onAuthenticatedPeerStateReceived(
+                peerID: String,
+                state: AuthenticatedPeerState,
+                authenticatedSession: com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+            ) {
+                authenticatedPeerState.receive(peerID, state, authenticatedSession)
+            }
+
             override fun decryptChannelMessage(encryptedContent: ByteArray, channel: String): String? {
                 return delegate?.decryptChannelMessage(encryptedContent, channel)
             }
@@ -471,6 +527,32 @@ class MeshCore(
         }
     }
 
+    private fun sendAuthenticatedPeerState(
+        peerID: String,
+        state: AuthenticatedPeerState,
+        authenticatedSession: com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ): Boolean {
+        val plaintext = NoisePayload(NoisePayloadType.PEER_STATE, state.encode()).encode()
+        val ciphertext = securityManager.encryptForPeer(
+            plaintext,
+            peerID,
+            authenticatedSession
+        ) ?: return false
+        val packet = BitchatPacket(
+            version = if (ciphertext.size > 0xFFFF) 2u else 1u,
+            type = MessageType.NOISE_ENCRYPTED.value,
+            senderID = MeshPacketUtils.hexStringToByteArray(myPeerID),
+            recipientID = MeshPacketUtils.hexStringToByteArray(peerID),
+            timestamp = System.currentTimeMillis().toULong(),
+            payload = ciphertext,
+            ttl = maxTtl
+        )
+        val signed = signPacketBeforeBroadcast(packet)
+        if (signed.signature?.size != 64) return false
+        dispatchGlobal(RoutedPacket(signed))
+        return true
+    }
+
     fun sendFileBroadcast(file: BitchatFilePacket) {
         try {
             val payload = file.encode() ?: return
@@ -510,6 +592,7 @@ class MeshCore(
                 Log.i("MeshCore", "Private media needs a Noise handshake; initiating without sending")
                 initiateNoiseHandshake(recipientPeerID)
             }
+            PrivateMediaPreparation.AwaitingPeerState -> Unit
             is PrivateMediaPreparation.Rejected ->
                 Log.w("MeshCore", "Private media blocked: ${prepared.reason}")
         }
@@ -531,6 +614,8 @@ class MeshCore(
                 PrivateMediaPreparation.RequiresLegacyConsent(outcome.warning)
             PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.NeedsHandshake ->
                 PrivateMediaPreparation.NeedsHandshake
+            PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.AwaitingPeerState ->
+                PrivateMediaPreparation.AwaitingPeerState
             is PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.Rejected ->
                 PrivateMediaPreparation.Rejected(outcome.reason)
             is PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.Ready -> {

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/MeshDelegate.kt

@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ interface MeshDelegate {
     fun didReceiveReadReceipt(messageID: String, recipientPeerID: String)
     fun didReceiveVerifyChallenge(peerID: String, payload: ByteArray, timestampMs: Long) {}
     fun didReceiveVerifyResponse(peerID: String, payload: ByteArray, timestampMs: Long) {}
+    /** Current Noise generation either proved peer state or exhausted its 5-second watchdog. */
+    fun didResolvePrivateMediaPolicy(peerID: String) {}
     fun decryptChannelMessage(encryptedContent: ByteArray, channel: String): String?
     fun getNickname(): String?
     fun isFavorite(peerID: String): Boolean

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/MessageHandler.kt

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package com.bitchat.android.mesh
 import android.util.Log
 import com.bitchat.android.model.BitchatMessage
 import com.bitchat.android.model.BitchatMessageType
+import com.bitchat.android.model.AuthenticatedPeerState
 import com.bitchat.android.model.RoutedPacket
 import com.bitchat.android.protocol.BitchatPacket
 import com.bitchat.android.protocol.MessageType
@@ -59,11 +60,12 @@ class MessageHandler(private val myPeerID: String, private val appContext: andro
         
         try {
             // Decrypt the message using the Noise service
-            val decryptedData = delegate?.decryptFromPeer(packet.payload, peerID)
+            val decryption = delegate?.decryptFromPeer(packet.payload, peerID)
-            if (decryptedData == null) {
+            if (decryption == null) {
                 Log.w(TAG, "Failed to decrypt Noise message from $peerID - may need handshake")
                 return
             }
+            val decryptedData = decryption.plaintext
             
             if (decryptedData.isEmpty()) {
                 Log.w(TAG, "Decrypted data is empty from $peerID")
@@ -145,6 +147,19 @@ class MessageHandler(private val myPeerID: String, private val appContext: andro
                         Log.w(TAG, "⚠️ Failed to decode encrypted file transfer from $peerID")
                     }
                 }
+
+                com.bitchat.android.model.NoisePayloadType.PEER_STATE -> {
+                    val authenticatedState = AuthenticatedPeerState.decode(noisePayload.data)
+                    if (authenticatedState == null) {
+                        Log.w(TAG, "Dropping malformed authenticated peer state from ${peerID.take(8)}")
+                    } else {
+                        delegate?.onAuthenticatedPeerStateReceived(
+                            peerID,
+                            authenticatedState,
+                            decryption.authenticatedSession
+                        )
+                    }
+                }
                 
                 com.bitchat.android.model.NoisePayloadType.DELIVERED -> {
                     // Handle delivery ACK exactly like iOS
@@ -248,6 +263,14 @@ class MessageHandler(private val myPeerID: String, private val appContext: andro
             return AnnounceHandlingResult.Rejected
         }
 
+        val persistedSigningKey = delegate?.getAuthenticatedSigningKey(announcement.noisePublicKey)
+        if (persistedSigningKey != null &&
+            !persistedSigningKey.contentEquals(announcement.signingPublicKey)
+        ) {
+            Log.w(TAG, "Rejecting ANNOUNCE Ed key that conflicts with authenticated peer state")
+            return AnnounceHandlingResult.Rejected
+        }
+
         var verified = true
 
         // Check for existing peer with different noise public key
@@ -629,7 +652,6 @@ interface MessageHandlerDelegate {
         isVerified: Boolean,
         capabilities: com.bitchat.android.model.PeerCapabilities? = null
     ): Boolean
-    fun onVerifiedAnnouncementProcessed(peerID: String) {}
     
     // Packet operations
     fun sendPacket(packet: BitchatPacket)
@@ -639,13 +661,22 @@ interface MessageHandlerDelegate {
     // Cryptographic operations
     fun verifySignature(packet: BitchatPacket, peerID: String): Boolean
     fun encryptForPeer(data: ByteArray, recipientPeerID: String): ByteArray?
-    fun decryptFromPeer(encryptedData: ByteArray, senderPeerID: String): ByteArray?
+    fun decryptFromPeer(
+        encryptedData: ByteArray,
+        senderPeerID: String
+    ): com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseDecryptionResult?
     fun verifyEd25519Signature(signature: ByteArray, data: ByteArray, publicKey: ByteArray): Boolean
+    fun getAuthenticatedSigningKey(noisePublicKey: ByteArray): ByteArray? = null
     
     // Noise protocol operations
     fun hasNoiseSession(peerID: String): Boolean
     fun initiateNoiseHandshake(peerID: String)
     fun processNoiseHandshakeMessage(payload: ByteArray, peerID: String): ByteArray?
+    fun onAuthenticatedPeerStateReceived(
+        peerID: String,
+        state: AuthenticatedPeerState,
+        authenticatedSession: com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ) {}
     
     // Message operations
     fun decryptChannelMessage(encryptedContent: ByteArray, channel: String): String?

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/PeerManager.kt

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package com.bitchat.android.mesh
 
 import android.util.Log
+import com.bitchat.android.model.AuthenticatedPeerState
 import com.bitchat.android.model.PeerCapabilities
 import kotlinx.coroutines.*
 import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
@@ -162,6 +163,37 @@ class PeerManager {
         verifiedAnnouncementNoisePublicKey = noisePublicKey.copyOf()
     )
 
+    /** Replace capability/Ed identity from Noise 0x21 in one peer-map mutation. */
+    @Synchronized
+    fun applyAuthenticatedPeerState(
+        peerID: String,
+        authenticatedNoisePublicKey: ByteArray,
+        state: AuthenticatedPeerState
+    ) {
+        val existing = peers[peerID]
+        val announcementMatchesAuthenticatedState = existing?.hasVerifiedAnnouncement == true &&
+            existing.verifiedAnnouncementNoisePublicKey?.contentEquals(authenticatedNoisePublicKey) == true &&
+            existing.signingPublicKey?.contentEquals(state.signingPublicKey) == true
+        val replacement = PeerInfo(
+            id = peerID,
+            // A copied-static preannouncement cannot retain its attacker-chosen display name once
+            // authenticated peer state proves a different Ed key.
+            nickname = existing?.nickname?.takeIf { announcementMatchesAuthenticatedState } ?: peerID,
+            isConnected = true,
+            isDirectConnection = existing?.isDirectConnection ?: false,
+            noisePublicKey = authenticatedNoisePublicKey.copyOf(),
+            signingPublicKey = state.signingPublicKey.copyOf(),
+            isVerifiedNickname = existing?.isVerifiedNickname == true && announcementMatchesAuthenticatedState,
+            lastSeen = System.currentTimeMillis(),
+            capabilities = state.capabilities,
+            hasVerifiedAnnouncement = announcementMatchesAuthenticatedState,
+            verifiedAnnouncementNoisePublicKey = authenticatedNoisePublicKey.copyOf()
+                .takeIf { announcementMatchesAuthenticatedState }
+        )
+        peers[peerID] = replacement
+        if (existing == null || existing != replacement) notifyPeerListUpdate()
+    }
+
     private fun updatePeerInfoInternal(
         peerID: String,
         nickname: String,

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/PrivateMediaSecurity.kt

@@ -1,31 +1,15 @@
 package com.bitchat.android.mesh
 
-import android.content.Context
-import com.bitchat.android.identity.SecureIdentityStateManager
 import com.bitchat.android.model.PeerCapabilities
-import java.security.MessageDigest
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
-
-internal interface PrivateMediaCapabilityPinStore {
-    fun contains(fingerprint: String): Boolean
-    fun insert(fingerprint: String)
-}
-
-internal class SecurePrivateMediaCapabilityPinStore(context: Context) :
-    PrivateMediaCapabilityPinStore {
-    private val identityState = SecureIdentityStateManager(context.applicationContext)
-
-    override fun contains(fingerprint: String): Boolean =
-        identityState.isPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint)
-
-    override fun insert(fingerprint: String) {
-        identityState.markPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint)
-    }
-}
 
 internal sealed interface PrivateMediaPolicyDecision {
-    data object Encrypted : PrivateMediaPolicyDecision
+    data class Encrypted(
+        val authenticatedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ) : PrivateMediaPolicyDecision
     data object RequiresLegacyConsent : PrivateMediaPolicyDecision
     data object NeedsHandshake : PrivateMediaPolicyDecision
+    data object AwaitingPeerState : PrivateMediaPolicyDecision
     data class Blocked(val reason: String) : PrivateMediaPolicyDecision
 }
 
@@ -35,71 +19,46 @@ internal sealed interface PrivateMediaPolicyDecision {
  * fingerprint. Announcements alone can never create a pin.
  */
 internal class PrivateMediaSecurityController(
-    private val peerInfoProvider: (String) -> PeerInfo?,
+    private val authenticatedSessionProvider: (String) -> AuthenticatedNoiseSession?,
-    private val authenticatedRemoteStaticProvider: (String) -> ByteArray?,
+    private val peerStateStatusProvider: (
-    private val pinStore: PrivateMediaCapabilityPinStore
+        String,
+        AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ) -> AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus,
+    private val isPrivateMediaPinned: (String) -> Boolean
 ) {
-    fun refreshAuthenticatedCapability(peerID: String): Boolean {
-        val remoteStatic = authenticatedRemoteStaticProvider(peerID)
-            ?.takeIf { it.size == 32 }
-            ?: return false
-        val peer = peerInfoProvider(peerID) ?: return false
-        if (!peer.hasVerifiedAnnouncement) return false
-        val announcedStatic = peer.verifiedAnnouncementNoisePublicKey ?: return false
-        if (!announcedStatic.contentEquals(remoteStatic)) return false
-        if (peer.capabilities?.contains(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA) != true) return false
-
-        pinStore.insert(fingerprint(remoteStatic))
-        return true
-    }
-
     fun sendPolicy(peerID: String): PrivateMediaPolicyDecision {
-        val remoteStatic = authenticatedRemoteStaticProvider(peerID)
+        val authenticatedSession = authenticatedSessionProvider(peerID)
-            ?.takeIf { it.size == 32 }
+            ?.takeIf { it.remoteStaticKey.size == 32 && it.sessionToken.size == 32 }
             ?: return PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.NeedsHandshake
-        val authenticatedFingerprint = fingerprint(remoteStatic)
 
-        // Once a fingerprint has authenticated encrypted media support, never
+        return when (val status = peerStateStatusProvider(peerID, authenticatedSession)) {
-        // downgrade it because a later announce omits or clears the bit.
+            AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Awaiting -> PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.AwaitingPeerState
-        if (pinStore.contains(authenticatedFingerprint)) {
+            is AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Proven -> {
-            return PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted
+                if (status.state.capabilities.contains(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA)) {
-        }
+                    PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted(authenticatedSession)
-
+                } else if (isPrivateMediaPinned(peerID)) {
-        val peer = peerInfoProvider(peerID)
+                    PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Blocked(
-            ?: return PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Blocked(
+                        "Encrypted private media was previously pinned, but this session proved no support; send blocked"
-                "No signature-verified identity announcement is available"
+                    )
-            )
+                } else {
-        if (!peer.hasVerifiedAnnouncement) {
+                    PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.RequiresLegacyConsent
-            return PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Blocked(
+                }
-                "The peer identity announcement has not been verified"
+            }
-            )
+            AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Missing ->
-        }
+                // A live crypto session can become visible just before its authenticated callback
-        val announcedStatic = peer.verifiedAnnouncementNoisePublicKey
+                // installs the coordinator generation. Never treat that gap as a watchdog timeout.
-            ?: return PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Blocked(
+                PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.AwaitingPeerState
-                "The verified announcement did not contain a Noise identity"
+            AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.TimedOut -> {
-            )
+                if (isPrivateMediaPinned(peerID)) {
-        if (!announcedStatic.contentEquals(remoteStatic)) {
+                    PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Blocked(
-            return PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Blocked(
+                        "Encrypted private media was previously pinned, but this session did not provide authenticated peer state"
-                "The authenticated Noise identity does not match the verified announcement"
+                    )
-            )
+                } else {
-        }
+                    // A Noise-capable old client that does not know 0x21 may use explicit one-shot
-
+                    // legacy consent after the five-second generation watchdog.
-        return if (peer.capabilities?.contains(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA) == true) {
+                    PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.RequiresLegacyConsent
-            pinStore.insert(authenticatedFingerprint)
+                }
-            PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted
+            }
-        } else {
-            // Both a missing TLV and an explicitly empty bitfield are legacy.
-            PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.RequiresLegacyConsent
         }
     }
-
-    internal fun authenticatedFingerprint(peerID: String): String? =
-        authenticatedRemoteStaticProvider(peerID)
-            ?.takeIf { it.size == 32 }
-            ?.let(::fingerprint)
-
-    private fun fingerprint(publicKey: ByteArray): String =
-        MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")
-            .digest(publicKey)
-            .joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) }
 }

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/PrivateMediaTransfer.kt

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package com.bitchat.android.mesh
 import com.bitchat.android.model.BitchatFilePacket
 import com.bitchat.android.model.NoisePayload
 import com.bitchat.android.model.NoisePayloadType
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
 import com.bitchat.android.protocol.BitchatPacket
 import com.bitchat.android.protocol.MessageType
 import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ sealed interface PrivateMediaPreparation {
     data class Ready(val transfer: PreparedPrivateMediaTransfer) : PrivateMediaPreparation
     data class RequiresLegacyConsent(val warning: String) : PrivateMediaPreparation
     data object NeedsHandshake : PrivateMediaPreparation
+    data object AwaitingPeerState : PrivateMediaPreparation
     data class Rejected(val reason: String) : PrivateMediaPreparation
 }
 
@@ -43,15 +45,26 @@ internal sealed interface PrivateMediaBuildOutcome {
     data class Ready(val built: BuiltPrivateMediaTransfer) : PrivateMediaBuildOutcome
     data class RequiresLegacyConsent(val warning: String) : PrivateMediaBuildOutcome
     data object NeedsHandshake : PrivateMediaBuildOutcome
+    data object AwaitingPeerState : PrivateMediaBuildOutcome
     data class Rejected(val reason: String) : PrivateMediaBuildOutcome
 }
 
+internal sealed interface PrivateMediaEncryptionResult {
+    data class Success(val ciphertext: ByteArray) : PrivateMediaEncryptionResult
+    data object GenerationChanged : PrivateMediaEncryptionResult
+    data object Failed : PrivateMediaEncryptionResult
+}
+
 /** Builds, routes, signs, and fragments exactly once before UI local echo. */
 internal class PrivateMediaTransferPreparer(
     private val senderID: ByteArray,
     private val ttl: UByte,
     private val policyProvider: (String) -> PrivateMediaPolicyDecision,
-    private val encrypt: (ByteArray, String) -> ByteArray?,
+    private val encrypt: (
+        ByteArray,
+        String,
+        AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ) -> PrivateMediaEncryptionResult,
     private val finalizeRoutedAndSigned: (BitchatPacket) -> BitchatPacket?,
     private val fragment: (BitchatPacket, Int) -> List<BitchatPacket>,
     private val now: () -> ULong = { System.currentTimeMillis().toULong() }
@@ -61,10 +74,24 @@ internal class PrivateMediaTransferPreparer(
         recipientID: ByteArray,
         file: BitchatFilePacket,
         allowLegacyFallback: Boolean
+    ): PrivateMediaBuildOutcome = prepare(
+        recipientPeerID,
+        recipientID,
+        file,
+        allowLegacyFallback,
+        generationRetriesRemaining = 1
+    )
+
+    private fun prepare(
+        recipientPeerID: String,
+        recipientID: ByteArray,
+        file: BitchatFilePacket,
+        allowLegacyFallback: Boolean,
+        generationRetriesRemaining: Int
     ): PrivateMediaBuildOutcome {
         val policy = policyProvider(recipientPeerID)
         val mode = when (policy) {
-            PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted -> PrivateMediaWireMode.ENCRYPTED_NOISE_0X20
+            is PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted -> PrivateMediaWireMode.ENCRYPTED_NOISE_0X20
             PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.RequiresLegacyConsent -> {
                 if (!allowLegacyFallback) {
                     return PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.RequiresLegacyConsent(
@@ -77,6 +104,8 @@ internal class PrivateMediaTransferPreparer(
             }
             PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.NeedsHandshake ->
                 return PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.NeedsHandshake
+            PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.AwaitingPeerState ->
+                return PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.AwaitingPeerState
             is PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Blocked ->
                 return PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.Rejected(policy.reason)
         }
@@ -87,13 +116,34 @@ internal class PrivateMediaTransferPreparer(
         val packet = when (mode) {
             PrivateMediaWireMode.ENCRYPTED_NOISE_0X20 -> {
                 val plaintext = NoisePayload(NoisePayloadType.FILE_TRANSFER, filePayload).encode()
-                val ciphertext = try {
+                val encryption = try {
-                    encrypt(plaintext, recipientPeerID)
+                    encrypt(
+                        plaintext,
+                        recipientPeerID,
+                        (policy as PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted).authenticatedSession
+                    )
                 } catch (_: Exception) {
-                    null
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.Failed
-                } ?: return PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.Rejected(
+                }
-                    "The authenticated Noise session could not encrypt this file"
+                val ciphertext = when (encryption) {
-                )
+                    is PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.Success -> encryption.ciphertext
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.GenerationChanged -> {
+                        if (generationRetriesRemaining > 0) {
+                            return prepare(
+                                recipientPeerID,
+                                recipientID,
+                                file,
+                                allowLegacyFallback,
+                                generationRetriesRemaining - 1
+                            )
+                        }
+                        return PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.AwaitingPeerState
+                    }
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.Failed ->
+                        return PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.Rejected(
+                            "The authenticated Noise session could not encrypt this file"
+                        )
+                }
                 BitchatPacket(
                     version = if (ciphertext.size > 0xFFFF) 2u else 1u,
                     type = MessageType.NOISE_ENCRYPTED.value,

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/SecurityManager.kt

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import com.bitchat.android.crypto.EncryptionService
 import com.bitchat.android.protocol.BitchatPacket
 import com.bitchat.android.protocol.MessageType
 import com.bitchat.android.model.RoutedPacket
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseDecryptionResult
 import com.bitchat.android.util.toHexString
 import kotlinx.coroutines.*
 import java.util.*
@@ -136,11 +138,19 @@ class SecurityManager(private val encryptionService: EncryptionService, private
                     Log.e(TAG, "Bound Noise completion for $peerID omitted its authenticated static key")
                     return false
                 }
+                val authenticatedSessionToken = result.authenticatedSessionToken
+                if (authenticatedSessionToken?.size != 32 ||
+                    authenticatedSessionToken.all { it == 0.toByte() }
+                ) {
+                    Log.e(TAG, "Bound Noise completion for $peerID omitted its generation token")
+                    return false
+                }
                 val isDirectIngress = packet.ttl == com.bitchat.android.util.AppConstants.MESSAGE_TTL_HOPS
                 Log.d(TAG, "✅ Noise handshake completed with $peerID")
                 delegate?.onKeyExchangeCompleted(
                     peerID = peerID,
                     authenticatedRemoteStaticKey = authenticatedRemoteStaticKey,
+                    authenticatedSessionToken = authenticatedSessionToken,
                     directRelayAddress = routed.relayAddress.takeIf { isDirectIngress },
                     ingressLinkID = routed.ingressLinkID.takeIf { isDirectIngress }
                 )
@@ -187,13 +197,24 @@ class SecurityManager(private val encryptionService: EncryptionService, private
             null
         }
     }
+
+    fun encryptForPeer(
+        data: ByteArray,
+        recipientPeerID: String,
+        expectedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ): ByteArray? = try {
+        encryptionService.encryptForSession(data, recipientPeerID, expectedSession)
+    } catch (e: Exception) {
+        Log.e(TAG, "Noise generation changed before encrypting for $recipientPeerID: ${e.message}")
+        null
+    }
     
     /**
      * Decrypt payload from specific peer
      */
-    fun decryptFromPeer(encryptedData: ByteArray, senderPeerID: String): ByteArray? {
+    fun decryptFromPeer(encryptedData: ByteArray, senderPeerID: String): NoiseDecryptionResult? {
         return try {
-            encryptionService.decrypt(encryptedData, senderPeerID)
+            encryptionService.decryptWithSession(encryptedData, senderPeerID)
         } catch (e: Exception) {
             Log.e(TAG, "Failed to decrypt from $senderPeerID: ${e.message}")
             null
@@ -250,6 +271,14 @@ class SecurityManager(private val encryptionService: EncryptionService, private
                     return false
                 }
 
+                val persistedSigningKey = delegate?.getAuthenticatedSigningKey(announcement.noisePublicKey)
+                if (persistedSigningKey != null &&
+                    !persistedSigningKey.contentEquals(announcement.signingPublicKey)
+                ) {
+                    Log.w(TAG, "Rejecting ANNOUNCE Ed key that conflicts with authenticated peer state for $peerID")
+                    return false
+                }
+
                 val existingPeer = delegate?.getPeerInfo(peerID)
                 if (
                     existingPeer?.noisePublicKey != null &&
@@ -429,9 +458,11 @@ interface SecurityManagerDelegate {
     fun onKeyExchangeCompleted(
         peerID: String,
         authenticatedRemoteStaticKey: ByteArray,
+        authenticatedSessionToken: ByteArray,
         directRelayAddress: String?,
         ingressLinkID: String?
     )
     fun sendHandshakeResponse(peerID: String, response: ByteArray)
     fun getPeerInfo(peerID: String): PeerInfo? // NEW: For signature verification
+    fun getAuthenticatedSigningKey(noisePublicKey: ByteArray): ByteArray? = null
 }

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/UnifiedMeshService.kt

@@ -358,6 +358,10 @@ class UnifiedMeshService(
         delegate?.didReceiveVerifyResponse(peerID, payload, timestampMs)
     }
 
+    override fun didResolvePrivateMediaPolicy(peerID: String) {
+        delegate?.didResolvePrivateMediaPolicy(peerID)
+    }
+
     override fun decryptChannelMessage(encryptedContent: ByteArray, channel: String): String? {
         return delegate?.decryptChannelMessage(encryptedContent, channel)
     }

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/model/AuthenticatedPeerState.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+package com.bitchat.android.model
+
+/**
+ * Canonical payload carried inside Noise payload type 0x21.
+ *
+ * Wire format:
+ * `[version=0x01][type=0x01][len=1...8][minimal LE capabilities]`
+ * `[type=0x02][len=32][Ed25519 public key]`
+ *
+ * Unknown TLVs are skipped. Both known fields must occur exactly once.
+ */
+data class AuthenticatedPeerState(
+    val capabilities: PeerCapabilities,
+    val signingPublicKey: ByteArray
+) {
+    init {
+        require(signingPublicKey.size == SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE) {
+            "Ed25519 public key must be 32 bytes"
+        }
+    }
+
+    fun encode(): ByteArray {
+        val capabilityBytes = capabilities.encoded()
+        return buildList<Byte>(1 + 2 + capabilityBytes.size + 2 + signingPublicKey.size) {
+            add(VERSION.toByte())
+            add(CAPABILITIES_TLV.toByte())
+            add(capabilityBytes.size.toByte())
+            addAll(capabilityBytes.toList())
+            add(SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_TLV.toByte())
+            add(SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE.toByte())
+            addAll(signingPublicKey.toList())
+        }.toByteArray()
+    }
+
+    companion object {
+        const val VERSION = 0x01
+        private const val CAPABILITIES_TLV = 0x01
+        private const val SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_TLV = 0x02
+        private const val SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE = 32
+
+        fun decode(data: ByteArray): AuthenticatedPeerState? {
+            if (data.firstOrNull()?.toInt()?.and(0xFF) != VERSION) return null
+            var offset = 1
+            var capabilities: PeerCapabilities? = null
+            var signingPublicKey: ByteArray? = null
+
+            while (offset < data.size) {
+                if (offset + 2 > data.size) return null
+                val type = data[offset].toInt() and 0xFF
+                val length = data[offset + 1].toInt() and 0xFF
+                offset += 2
+                if (offset + length > data.size) return null
+                val value = data.copyOfRange(offset, offset + length)
+                offset += length
+
+                when (type) {
+                    CAPABILITIES_TLV -> {
+                        if (capabilities != null || length !in 1..8) return null
+                        val decoded = PeerCapabilities.decode(value)
+                        if (!decoded.encoded().contentEquals(value)) return null
+                        capabilities = decoded
+                    }
+
+                    SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_TLV -> {
+                        if (signingPublicKey != null || length != SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE) return null
+                        signingPublicKey = value
+                    }
+
+                    else -> Unit
+                }
+            }
+
+            val decodedCapabilities = capabilities ?: return null
+            val decodedSigningKey = signingPublicKey ?: return null
+            return AuthenticatedPeerState(decodedCapabilities, decodedSigningKey)
+        }
+    }
+
+    override fun equals(other: Any?): Boolean =
+        this === other ||
+            (other is AuthenticatedPeerState &&
+                capabilities == other.capabilities &&
+                signingPublicKey.contentEquals(other.signingPublicKey))
+
+    override fun hashCode(): Int = 31 * capabilities.hashCode() + signingPublicKey.contentHashCode()
+}

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/model/NoiseEncrypted.kt

@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@ enum class NoisePayloadType(val value: UByte) {
     DELIVERED(0x03u),           // Message was delivered
     VERIFY_CHALLENGE(0x10u),    // Verification challenge
     VERIFY_RESPONSE(0x11u),     // Verification response
-    FILE_TRANSFER(0x20u);
+    FILE_TRANSFER(0x20u),
+    /** Authenticated capabilities + Ed25519 binding for the current Noise generation. */
+    PEER_STATE(0x21u);
 
 
     companion object {

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/noise/NoiseEncryptionService.kt

@@ -149,6 +149,15 @@ class NoiseEncryptionService(private val context: Context) {
     fun getPeerPublicKeyData(peerID: String): ByteArray? {
         return sessionManager.getRemoteStaticKey(peerID)
     }
+
+    fun getAuthenticatedSession(peerID: String): AuthenticatedNoiseSession? =
+        sessionManager.getAuthenticatedSession(peerID)
+
+    fun withAuthenticatedSession(
+        peerID: String,
+        expectedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession,
+        action: () -> Boolean
+    ): Boolean = sessionManager.withAuthenticatedSession(peerID, expectedSession, action)
     
     /**
      * Clear persistent identity (for panic mode)
@@ -247,6 +256,13 @@ class NoiseEncryptionService(private val context: Context) {
             null
         }
     }
+
+    @Throws(Exception::class)
+    fun encryptForSession(
+        data: ByteArray,
+        peerID: String,
+        expectedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ): ByteArray = sessionManager.encryptForSession(data, peerID, expectedSession)
     
     /**
      * Decrypt data from a specific peer using established Noise session
@@ -264,6 +280,14 @@ class NoiseEncryptionService(private val context: Context) {
             null
         }
     }
+
+    fun decryptWithSession(encryptedData: ByteArray, peerID: String): NoiseDecryptionResult? =
+        try {
+            sessionManager.decryptWithSession(encryptedData, peerID)
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            Log.e(TAG, "Failed generation-bound decryption from $peerID: ${e.message}")
+            null
+        }
     
     // MARK: - Peer Management
     

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/noise/NoiseSession.kt

@@ -474,7 +474,10 @@ class NoiseSession(
             receiveCipher = cipherPair.getReceiver()
             
             // Extract handshake hash for channel binding
-            handshakeHash = activeHandshake.getHandshakeHash()
+            // getHandshakeHash() exposes the handshake state's backing array. Clone it before
+            // destroy() zeroizes that state, or every completed session appears to have the same
+            // all-zero channel-binding token.
+            handshakeHash = activeHandshake.getHandshakeHash().clone()
             
             // Clean up handshake state
             activeHandshake.destroy()

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/noise/NoiseSessionManager.kt

@@ -7,7 +7,36 @@ data class NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult(
     val response: ByteArray?,
     val establishedNow: Boolean,
     /** The bound remote static key only when this exact call completed authentication. */
-    val authenticatedRemoteStaticKey: ByteArray? = null
+    val authenticatedRemoteStaticKey: ByteArray? = null,
+    /** Handshake hash identifying that exact authenticated Noise generation. */
+    val authenticatedSessionToken: ByteArray? = null
+)
+
+/** Atomic snapshot of the live authenticated Noise generation. */
+class AuthenticatedNoiseSession(
+    remoteStaticKey: ByteArray,
+    sessionToken: ByteArray
+) {
+    private val remoteStaticKeyBytes = remoteStaticKey.copyOf()
+    private val sessionTokenBytes = sessionToken.copyOf()
+
+    val remoteStaticKey: ByteArray get() = remoteStaticKeyBytes.copyOf()
+    val sessionToken: ByteArray get() = sessionTokenBytes.copyOf()
+
+    override fun equals(other: Any?): Boolean =
+        this === other ||
+            (other is AuthenticatedNoiseSession &&
+                remoteStaticKeyBytes.contentEquals(other.remoteStaticKeyBytes) &&
+                sessionTokenBytes.contentEquals(other.sessionTokenBytes))
+
+    override fun hashCode(): Int =
+        31 * remoteStaticKeyBytes.contentHashCode() + sessionTokenBytes.contentHashCode()
+}
+
+/** Plaintext and generation binding captured atomically from the session that decrypted it. */
+data class NoiseDecryptionResult(
+    val plaintext: ByteArray,
+    val authenticatedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession
 )
 
 /**
@@ -23,6 +52,7 @@ class NoiseSessionManager(
         private const val TAG = "NoiseSessionManager"
         private const val HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000L
         private const val HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE_1_SIZE = 32
+        private const val SESSION_TOKEN_SIZE = 32
     }
     
     private val sessions = ConcurrentHashMap<String, NoiseSession>()
@@ -130,6 +160,7 @@ class NoiseSessionManager(
         var activeSession: NoiseSession? = null
         var isReplacementCandidate = false
         var establishedRemoteKey: ByteArray? = null
+        var establishedSessionToken: ByteArray? = null
         var response: ByteArray? = null
 
         try {
@@ -204,6 +235,10 @@ class NoiseSessionManager(
                     throw NoiseSessionError.PeerIdentityMismatch(peerID, derivedPeerID)
                 }
 
+                val sessionToken = session.getHandshakeHash()
+                    ?.takeIf { it.size == SESSION_TOKEN_SIZE && it.any { byte -> byte != 0.toByte() } }
+                    ?: throw NoiseSessionError.HandshakeFailed
+
                 if (isReplacementCandidate) {
                     responderCandidates.remove(peerID, session)
                     val previous = sessions.put(peerID, session)
@@ -211,6 +246,7 @@ class NoiseSessionManager(
                 }
 
                 establishedRemoteKey = remoteStaticKey
+                establishedSessionToken = sessionToken
                 Log.d(TAG, "✅ Session ESTABLISHED with bound identity $peerID")
             }
         } catch (e: Exception) {
@@ -232,7 +268,8 @@ class NoiseSessionManager(
         return NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult(
             response = response,
             establishedNow = establishedRemoteKey != null,
-            authenticatedRemoteStaticKey = establishedRemoteKey?.clone()
+            authenticatedRemoteStaticKey = establishedRemoteKey?.clone(),
+            authenticatedSessionToken = establishedSessionToken?.clone()
         )
     }
 
@@ -252,6 +289,7 @@ class NoiseSessionManager(
     /**
      * SIMPLIFIED: Encrypt data
      */
+    @Synchronized
     fun encrypt(data: ByteArray, peerID: String): ByteArray {
         val session = getSession(peerID) ?: throw IllegalStateException("No session found for $peerID")
         if (!session.isEstablished()) {
@@ -259,11 +297,29 @@ class NoiseSessionManager(
         }
         return session.encrypt(data)
     }
+
+    /** Encrypt only if the exact generation that authorized the operation is still active. */
+    @Synchronized
+    fun encryptForSession(
+        data: ByteArray,
+        peerID: String,
+        expectedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+    ): ByteArray {
+        val session = getSession(peerID) ?: throw NoiseSessionError.SessionNotFound
+        if (!session.isEstablished()) throw NoiseSessionError.SessionNotEstablished
+        val current = authenticatedSession(session) ?: throw NoiseSessionError.SessionNotEstablished
+        if (current != expectedSession) throw NoiseSessionError.SessionGenerationChanged
+        return session.encrypt(data)
+    }
     
     /**
      * SIMPLIFIED: Decrypt data
      */
-    fun decrypt(encryptedData: ByteArray, peerID: String): ByteArray {
+    fun decrypt(encryptedData: ByteArray, peerID: String): ByteArray =
+        decryptWithSession(encryptedData, peerID).plaintext
+
+    @Synchronized
+    fun decryptWithSession(encryptedData: ByteArray, peerID: String): NoiseDecryptionResult {
         val session = getSession(peerID)
         if (session == null) {
             Log.e(TAG, "No session found for $peerID when trying to decrypt")
@@ -273,7 +329,10 @@ class NoiseSessionManager(
             Log.e(TAG, "Session not established with $peerID when trying to decrypt")
             throw IllegalStateException("Session not established with $peerID")
         }
-        return session.decrypt(encryptedData)
+        val plaintext = session.decrypt(encryptedData)
+        val authenticatedSession = authenticatedSession(session)
+            ?: throw IllegalStateException("Established session for $peerID has no channel binding")
+        return NoiseDecryptionResult(plaintext, authenticatedSession)
     }
     
     /**
@@ -295,15 +354,42 @@ class NoiseSessionManager(
     /**
      * Get remote static public key for a peer (if session established)
      */
-    fun getRemoteStaticKey(peerID: String): ByteArray? {
+    fun getRemoteStaticKey(peerID: String): ByteArray? =
-        return getSession(peerID)?.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
+        getAuthenticatedSession(peerID)?.remoteStaticKey
+
+    @Synchronized
+    fun getAuthenticatedSession(peerID: String): AuthenticatedNoiseSession? {
+        val session = getSession(peerID) ?: return null
+        if (!session.isEstablished()) return null
+        return authenticatedSession(session)
+    }
+
+    /** Execute a state transition while preventing replacement/removal of the expected session. */
+    @Synchronized
+    fun withAuthenticatedSession(
+        peerID: String,
+        expectedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession,
+        action: () -> Boolean
+    ): Boolean {
+        val session = getSession(peerID) ?: return false
+        if (!session.isEstablished()) return false
+        if (authenticatedSession(session) != expectedSession) return false
+        return action()
     }
     
     /**
      * Get handshake hash for channel binding (if session established)
      */
     fun getHandshakeHash(peerID: String): ByteArray? {
-        return getSession(peerID)?.getHandshakeHash()
+        return getAuthenticatedSession(peerID)?.sessionToken
+    }
+
+    private fun authenticatedSession(session: NoiseSession): AuthenticatedNoiseSession? {
+        val remoteStaticKey = session.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()?.takeIf { it.size == 32 } ?: return null
+        val sessionToken = session.getHandshakeHash()?.takeIf {
+            it.size == SESSION_TOKEN_SIZE && it.any { byte -> byte != 0.toByte() }
+        } ?: return null
+        return AuthenticatedNoiseSession(remoteStaticKey, sessionToken)
     }
     
     /**
@@ -356,6 +442,7 @@ sealed class NoiseSessionError(message: String, cause: Throwable? = null) : Exce
     object InvalidState : NoiseSessionError("Session in invalid state")
     object HandshakeFailed : NoiseSessionError("Handshake failed")
     object AlreadyEstablished : NoiseSessionError("Session already established")
+    object SessionGenerationChanged : NoiseSessionError("Noise session generation changed")
     class PeerIdentityMismatch(claimedPeerID: String, derivedPeerID: String?) : NoiseSessionError(
         "Authenticated Noise key derives to ${derivedPeerID ?: "invalid"}, not claimed peer $claimedPeerID"
     )

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/nostr/NostrDirectMessageHandler.kt

@@ -191,7 +191,8 @@ class NostrDirectMessageHandler(
                 }
             }
             NoisePayloadType.VERIFY_CHALLENGE,
-            NoisePayloadType.VERIFY_RESPONSE -> Unit // Ignore verification payloads in Nostr direct messages
+            NoisePayloadType.VERIFY_RESPONSE,
+            NoisePayloadType.PEER_STATE -> Unit // Peer state is bound to a live mesh Noise generation.
         }
     }
 

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/ui/ChatViewModel.kt

@@ -131,7 +131,12 @@ class ChatViewModel(
     val verifiedFingerprints = verificationHandler.verifiedFingerprints
 
     // Media file sending manager
-    private val mediaSendingManager = MediaSendingManager(state, messageManager, channelManager) { mesh }
+    private val mediaSendingManager = MediaSendingManager(
+        state,
+        messageManager,
+        channelManager,
+        viewModelScope
+    ) { mesh }
     
     // Delegate handler for mesh callbacks
     private val meshDelegateHandler = MeshDelegateHandler(
@@ -931,6 +936,10 @@ class ChatViewModel(
     override fun didReceiveVerifyResponse(peerID: String, payload: ByteArray, timestampMs: Long) {
         verificationHandler.didReceiveVerifyResponse(peerID, payload)
     }
+
+    override fun didResolvePrivateMediaPolicy(peerID: String) {
+        mediaSendingManager.retryPendingPrivateMedia(peerID)
+    }
     
     override fun decryptChannelMessage(encryptedContent: ByteArray, channel: String): String? {
         return meshDelegateHandler.decryptChannelMessage(encryptedContent, channel)

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/ui/MediaSendingManager.kt

@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ import java.util.UUID
 import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.MutableStateFlow
 import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.StateFlow
 import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asStateFlow
+import kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineScope
+import kotlinx.coroutines.delay
+import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
 
 data class LegacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest(
     val requestId: String,
@@ -28,6 +31,7 @@ class MediaSendingManager(
     private val state: ChatState,
     private val messageManager: MessageManager,
     private val channelManager: ChannelManager,
+    private val scope: CoroutineScope,
     private val getMeshService: () -> MeshService
 ) {
     // Helper to get current mesh service (may change after panic clear)
@@ -36,6 +40,7 @@ class MediaSendingManager(
     companion object {
         private const val TAG = "MediaSendingManager"
         private const val MAX_FILE_SIZE = com.bitchat.android.util.AppConstants.Media.MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES // 50MB limit
+        private const val PENDING_PRIVATE_MEDIA_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000L
     }
 
     // Track in-flight transfer progress: transferId -> messageId and reverse
@@ -57,6 +62,21 @@ class MediaSendingManager(
 
     private var pendingPrivateMedia: PendingPrivateMedia? = null
 
+    private data class PendingAutomaticPrivateMedia(
+        val requestId: String,
+        val peerID: String,
+        val filePacket: BitchatFilePacket,
+        val filePath: String,
+        val messageType: BitchatMessageType,
+        val transferId: String,
+        val allowLegacyFallback: Boolean
+    )
+
+    private var pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia: PendingAutomaticPrivateMedia? = null
+    private var evaluatingAutomaticRequestId: String? = null
+    private var automaticRetryRequestedFor: String? = null
+    private var pendingAutomaticTimeoutRequestId: String? = null
+
     /**
      * Send a voice note (audio file)
      */
@@ -213,61 +233,23 @@ class MediaSendingManager(
 
         Log.d(TAG, "📤 FILE_TRANSFER send (private): name='${filePacket.fileName}', size=${filePacket.fileSize}, mime='${filePacket.mimeType}', sha256=$contentHash, to=${toPeerID.take(8)} transferId=${transferId.take(16)}…")
 
-        when (val preparation = meshService.prepareFilePrivate(
+        val pending = PendingAutomaticPrivateMedia(
-            recipientPeerID = toPeerID,
+            requestId = UUID.randomUUID().toString(),
-            file = filePacket,
+            peerID = toPeerID,
+            filePacket = filePacket,
+            filePath = filePath,
+            messageType = messageType,
             transferId = transferId,
             allowLegacyFallback = false
-        )) {
+        )
-            is PrivateMediaPreparation.Ready -> commitPreparedPrivateFile(
+        if (!reserveAutomaticPending(pending)) {
-                preparation = preparation,
+            addPrivateMediaSystemMessage(
-                toPeerID = toPeerID,
+                toPeerID,
-                filePath = filePath,
+                "Private media was not sent because another secure media send is still pending."
-                messageType = messageType,
-                transferId = transferId
             )
-
+            return
-            is PrivateMediaPreparation.RequiresLegacyConsent -> {
-                val nickname = try {
-                    meshService.getPeerNicknames()[toPeerID]
-                } catch (_: Exception) {
-                    null
-                } ?: toPeerID.take(8)
-                val request = LegacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest(
-                    requestId = UUID.randomUUID().toString(),
-                    recipientNickname = nickname,
-                    fileName = filePacket.fileName,
-                    warning = preparation.warning
-                )
-                synchronized(pendingConsentLock) {
-                    if (pendingPrivateMedia != null) {
-                        Log.w(TAG, "A legacy private-media consent prompt is already pending")
-                        return
-                    }
-                    pendingPrivateMedia = PendingPrivateMedia(
-                        request,
-                        toPeerID,
-                        filePacket,
-                        filePath,
-                        messageType,
-                        transferId
-                    )
-                    _legacyPrivateMediaConsent.value = request
-                }
-            }
-
-            PrivateMediaPreparation.NeedsHandshake -> {
-                Log.i(TAG, "Private media needs a Noise handshake; initiating now, with no local echo")
-                try {
-                    meshService.initiateNoiseHandshake(toPeerID)
-                } catch (e: Exception) {
-                    Log.w(TAG, "Could not initiate private-media Noise handshake: ${e.message}")
-                }
-            }
-
-            is PrivateMediaPreparation.Rejected ->
-                Log.w(TAG, "Private media not sent: ${preparation.reason}")
         }
+        evaluateAutomaticPending(pending)
     }
 
     /**
@@ -277,32 +259,23 @@ class MediaSendingManager(
      */
     fun approveLegacyPrivateMedia(requestId: String) {
         val pending = consumePendingConsent(requestId) ?: return
-        when (val preparation = meshService.prepareFilePrivate(
+        val automatic = PendingAutomaticPrivateMedia(
-            recipientPeerID = pending.peerID,
+            requestId = UUID.randomUUID().toString(),
-            file = pending.filePacket,
+            peerID = pending.peerID,
+            filePacket = pending.filePacket,
+            filePath = pending.filePath,
+            messageType = pending.messageType,
             transferId = pending.transferId,
             allowLegacyFallback = true
-        )) {
+        )
-            is PrivateMediaPreparation.Ready -> commitPreparedPrivateFile(
+        if (!reserveAutomaticPending(automatic)) {
-                preparation,
+            addPrivateMediaSystemMessage(
                 pending.peerID,
-                pending.filePath,
+                "Private media was not sent because another secure media send is still pending."
-                pending.messageType,
-                pending.transferId
             )
-            is PrivateMediaPreparation.RequiresLegacyConsent ->
+            return
-                Log.w(TAG, "Legacy consent was consumed but policy still requested consent; send aborted")
-            PrivateMediaPreparation.NeedsHandshake -> {
-                Log.i(TAG, "Noise session disappeared before consent approval; initiating a new handshake")
-                try {
-                    meshService.initiateNoiseHandshake(pending.peerID)
-                } catch (e: Exception) {
-                    Log.w(TAG, "Could not re-initiate private-media Noise handshake: ${e.message}")
-                }
-            }
-            is PrivateMediaPreparation.Rejected ->
-                Log.w(TAG, "Private media policy changed before approval: ${preparation.reason}")
         }
+        evaluateAutomaticPending(automatic)
     }
 
     fun cancelLegacyPrivateMedia(requestId: String) {
@@ -312,10 +285,221 @@ class MediaSendingManager(
     fun clearPendingPrivateMediaConsent() {
         synchronized(pendingConsentLock) {
             pendingPrivateMedia = null
+            pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia = null
+            evaluatingAutomaticRequestId = null
+            automaticRetryRequestedFor = null
+            pendingAutomaticTimeoutRequestId = null
             _legacyPrivateMediaConsent.value = null
         }
     }
 
+    /** Retry the exact first-send intent after peer-state proof or watchdog resolution. */
+    fun retryPendingPrivateMedia(peerID: String) {
+        scope.launch { retryPendingPrivateMediaOnScope(peerID) }
+    }
+
+    private fun retryPendingPrivateMediaOnScope(peerID: String) {
+        val pending = synchronized(pendingConsentLock) {
+            pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia
+                ?.takeIf { it.peerID == peerID }
+        } ?: return
+        evaluateAutomaticPending(pending)
+    }
+
+    private fun evaluateAutomaticPending(pending: PendingAutomaticPrivateMedia) {
+        val acquired = synchronized(pendingConsentLock) {
+            if (pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia?.requestId != pending.requestId) {
+                return@synchronized false
+            }
+            if (evaluatingAutomaticRequestId == pending.requestId) {
+                automaticRetryRequestedFor = pending.requestId
+                return@synchronized false
+            }
+            evaluatingAutomaticRequestId = pending.requestId
+            true
+        }
+        if (!acquired) return
+
+        while (true) {
+            val preparation = try {
+                meshService.prepareFilePrivate(
+                    recipientPeerID = pending.peerID,
+                    file = pending.filePacket,
+                    transferId = pending.transferId,
+                    allowLegacyFallback = pending.allowLegacyFallback
+                )
+            } catch (error: Exception) {
+                PrivateMediaPreparation.Rejected(
+                    error.message ?: "Secure private-media preparation failed"
+                )
+            }
+            val stillCurrent = synchronized(pendingConsentLock) {
+                pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia?.requestId == pending.requestId
+            }
+            if (stillCurrent) handlePrivatePreparation(preparation, pending)
+
+            val rerun = synchronized(pendingConsentLock) {
+                if (evaluatingAutomaticRequestId == pending.requestId) {
+                    evaluatingAutomaticRequestId = null
+                }
+                val requested = automaticRetryRequestedFor == pending.requestId &&
+                    pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia?.requestId == pending.requestId
+                if (automaticRetryRequestedFor == pending.requestId) {
+                    automaticRetryRequestedFor = null
+                }
+                if (requested) evaluatingAutomaticRequestId = pending.requestId
+                requested
+            }
+            if (!rerun) return
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun handlePrivatePreparation(
+        preparation: PrivateMediaPreparation,
+        pending: PendingAutomaticPrivateMedia
+    ) {
+        when (preparation) {
+            is PrivateMediaPreparation.Ready -> {
+                clearAutomaticPending(pending.requestId)
+                commitPreparedPrivateFile(
+                    preparation,
+                    pending.peerID,
+                    pending.filePath,
+                    pending.messageType,
+                    pending.transferId
+                )
+            }
+
+            is PrivateMediaPreparation.RequiresLegacyConsent -> {
+                clearAutomaticPending(pending.requestId)
+                if (pending.allowLegacyFallback) {
+                    Log.w(TAG, "Legacy consent was consumed but policy still requested consent; send aborted")
+                    addPrivateMediaSystemMessage(
+                        pending.peerID,
+                        "Private media was not sent because its security policy changed."
+                    )
+                    return
+                }
+                val nickname = try {
+                    meshService.getPeerNicknames()[pending.peerID]
+                } catch (_: Exception) {
+                    null
+                } ?: pending.peerID.take(8)
+                val request = LegacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest(
+                    requestId = UUID.randomUUID().toString(),
+                    recipientNickname = nickname,
+                    fileName = pending.filePacket.fileName,
+                    warning = preparation.warning
+                )
+                synchronized(pendingConsentLock) {
+                    if (pendingPrivateMedia != null) {
+                        Log.w(TAG, "A legacy private-media consent prompt is already pending")
+                        return
+                    }
+                    pendingPrivateMedia = PendingPrivateMedia(
+                        request,
+                        pending.peerID,
+                        pending.filePacket,
+                        pending.filePath,
+                        pending.messageType,
+                        pending.transferId
+                    )
+                    _legacyPrivateMediaConsent.value = request
+                }
+            }
+
+            PrivateMediaPreparation.NeedsHandshake -> {
+                ensureAutomaticPendingTimeout(pending)
+                Log.i(TAG, "Private media needs a Noise handshake; retaining first-send intent")
+                try {
+                    meshService.initiateNoiseHandshake(pending.peerID)
+                } catch (e: Exception) {
+                    Log.w(TAG, "Could not initiate private-media Noise handshake: ${e.message}")
+                }
+            }
+
+            PrivateMediaPreparation.AwaitingPeerState -> {
+                ensureAutomaticPendingTimeout(pending)
+                Log.i(TAG, "Private media is waiting for authenticated peer state; first-send intent retained")
+            }
+
+            is PrivateMediaPreparation.Rejected -> {
+                clearAutomaticPending(pending.requestId)
+                Log.w(TAG, "Private media not sent: ${preparation.reason}")
+                addPrivateMediaSystemMessage(
+                    pending.peerID,
+                    "Private media was not sent: ${preparation.reason}"
+                )
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun reserveAutomaticPending(pending: PendingAutomaticPrivateMedia): Boolean =
+        synchronized(pendingConsentLock) {
+            if (pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia != null) return@synchronized false
+            pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia = pending
+            true
+        }
+
+    private fun ensureAutomaticPendingTimeout(pending: PendingAutomaticPrivateMedia) {
+        val shouldStart = synchronized(pendingConsentLock) {
+            if (pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia?.requestId != pending.requestId ||
+                pendingAutomaticTimeoutRequestId == pending.requestId
+            ) return@synchronized false
+            pendingAutomaticTimeoutRequestId = pending.requestId
+            true
+        }
+        if (!shouldStart) return
+        scope.launch {
+            delay(PENDING_PRIVATE_MEDIA_TIMEOUT_MS)
+            val expired = synchronized(pendingConsentLock) {
+                if (pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia?.requestId != pending.requestId) false
+                else {
+                    pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia = null
+                    if (automaticRetryRequestedFor == pending.requestId) {
+                        automaticRetryRequestedFor = null
+                    }
+                    if (pendingAutomaticTimeoutRequestId == pending.requestId) {
+                        pendingAutomaticTimeoutRequestId = null
+                    }
+                    true
+                }
+            }
+            if (expired) {
+                addPrivateMediaSystemMessage(
+                    pending.peerID,
+                    "Private media was not sent because secure session setup timed out."
+                )
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun clearAutomaticPending(requestId: String) {
+        synchronized(pendingConsentLock) {
+            if (pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia?.requestId == requestId) {
+                pendingAutomaticPrivateMedia = null
+            }
+            if (automaticRetryRequestedFor == requestId) automaticRetryRequestedFor = null
+            if (pendingAutomaticTimeoutRequestId == requestId) {
+                pendingAutomaticTimeoutRequestId = null
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun addPrivateMediaSystemMessage(peerID: String, text: String) {
+        messageManager.addPrivateMessageNoUnread(
+            peerID,
+            BitchatMessage(
+                sender = "system",
+                content = text,
+                timestamp = Date(),
+                isRelay = false,
+                isPrivate = true,
+                senderPeerID = peerID
+            )
+        )
+    }
+
     private fun consumePendingConsent(requestId: String): PendingPrivateMedia? {
         return synchronized(pendingConsentLock) {
             val pending = pendingPrivateMedia
@@ -369,6 +553,10 @@ class MediaSendingManager(
                 messageTransferMap.remove(msg.id)
             }
             Log.w(TAG, "Prepared private-media commit failed; local echo rolled back")
+            addPrivateMediaSystemMessage(
+                toPeerID,
+                "Private media was not sent because the prepared transfer could not be committed."
+            )
             return
         }
         Log.d(TAG, "✅ Private media committed using ${preparation.transfer.wireMode}")

app/src/test/kotlin/com/bitchat/android/identity/PrivateMediaCapabilityPinPersistenceTest.kt

@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 package com.bitchat.android.identity
 
 import android.content.Context
+import com.bitchat.android.model.AuthenticatedPeerState
+import com.bitchat.android.model.PeerCapabilities
+import org.junit.Assert.assertArrayEquals
+import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
 import org.junit.After
 import org.junit.Assert.assertFalse
 import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
@@ -33,18 +37,37 @@ class PrivateMediaCapabilityPinPersistenceTest {
     }
 
     @Test
-    fun `capability pin persists and panic identity wipe removes it`() {
+    fun `authenticated Ed key and capabilities persist rotate and clear atomically`() {
-        manager.markPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint)
+        val firstKey = ByteArray(32) { 0x11 }
+        val rotatedKey = ByteArray(32) { 0x22 }
+        assertTrue(manager.storeAuthenticatedPeerState(
+            fingerprint,
+            AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA, firstKey)
+        ))
 
         val reloaded = SecureIdentityStateManager(prefs, testOnly = true)
+        assertArrayEquals(firstKey, reloaded.getAuthenticatedSigningKey(fingerprint))
+        assertEquals(
+            PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA,
+            reloaded.getAuthenticatedPeerState(fingerprint)?.capabilities
+        )
+        assertTrue(reloaded.isPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint))
+
+        assertTrue(reloaded.storeAuthenticatedPeerState(
+            fingerprint,
+            AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.NONE, rotatedKey)
+        ))
+        assertArrayEquals(rotatedKey, reloaded.getAuthenticatedSigningKey(fingerprint))
+        // HSTS-style private-media history is not erased by a no-bit proof.
         assertTrue(reloaded.isPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint))
 
         reloaded.clearIdentityData()
-        // Simulate an old BLE/Wi-Fi controller finishing a pre-panic callback
+        assertFalse(manager.storeAuthenticatedPeerState(
-        // after another manager performed the wipe.
+            fingerprint,
-        manager.markPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint)
+            AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA, firstKey)
+        ))
         val afterPanic = SecureIdentityStateManager(prefs, testOnly = true)
+        assertEquals(null, afterPanic.getAuthenticatedPeerState(fingerprint))
         assertFalse(afterPanic.isPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint))
-        assertTrue(afterPanic.getPrivateMediaCapabilityPinsForTesting().isEmpty())
     }
 }

app/src/test/kotlin/com/bitchat/android/mesh/AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinatorTest.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+package com.bitchat.android.mesh
+
+import com.bitchat.android.model.AuthenticatedPeerState
+import com.bitchat.android.model.PeerCapabilities
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.NoisePeerIdentity
+import java.security.MessageDigest
+import java.util.concurrent.CopyOnWriteArrayList
+import kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineScope
+import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
+import kotlinx.coroutines.SupervisorJob
+import kotlinx.coroutines.delay
+import kotlinx.coroutines.runBlocking
+import org.junit.Assert.assertArrayEquals
+import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
+import org.junit.Assert.assertFalse
+import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
+import org.junit.Test
+
+class AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinatorTest {
+    private class MemoryStore : AuthenticatedPeerStateStore {
+        val states = mutableMapOf<String, AuthenticatedPeerState>()
+        val pins = mutableSetOf<String>()
+
+        override fun load(fingerprint: String): AuthenticatedPeerState? = states[fingerprint]
+        override fun persist(
+            fingerprint: String,
+            state: AuthenticatedPeerState,
+            onCommitted: () -> Unit
+        ): Boolean {
+            states[fingerprint] = state
+            if (state.capabilities.contains(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA)) pins += fingerprint
+            onCommitted()
+            return true
+        }
+        override fun isPrivateMediaPinned(fingerprint: String): Boolean = fingerprint in pins
+    }
+
+    private val remoteStatic = ByteArray(32) { 0x33 }
+    private val peerID = NoisePeerIdentity.derivePeerID(remoteStatic)!!
+    private val firstSession = AuthenticatedNoiseSession(
+        remoteStatic,
+        ByteArray(32) { 0x71 }
+    )
+    private val secondSession = AuthenticatedNoiseSession(
+        remoteStatic,
+        ByteArray(32) { 0x72 }
+    )
+    private val localState = AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA, ByteArray(32) { 0x44 })
+    private val remoteState = AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA, ByteArray(32) { 0x55 })
+
+    @Test
+    fun `every generation emits and first valid proof echoes exactly once`() {
+        val store = MemoryStore()
+        val sent = CopyOnWriteArrayList<AuthenticatedPeerState>()
+        val applied = CopyOnWriteArrayList<AuthenticatedPeerState>()
+        var activeSession = firstSession
+        val coordinator = AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinator(
+            scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Default),
+            authenticatedSessionProvider = { activeSession },
+            withAuthenticatedSession = { _, expected, action ->
+                if (expected == activeSession) action() else false
+            },
+            store = store,
+            localStateProvider = { localState },
+            applyAuthenticatedState = { _, key, state ->
+                assertArrayEquals(remoteStatic, key)
+                applied += state
+            },
+            sendState = { _, state, _ -> sent.add(state) },
+            onResolution = {},
+            proofTimeoutMs = 5_000
+        )
+
+        coordinator.onSessionAuthenticated(peerID, remoteStatic, firstSession.sessionToken)
+        assertEquals(AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Awaiting, coordinator.status(peerID, firstSession))
+        assertEquals(1, sent.size)
+        assertTrue(coordinator.receive(peerID, remoteState, firstSession))
+        assertEquals(2, sent.size)
+        assertTrue(coordinator.receive(peerID, remoteState, firstSession))
+        assertEquals("Repeated proof must not echo again", 2, sent.size)
+        assertEquals(1, applied.size)
+
+        val different = AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.NONE, ByteArray(32) { 0x66 })
+        assertFalse(
+            "A generation cannot replace its first proof",
+            coordinator.receive(peerID, different, firstSession)
+        )
+
+        activeSession = secondSession
+        // Policy can observe the crypto swap before its completion callback. It must adopt the
+        // new token as Awaiting instead of reusing gen-N Proven state.
+        assertEquals(AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Awaiting, coordinator.status(peerID, secondSession))
+        assertEquals(3, sent.size)
+        coordinator.onSessionAuthenticated(peerID, remoteStatic, secondSession.sessionToken)
+        assertEquals(3, sent.size)
+        assertEquals(AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Awaiting, coordinator.status(peerID, secondSession))
+        assertFalse(coordinator.receive(peerID, remoteState, firstSession))
+        assertTrue(coordinator.receive(peerID, different, secondSession))
+        assertEquals(4, sent.size)
+        assertEquals(2, applied.size)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `live generation is adopted once and watchdog is never reset by policy reads`() = runBlocking {
+        val sent = CopyOnWriteArrayList<AuthenticatedPeerState>()
+        val resolutions = CopyOnWriteArrayList<String>()
+        val coordinator = AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinator(
+            scope = this,
+            authenticatedSessionProvider = { firstSession },
+            withAuthenticatedSession = { _, expected, action ->
+                if (expected == firstSession) action() else false
+            },
+            store = MemoryStore(),
+            localStateProvider = { localState },
+            applyAuthenticatedState = { _, _, _ -> },
+            sendState = { _, state, _ -> sent += state; true },
+            onResolution = resolutions::add,
+            proofTimeoutMs = 20
+        )
+
+        assertEquals(AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Awaiting, coordinator.status(peerID, firstSession))
+        delay(10)
+        assertEquals(AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Awaiting, coordinator.status(peerID, firstSession))
+        delay(25)
+
+        assertEquals(AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.TimedOut, coordinator.status(peerID, firstSession))
+        assertEquals(1, sent.size)
+        assertEquals(listOf(peerID), resolutions)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `delayed old completion cannot replace a newer tracked generation`() {
+        val sentTokens = CopyOnWriteArrayList<ByteArray>()
+        var activeSession = secondSession
+        val coordinator = AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinator(
+            scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Default),
+            authenticatedSessionProvider = { activeSession },
+            withAuthenticatedSession = { _, expected, action ->
+                if (expected == activeSession) action() else false
+            },
+            store = MemoryStore(),
+            localStateProvider = { localState },
+            applyAuthenticatedState = { _, _, _ -> },
+            sendState = { _, _, session -> sentTokens += session.sessionToken; true },
+            onResolution = {},
+            proofTimeoutMs = 5_000
+        )
+
+        coordinator.onSessionAuthenticated(peerID, remoteStatic, secondSession.sessionToken)
+        coordinator.onSessionAuthenticated(peerID, remoteStatic, firstSession.sessionToken)
+
+        assertEquals(AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Awaiting, coordinator.status(peerID, secondSession))
+        assertEquals(1, sentTokens.size)
+        assertArrayEquals(secondSession.sessionToken, sentTokens.single())
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `watchdog resolves no-proof generation without trusting persisted prior state`() = runBlocking {
+        val store = MemoryStore()
+        store.states[fingerprint(remoteStatic)] = remoteState
+        val resolutions = CopyOnWriteArrayList<String>()
+        val coordinator = AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinator(
+            scope = this,
+            authenticatedSessionProvider = { firstSession },
+            withAuthenticatedSession = { _, expected, action ->
+                if (expected == firstSession) action() else false
+            },
+            store = store,
+            localStateProvider = { localState },
+            applyAuthenticatedState = { _, _, _ -> },
+            sendState = { _, _, _ -> true },
+            onResolution = resolutions::add,
+            proofTimeoutMs = 20
+        )
+
+        coordinator.onSessionAuthenticated(peerID, remoteStatic, firstSession.sessionToken)
+        delay(50)
+
+        assertEquals(AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.TimedOut, coordinator.status(peerID, firstSession))
+        assertEquals(listOf(peerID), resolutions)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `copied-static preannounce Ed key is replaced by authenticated proof`() {
+        val peerManager = PeerManager()
+        val attackerEd = ByteArray(32) { 0x11 }
+        val victimEd = ByteArray(32) { 0x22 }
+        peerManager.updatePeerInfoFromVerifiedAnnouncement(
+            peerID,
+            "attacker-name",
+            remoteStatic,
+            attackerEd,
+            true,
+            PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA
+        )
+        val coordinator = AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinator(
+            scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Default),
+            authenticatedSessionProvider = { firstSession },
+            withAuthenticatedSession = { _, expected, action ->
+                if (expected == firstSession) action() else false
+            },
+            store = MemoryStore(),
+            localStateProvider = { localState },
+            applyAuthenticatedState = peerManager::applyAuthenticatedPeerState,
+            sendState = { _, _, _ -> true },
+            onResolution = {},
+            proofTimeoutMs = 5_000
+        )
+        coordinator.onSessionAuthenticated(peerID, remoteStatic, firstSession.sessionToken)
+
+        assertTrue(
+            coordinator.receive(
+                peerID,
+                AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA, victimEd),
+                firstSession
+            )
+        )
+        val peer = peerManager.getPeerInfo(peerID)!!
+        assertArrayEquals(victimEd, peer.signingPublicKey)
+        assertEquals(peerID, peer.nickname)
+        assertFalse("Copied self-signed nickname must lose verified status", peer.isVerifiedNickname)
+        assertFalse(peer.hasVerifiedAnnouncement)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `failed durable persistence cannot publish peer state in memory`() {
+        val applied = CopyOnWriteArrayList<AuthenticatedPeerState>()
+        val store = object : AuthenticatedPeerStateStore {
+            override fun load(fingerprint: String): AuthenticatedPeerState? = null
+            override fun persist(
+                fingerprint: String,
+                state: AuthenticatedPeerState,
+                onCommitted: () -> Unit
+            ): Boolean = false
+            override fun isPrivateMediaPinned(fingerprint: String): Boolean = false
+        }
+        val coordinator = AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinator(
+            scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Default),
+            authenticatedSessionProvider = { firstSession },
+            withAuthenticatedSession = { _, expected, action ->
+                if (expected == firstSession) action() else false
+            },
+            store = store,
+            localStateProvider = { localState },
+            applyAuthenticatedState = { _, _, state -> applied += state },
+            sendState = { _, _, _ -> true },
+            onResolution = {},
+            proofTimeoutMs = 5_000
+        )
+        coordinator.onSessionAuthenticated(peerID, remoteStatic, firstSession.sessionToken)
+
+        assertFalse(coordinator.receive(peerID, remoteState, firstSession))
+        assertEquals(AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Awaiting, coordinator.status(peerID, firstSession))
+        assertTrue(applied.isEmpty())
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `stale decryption lease cannot persist or apply after generation replacement`() {
+        var activeSession = firstSession
+        var persistCalls = 0
+        var applyCalls = 0
+        val store = object : AuthenticatedPeerStateStore {
+            override fun load(fingerprint: String): AuthenticatedPeerState? = null
+            override fun persist(
+                fingerprint: String,
+                state: AuthenticatedPeerState,
+                onCommitted: () -> Unit
+            ): Boolean {
+                persistCalls += 1
+                onCommitted()
+                return true
+            }
+            override fun isPrivateMediaPinned(fingerprint: String): Boolean = false
+        }
+        val coordinator = AuthenticatedPeerStateCoordinator(
+            scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Default),
+            authenticatedSessionProvider = { activeSession },
+            withAuthenticatedSession = { _, expected, action ->
+                if (expected == activeSession) action() else false
+            },
+            store = store,
+            localStateProvider = { localState },
+            applyAuthenticatedState = { _, _, _ -> applyCalls += 1 },
+            sendState = { _, _, _ -> true },
+            onResolution = {},
+            proofTimeoutMs = 5_000
+        )
+        coordinator.onSessionAuthenticated(peerID, remoteStatic, firstSession.sessionToken)
+        activeSession = secondSession
+
+        assertFalse(coordinator.receive(peerID, remoteState, firstSession))
+        assertEquals(0, persistCalls)
+        assertEquals(0, applyCalls)
+    }
+
+    private fun fingerprint(key: ByteArray): String =
+        MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(key).joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) }
+}

app/src/test/kotlin/com/bitchat/android/mesh/MessageHandlerTest.kt

@@ -2,10 +2,15 @@ package com.bitchat.android.mesh
 
 import android.os.Build
 import com.bitchat.android.model.IdentityAnnouncement
+import com.bitchat.android.model.AuthenticatedPeerState
 import com.bitchat.android.model.BitchatFilePacket
+import com.bitchat.android.model.NoisePayload
+import com.bitchat.android.model.NoisePayloadType
 import com.bitchat.android.model.PeerCapabilities
 import com.bitchat.android.model.RoutedPacket
 import com.bitchat.android.noise.NoisePeerIdentity
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.NoiseDecryptionResult
 import com.bitchat.android.protocol.BitchatPacket
 import com.bitchat.android.protocol.MessageType
 import com.bitchat.android.protocol.SpecialRecipients
@@ -38,6 +43,10 @@ class MessageHandlerTest {
     private val myPeerID = "1111222233334444"
     private val noiseKey = ByteArray(32) { 0x0B }
     private val peerID = NoisePeerIdentity.derivePeerID(noiseKey)!!
+    private val authenticatedSession = AuthenticatedNoiseSession(
+        noiseKey,
+        ByteArray(32) { 0x5D }
+    )
     private val nickname = "peer"
     private val signingKey = ByteArray(32) { 0x0A }
     private val signature = ByteArray(64) { 1 }
@@ -216,7 +225,9 @@ class MessageHandlerTest {
             )
             val prereleasePlaintext = byteArrayOf(0x09) + file.encode()!!
             val ciphertext = byteArrayOf(0x41, 0x42, 0x43)
-            whenever(delegate.decryptFromPeer(any(), eq(peerID))).thenReturn(prereleasePlaintext)
+            whenever(delegate.decryptFromPeer(any(), eq(peerID))).thenReturn(
+                NoiseDecryptionResult(prereleasePlaintext, authenticatedSession)
+            )
             whenever(delegate.getPeerNickname(peerID)).thenReturn(nickname)
             whenever(delegate.getMyNickname()).thenReturn("me")
             whenever(delegate.encryptForPeer(any(), eq(peerID))).thenReturn(byteArrayOf(0x55))
@@ -239,6 +250,41 @@ class MessageHandlerTest {
         }
     }
 
+    @Test
+    fun `valid encrypted peer state is delivered and malformed state is ignored`() = runBlocking {
+        val state = AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA, signingKey)
+        val validCiphertext = byteArrayOf(0x31)
+        val malformedCiphertext = byteArrayOf(0x32)
+        whenever(delegate.decryptFromPeer(validCiphertext, peerID)).thenReturn(
+            NoiseDecryptionResult(
+                NoisePayload(NoisePayloadType.PEER_STATE, state.encode()).encode(),
+                authenticatedSession
+            )
+        )
+        whenever(delegate.decryptFromPeer(malformedCiphertext, peerID)).thenReturn(
+            NoiseDecryptionResult(
+                NoisePayload(NoisePayloadType.PEER_STATE, byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x01)).encode(),
+                authenticatedSession
+            )
+        )
+        val base = BitchatPacket(
+            version = 1u,
+            type = MessageType.NOISE_ENCRYPTED.value,
+            senderID = peerID.hexToBytes(),
+            recipientID = myPeerID.hexToBytes(),
+            timestamp = System.currentTimeMillis().toULong(),
+            payload = validCiphertext,
+            ttl = 7u
+        )
+
+        handler.handleNoiseEncrypted(RoutedPacket(base, peerID, "direct-link"))
+        handler.handleNoiseEncrypted(
+            RoutedPacket(base.copy(payload = malformedCiphertext), peerID, "direct-link")
+        )
+
+        verify(delegate).onAuthenticatedPeerStateReceived(peerID, state, authenticatedSession)
+    }
+
     @Test
     fun `first self-signed announce cannot claim an ID derived from another Noise key`() = runBlocking {
         val attackerNoiseKey = ByteArray(32) { 0x6B }
@@ -314,6 +360,20 @@ class MessageHandlerTest {
         Unit
     }
 
+    @Test
+    fun `persisted authenticated Ed key rejects copied-static preannounce after restart`() = runBlocking {
+        whenever(delegate.getAuthenticatedSigningKey(any())).thenReturn(ByteArray(32) { 0x44 })
+        val packet = announcePacket(ageMs = 0)
+
+        val result = handler.handleAnnounce(RoutedPacket(packet, peerID, "direct-link"))
+
+        assertFalse(result)
+        verify(delegate, never()).updatePeerInfoFromVerifiedAnnouncement(
+            any(), any(), any(), any(), any(), anyOrNull()
+        )
+        Unit
+    }
+
     private fun announcePacket(
         ageMs: Long,
         ttl: UByte = (AppConstants.MESSAGE_TTL_HOPS.toInt() - 1).toUByte(),

app/src/test/kotlin/com/bitchat/android/mesh/PrivateMediaSecurityTest.kt

@@ -1,144 +1,69 @@
 package com.bitchat.android.mesh
 
+import com.bitchat.android.model.AuthenticatedPeerState
 import com.bitchat.android.model.PeerCapabilities
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
 import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
-import org.junit.Assert.assertFalse
 import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
 import org.junit.Test
 
 class PrivateMediaSecurityTest {
-    private class MemoryPins : PrivateMediaCapabilityPinStore {
-        val pins = mutableSetOf<String>()
-        override fun contains(fingerprint: String): Boolean = fingerprint in pins
-        override fun insert(fingerprint: String) {
-            pins += fingerprint
-        }
-    }
-
     private val peerID = "0011223344556677"
-    private val remoteStatic = ByteArray(32) { (it + 1).toByte() }
+    private var authenticatedSession: AuthenticatedNoiseSession? = AuthenticatedNoiseSession(
-    private var peerInfo: PeerInfo? = null
+        ByteArray(32) { (it + 1).toByte() },
-    private var authenticatedRemoteStatic: ByteArray? = null
+        ByteArray(32) { 0x51 }
-    private val pins = MemoryPins()
+    )
+    private var status: AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus = AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Awaiting
+    private var pinned = false
     private val controller = PrivateMediaSecurityController(
-        peerInfoProvider = { peerInfo },
+        authenticatedSessionProvider = { authenticatedSession },
-        authenticatedRemoteStaticProvider = { authenticatedRemoteStatic?.copyOf() },
+        peerStateStatusProvider = { _, _ -> status },
-        pinStore = pins
+        isPrivateMediaPinned = { pinned }
     )
 
     @Test
-    fun `announce before handshake promotes only after authenticated key arrives`() {
+    fun `live session waits for fresh generation proof`() {
-        peerInfo = peer(capabilities = PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA)
+        assertEquals(PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.AwaitingPeerState, controller.sendPolicy(peerID))
-
-        assertFalse(controller.refreshAuthenticatedCapability(peerID))
-        assertTrue(pins.pins.isEmpty())
-
-        authenticatedRemoteStatic = remoteStatic
-        assertTrue(controller.refreshAuthenticatedCapability(peerID))
-        assertEquals(PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted, controller.sendPolicy(peerID))
-        assertEquals(1, pins.pins.size)
     }
 
     @Test
-    fun `handshake before announce promotes only after verified announce arrives`() {
+    fun `valid private-media proof enables encrypted wire`() {
-        authenticatedRemoteStatic = remoteStatic
+        status = AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Proven(
-
+            AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA, ByteArray(32) { 1 })
-        assertFalse(controller.refreshAuthenticatedCapability(peerID))
-        assertTrue(pins.pins.isEmpty())
-
-        peerInfo = peer(capabilities = PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA)
-        assertTrue(controller.refreshAuthenticatedCapability(peerID))
-        assertEquals(PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted, controller.sendPolicy(peerID))
-    }
-
-    @Test
-    fun `self certified or mismatched announcement never creates pin`() {
-        authenticatedRemoteStatic = remoteStatic
-        peerInfo = peer(
-            capabilities = PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA,
-            noiseKey = ByteArray(32) { 0x55 }
         )
+        assertTrue(controller.sendPolicy(peerID) is PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted)
+    }
 
-        assertFalse(controller.refreshAuthenticatedCapability(peerID))
+    @Test
-        assertTrue(pins.pins.isEmpty())
+    fun `no-bit proof permits consent only when capability was never pinned`() {
+        status = AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Proven(
+            AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.NONE, ByteArray(32) { 1 })
+        )
+        assertEquals(PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.RequiresLegacyConsent, controller.sendPolicy(peerID))
+
+        pinned = true
         assertTrue(controller.sendPolicy(peerID) is PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Blocked)
+    }
 
-        // A normal peer refresh may carry a new current key, but it cannot
+    @Test
-        // transfer capability trust away from the key in the signed announce.
+    fun `no-proof timeout permits old-client consent but blocks pinned downgrade`() {
-        peerInfo = peer(
+        status = AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.TimedOut
-            capabilities = PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA,
+        assertEquals(PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.RequiresLegacyConsent, controller.sendPolicy(peerID))
-            noiseKey = remoteStatic,
+
-            verifiedAnnouncementNoiseKey = ByteArray(32) { 0x55 }
+        pinned = true
-        )
-        assertFalse(controller.refreshAuthenticatedCapability(peerID))
         assertTrue(controller.sendPolicy(peerID) is PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Blocked)
-
-        peerInfo = peer(
-            capabilities = PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA,
-            hasVerifiedAnnouncement = false
-        )
-        assertFalse(controller.refreshAuthenticatedCapability(peerID))
-        assertTrue(pins.pins.isEmpty())
     }
 
     @Test
-    fun `signed absent and explicit empty capabilities both require one shot consent`() {
+    fun `live session missing coordinator generation waits and never unlocks legacy`() {
-        authenticatedRemoteStatic = remoteStatic
+        status = AuthenticatedPeerStateStatus.Missing
-
+        assertEquals(PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.AwaitingPeerState, controller.sendPolicy(peerID))
-        peerInfo = peer(capabilities = null)
-        assertEquals(
-            PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.RequiresLegacyConsent,
-            controller.sendPolicy(peerID)
-        )
-
-        peerInfo = peer(capabilities = PeerCapabilities.NONE)
-        assertEquals(
-            PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.RequiresLegacyConsent,
-            controller.sendPolicy(peerID)
-        )
-        assertTrue(pins.pins.isEmpty())
     }
 
     @Test
-    fun `pin is HSTS and prevents later capability downgrade`() {
+    fun `pin never bypasses requirement for live authenticated session`() {
-        authenticatedRemoteStatic = remoteStatic
+        pinned = true
-        peerInfo = peer(capabilities = PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA)
+        authenticatedSession = null
-        assertEquals(PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted, controller.sendPolicy(peerID))
-
-        peerInfo = peer(capabilities = null)
-        assertEquals(PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted, controller.sendPolicy(peerID))
-    }
-
-    @Test
-    fun `pin never bypasses requirement for a live authenticated static key`() {
-        authenticatedRemoteStatic = remoteStatic
-        peerInfo = peer(capabilities = PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA)
-        assertEquals(PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted, controller.sendPolicy(peerID))
-
-        authenticatedRemoteStatic = null
         assertEquals(PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.NeedsHandshake, controller.sendPolicy(peerID))
     }
-
-    private fun peer(
-        capabilities: PeerCapabilities?,
-        noiseKey: ByteArray = remoteStatic,
-        hasVerifiedAnnouncement: Boolean = true,
-        verifiedAnnouncementNoiseKey: ByteArray = noiseKey
-    ) = PeerInfo(
-        id = peerID,
-        nickname = "peer",
-        isConnected = true,
-        isDirectConnection = true,
-        noisePublicKey = noiseKey,
-        signingPublicKey = ByteArray(32) { 9 },
-        isVerifiedNickname = true,
-        lastSeen = 1,
-        capabilities = capabilities,
-        hasVerifiedAnnouncement = hasVerifiedAnnouncement,
-        verifiedAnnouncementNoisePublicKey = if (hasVerifiedAnnouncement) {
-            verifiedAnnouncementNoiseKey
-        } else {
-            null
-        }
-    )
 }

app/src/test/kotlin/com/bitchat/android/mesh/PrivateMediaTransferPreparerTest.kt

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import com.bitchat.android.model.NoisePayload
 import com.bitchat.android.model.NoisePayloadType
 import com.bitchat.android.protocol.BitchatPacket
 import com.bitchat.android.protocol.MessageType
+import com.bitchat.android.noise.AuthenticatedNoiseSession
 import org.junit.After
 import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
 import org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull
@@ -18,6 +19,10 @@ import java.util.Random
 class PrivateMediaTransferPreparerTest {
     private val senderID = hex("0011223344556677")
     private val recipientID = hex("8877665544332211")
+    private val authenticatedSession = AuthenticatedNoiseSession(
+        ByteArray(32) { 0x21 },
+        ByteArray(32) { 0x22 }
+    )
     private val fragmentManagers = mutableListOf<FragmentManager>()
 
     @After
@@ -29,10 +34,10 @@ class PrivateMediaTransferPreparerTest {
     fun `encrypted mode emits deployed Noise 0x20 and signs before fragmentation`() {
         var encryptedPlaintext: ByteArray? = null
         val preparer = preparer(
-            policy = PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted,
+            policy = PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted(authenticatedSession),
-            encrypt = { bytes, _ ->
+            encrypt = { bytes, _, _ ->
                 encryptedPlaintext = bytes
-                byteArrayOf(0x41) + bytes
+                PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.Success(byteArrayOf(0x41) + bytes)
             }
         )
 
@@ -101,9 +106,9 @@ class PrivateMediaTransferPreparerTest {
             senderID = senderID,
             ttl = 7u,
             policyProvider = { PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.NeedsHandshake },
-            encrypt = { _, _ ->
+            encrypt = { _, _, _ ->
                 encrypted = true
-                byteArrayOf(1)
+                PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.Success(byteArrayOf(1))
             },
             finalizeRoutedAndSigned = {
                 finalized = true
@@ -123,6 +128,38 @@ class PrivateMediaTransferPreparerTest {
         assertTrue(!fragmented)
     }
 
+    @Test
+    fun `peer-state wait returns before encoding signing encryption or fragmentation`() {
+        var encrypted = false
+        var finalized = false
+        var fragmented = false
+        val fragmentManager = FragmentManager().also { fragmentManagers += it }
+        val preparer = PrivateMediaTransferPreparer(
+            senderID = senderID,
+            ttl = 7u,
+            policyProvider = { PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.AwaitingPeerState },
+            encrypt = { _, _, _ ->
+                encrypted = true
+                PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.Success(byteArrayOf(1))
+            },
+            finalizeRoutedAndSigned = {
+                finalized = true
+                it
+            },
+            fragment = { packet, maxFragments ->
+                fragmented = true
+                fragmentManager.createFragments(packet, maxFragments)
+            }
+        )
+
+        val outcome = preparer.prepare("peer", recipientID, file(64), false)
+
+        assertEquals(PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.AwaitingPeerState, outcome)
+        assertTrue(!encrypted)
+        assertTrue(!finalized)
+        assertTrue(!fragmented)
+    }
+
     @Test
     fun `no route accepts 256 final fragments and rejects 257`() {
         assertExactBoundary(route = null)
@@ -139,10 +176,62 @@ class PrivateMediaTransferPreparerTest {
         )
     }
 
+    @Test
+    fun `generation churn re-runs policy once instead of losing the send intent`() {
+        val replacementSession = AuthenticatedNoiseSession(
+            authenticatedSession.remoteStaticKey,
+            ByteArray(32) { 0x23 }
+        )
+        var policyCalls = 0
+        val fragmentManager = FragmentManager().also { fragmentManagers += it }
+        val preparer = PrivateMediaTransferPreparer(
+            senderID = senderID,
+            ttl = 7u,
+            policyProvider = {
+                policyCalls += 1
+                PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted(
+                    if (policyCalls == 1) authenticatedSession else replacementSession
+                )
+            },
+            encrypt = { bytes, _, session ->
+                if (session == authenticatedSession) {
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.GenerationChanged
+                } else {
+                    PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.Success(byteArrayOf(0x41) + bytes)
+                }
+            },
+            finalizeRoutedAndSigned = { it.copy(signature = ByteArray(64) { 0x33 }) },
+            fragment = fragmentManager::createFragments
+        )
+
+        val outcome = preparer.prepare("peer", recipientID, file(64), false)
+
+        assertTrue(outcome is PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.Ready)
+        assertEquals(2, policyCalls)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `repeated generation churn remains retryable`() {
+        val fragmentManager = FragmentManager().also { fragmentManagers += it }
+        val preparer = PrivateMediaTransferPreparer(
+            senderID = senderID,
+            ttl = 7u,
+            policyProvider = { PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted(authenticatedSession) },
+            encrypt = { _, _, _ -> PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.GenerationChanged },
+            finalizeRoutedAndSigned = { it.copy(signature = ByteArray(64) { 0x33 }) },
+            fragment = fragmentManager::createFragments
+        )
+
+        assertEquals(
+            PrivateMediaBuildOutcome.AwaitingPeerState,
+            preparer.prepare("peer", recipientID, file(64), false)
+        )
+    }
+
     private fun assertExactBoundary(route: List<ByteArray>?) {
         val randomContent = ByteArray(180 * 1024).also { Random(0xB17C4A7).nextBytes(it) }
         val preparer = preparer(
-            policy = PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted,
+            policy = PrivateMediaPolicyDecision.Encrypted(authenticatedSession),
             finalizer = { packet ->
                 packet.copy(
                     version = if (route == null) packet.version else 2u,
@@ -180,7 +269,13 @@ class PrivateMediaTransferPreparerTest {
 
     private fun preparer(
         policy: PrivateMediaPolicyDecision,
-        encrypt: (ByteArray, String) -> ByteArray? = { bytes, _ -> byteArrayOf(0x01) + bytes },
+        encrypt: (
+            ByteArray,
+            String,
+            AuthenticatedNoiseSession
+        ) -> PrivateMediaEncryptionResult = { bytes, _, _ ->
+            PrivateMediaEncryptionResult.Success(byteArrayOf(0x01) + bytes)
+        },
         finalizer: (BitchatPacket) -> BitchatPacket? = { packet ->
             packet.copy(signature = ByteArray(64) { 0x33 })
         }

app/src/test/kotlin/com/bitchat/android/mesh/SecurityManagerTest.kt

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ class SecurityManagerTest {
     // Key pairs (using dummy bytes for mock verification)
     private val otherSigningKey = ByteArray(32) { 0xA }
     private val otherNoiseKey = ByteArray(32) { 0xB }
+    private val sessionToken = ByteArray(32) { 0x5C }
     private val unknownPeerID = NoisePeerIdentity.derivePeerID(otherNoiseKey)!!
 
     private val dummyPayload = "Hello World".toByteArray()
@@ -344,6 +345,21 @@ class SecurityManagerTest {
         assertFalse(securityManager.validatePacket(packet, otherPeerID))
     }
 
+    @Test
+    fun `validatePacket rejects announce conflicting with persisted authenticated Ed key`() {
+        whenever(mockDelegate.getAuthenticatedSigningKey(otherNoiseKey))
+            .thenReturn(ByteArray(32) { 0x44 })
+        val announcement = IdentityAnnouncement("Copied", otherNoiseKey, otherSigningKey)
+        val packet = BitchatPacket(
+            type = MessageType.ANNOUNCE.value,
+            ttl = 7u,
+            senderID = unknownPeerID,
+            payload = announcement.encode()!!
+        ).also { it.signature = validSignature }
+
+        assertFalse(securityManager.validatePacket(packet, unknownPeerID))
+    }
+
     @Test
     fun `validatePacket - ignores own packets`() {
         val packet = BitchatPacket(
@@ -420,7 +436,9 @@ class SecurityManagerTest {
         assertTrue(accepted)
         assertTrue(fakeEncryptionService.removePeerCalls == 0)
         verify(mockDelegate).sendHandshakeResponse(otherPeerID, response)
-        verify(mockDelegate, never()).onKeyExchangeCompleted(any(), any(), anyOrNull(), anyOrNull())
+        verify(mockDelegate, never()).onKeyExchangeCompleted(
+            any(), any(), any(), anyOrNull(), anyOrNull()
+        )
     }
 
     @Test
@@ -434,19 +452,23 @@ class SecurityManagerTest {
         assertFalse(securityManager.handleNoiseHandshake(routed))
         assertTrue(fakeEncryptionService.removePeerCalls == 0)
         verify(mockDelegate, never()).sendHandshakeResponse(any(), any())
-        verify(mockDelegate, never()).onKeyExchangeCompleted(any(), any(), anyOrNull(), anyOrNull())
+        verify(mockDelegate, never()).onKeyExchangeCompleted(
+            any(), any(), any(), anyOrNull(), anyOrNull()
+        )
 
         fakeEncryptionService.handshakeError = null
         fakeEncryptionService.handshakeResult = NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult(
             response = null,
             establishedNow = true,
-            authenticatedRemoteStaticKey = otherNoiseKey
+            authenticatedRemoteStaticKey = otherNoiseKey,
+            authenticatedSessionToken = sessionToken
         )
         assertTrue("Failed frames must not poison the processed-exchange cache", securityManager.handleNoiseHandshake(routed))
         assertTrue(fakeEncryptionService.handshakeCalls == 2)
         verify(mockDelegate).onKeyExchangeCompleted(
             otherPeerID,
             otherNoiseKey,
+            sessionToken,
             "direct-link",
             "direct-link-token"
         )
@@ -457,7 +479,8 @@ class SecurityManagerTest {
         fakeEncryptionService.handshakeResult = NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult(
             response = null,
             establishedNow = true,
-            authenticatedRemoteStaticKey = otherNoiseKey
+            authenticatedRemoteStaticKey = otherNoiseKey,
+            authenticatedSessionToken = sessionToken
         )
         val routed = handshakePacket(byteArrayOf(0x51, 0x52, 0x53))
 
@@ -466,6 +489,7 @@ class SecurityManagerTest {
         verify(mockDelegate, times(1)).onKeyExchangeCompleted(
             otherPeerID,
             otherNoiseKey,
+            sessionToken,
             "direct-link",
             "direct-link-token"
         )
@@ -478,7 +502,8 @@ class SecurityManagerTest {
         fakeEncryptionService.handshakeResult = NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult(
             response = null,
             establishedNow = true,
-            authenticatedRemoteStaticKey = otherNoiseKey
+            authenticatedRemoteStaticKey = otherNoiseKey,
+            authenticatedSessionToken = sessionToken
         )
         val routed = handshakePacket(
             payload = byteArrayOf(0x61, 0x62, 0x63),
@@ -486,7 +511,13 @@ class SecurityManagerTest {
         )
 
         assertTrue(securityManager.handleNoiseHandshake(routed))
-        verify(mockDelegate).onKeyExchangeCompleted(otherPeerID, otherNoiseKey, null, null)
+        verify(mockDelegate).onKeyExchangeCompleted(
+            otherPeerID,
+            otherNoiseKey,
+            sessionToken,
+            null,
+            null
+        )
     }
 
     private fun setupKnownPeer(peerID: String, signingKey: ByteArray) {

app/src/test/kotlin/com/bitchat/android/model/AuthenticatedPeerStateTest.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+package com.bitchat.android.model
+
+import org.junit.Assert.assertArrayEquals
+import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
+import org.junit.Assert.assertNull
+import org.junit.Test
+
+class AuthenticatedPeerStateTest {
+    private val signingKey = ByteArray(32) { it.toByte() }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `encoder matches canonical iOS bytes`() {
+        val encoded = AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA, signingKey).encode()
+
+        assertArrayEquals(
+            byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x20) + signingKey,
+            encoded
+        )
+        assertEquals(
+            AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA, signingKey),
+            AuthenticatedPeerState.decode(encoded)
+        )
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `decoder skips unknown TLVs and accepts either known-field order`() {
+        val payload = byteArrayOf(
+            0x01,
+            0x7F, 0x02, 0x55, 0x66,
+            0x02, 0x20
+        ) + signingKey + byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x01, 0x00)
+
+        assertEquals(
+            AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.NONE, signingKey),
+            AuthenticatedPeerState.decode(payload)
+        )
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `decoder rejects malformed duplicate missing and noncanonical fields`() {
+        val validCapabilities = byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x01, 0x00)
+        val validSigning = byteArrayOf(0x02, 0x20) + signingKey
+        val invalid = listOf(
+            byteArrayOf(),
+            byteArrayOf(0x02) + validCapabilities + validSigning,
+            byteArrayOf(0x01) + validCapabilities,
+            byteArrayOf(0x01) + validSigning,
+            byteArrayOf(0x01) + validCapabilities + validCapabilities + validSigning,
+            byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00) + validSigning,
+            byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x01, 0x00) + validSigning,
+            byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x01, 0x09) + ByteArray(9) + validSigning,
+            byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x02, 0x1F) + ByteArray(31) + validCapabilities,
+            byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x7F),
+            byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x7F, 0x02, 0x01)
+        )
+
+        invalid.forEach { assertNull("Expected rejection for ${it.joinToString()}", AuthenticatedPeerState.decode(it)) }
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `Noise wrapper emits and decodes canonical 0x21`() {
+        val state = AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.NONE, signingKey)
+        val encoded = NoisePayload(NoisePayloadType.PEER_STATE, state.encode()).encode()
+
+        assertEquals(0x21, encoded[0].toInt() and 0xFF)
+        assertEquals(NoisePayloadType.PEER_STATE, NoisePayload.decode(encoded)?.type)
+    }
+}

app/src/test/kotlin/com/bitchat/android/noise/NoiseSessionManagerIdentityBindingTest.kt

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ import org.junit.Assert.assertSame
 import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
 import org.junit.Assert.fail
 import org.junit.Test
+import java.util.concurrent.CountDownLatch
+import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit
+import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean
+import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicReference
 
 class NoiseSessionManagerIdentityBindingTest {
     private data class TestIdentity(
@@ -40,8 +44,12 @@ class NoiseSessionManagerIdentityBindingTest {
         assertArrayEquals(alice.publicKey, bobManager.getRemoteStaticKey(alice.peerID))
 
         val plaintext = "bound transport".toByteArray()
-        val ciphertext = aliceManager.encrypt(plaintext, bob.peerID)
+        val aliceSession = aliceManager.getAuthenticatedSession(bob.peerID)!!
-        assertArrayEquals(plaintext, bobManager.decrypt(ciphertext, alice.peerID))
+        val bobSession = bobManager.getAuthenticatedSession(alice.peerID)!!
+        val ciphertext = aliceManager.encryptForSession(plaintext, bob.peerID, aliceSession)
+        val decrypted = bobManager.decryptWithSession(ciphertext, alice.peerID)
+        assertArrayEquals(plaintext, decrypted.plaintext)
+        assertArrayEquals(bobSession.sessionToken, decrypted.authenticatedSession.sessionToken)
     }
 
     @Test
@@ -145,6 +153,7 @@ class NoiseSessionManagerIdentityBindingTest {
 
         completeHandshake(aliceManager, alice.peerID, originalBobManager, bob.peerID)
         val originalSession = aliceManager.getSession(bob.peerID)
+        val originalBinding = aliceManager.getAuthenticatedSession(bob.peerID)!!
 
         // Simulate Bob restarting with the same persistent static identity and no session state.
         val restartedBobManager = manager(bob)
@@ -157,12 +166,98 @@ class NoiseSessionManagerIdentityBindingTest {
         assertTrue(aliceManager.hasEstablishedSession(bob.peerID))
         assertArrayEquals(bob.publicKey, aliceManager.getRemoteStaticKey(bob.peerID))
         assertTrue(aliceAuthenticatedCallbacks == 2)
+        val replacementBinding = aliceManager.getAuthenticatedSession(bob.peerID)!!
+        assertFalse(originalBinding.sessionToken.contentEquals(replacementBinding.sessionToken))
+        try {
+            aliceManager.encryptForSession(
+                "stale generation".toByteArray(),
+                bob.peerID,
+                originalBinding
+            )
+            fail("Expected stale generation-bound encryption to be rejected")
+        } catch (_: NoiseSessionError.SessionGenerationChanged) {
+            // Expected.
+        }
 
         val plaintext = "replacement transport".toByteArray()
-        val ciphertext = restartedBobManager.encrypt(plaintext, alice.peerID)
+        val ciphertext = restartedBobManager.encryptForSession(
+            plaintext,
+            alice.peerID,
+            restartedBobManager.getAuthenticatedSession(alice.peerID)!!
+        )
         assertArrayEquals(plaintext, aliceManager.decrypt(ciphertext, bob.peerID))
     }
 
+    @Test
+    fun `generation lease blocks replacement and rejects stale token afterward`() {
+        val alice = identity()
+        val bob = identity()
+        val aliceManager = manager(alice)
+        val originalBobManager = manager(bob)
+        completeHandshake(aliceManager, alice.peerID, originalBobManager, bob.peerID)
+        val originalBinding = aliceManager.getAuthenticatedSession(bob.peerID)!!
+
+        val restartedBobManager = manager(bob)
+        val message1 = restartedBobManager.initiateHandshake(alice.peerID)!!
+        val message2 = aliceManager.processHandshakeMessage(bob.peerID, message1)!!
+        val message3 = restartedBobManager.processHandshakeMessage(alice.peerID, message2)!!
+
+        val leaseEntered = CountDownLatch(1)
+        val releaseLease = CountDownLatch(1)
+        val replacementStarted = CountDownLatch(1)
+        val replacementCompleted = CountDownLatch(1)
+        val replacementFinished = AtomicBoolean(false)
+        val threadFailure = AtomicReference<Throwable?>(null)
+        val leaseThread = Thread {
+            try {
+                assertTrue(
+                    aliceManager.withAuthenticatedSession(bob.peerID, originalBinding) {
+                        leaseEntered.countDown()
+                        releaseLease.await(2, TimeUnit.SECONDS)
+                    }
+                )
+            } catch (error: Throwable) {
+                threadFailure.set(error)
+            }
+        }
+        val replacementThread = Thread {
+            try {
+                replacementStarted.countDown()
+                aliceManager.processHandshakeMessage(bob.peerID, message3)
+                replacementFinished.set(true)
+            } catch (error: Throwable) {
+                threadFailure.set(error)
+            } finally {
+                replacementCompleted.countDown()
+            }
+        }
+
+        leaseThread.start()
+        assertTrue(leaseEntered.await(1, TimeUnit.SECONDS))
+        replacementThread.start()
+        assertTrue(replacementStarted.await(1, TimeUnit.SECONDS))
+        try {
+            assertFalse(
+                "Replacement must wait while the old generation lease is active",
+                replacementCompleted.await(100, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS)
+            )
+        } finally {
+            releaseLease.countDown()
+        }
+        leaseThread.join(2_000)
+        replacementThread.join(2_000)
+        assertTrue(replacementCompleted.await(1, TimeUnit.SECONDS))
+        threadFailure.get()?.let { throw it }
+        assertTrue(replacementFinished.get())
+
+        try {
+            aliceManager.encryptForSession(byteArrayOf(1), bob.peerID, originalBinding)
+            fail("Expected old token to be rejected after replacement")
+        } catch (_: NoiseSessionError.SessionGenerationChanged) {
+            // Expected.
+        }
+    }
+
     @Test
     fun `peer ID derivation rejects malformed keys and non-wire claims`() {
         val peer = identity()

app/src/test/kotlin/com/bitchat/android/ui/MediaSendingManagerMigrationTest.kt

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ class MediaSendingManagerMigrationTest {
             state,
             MessageManager(state),
             mock(),
+            CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Unconfined),
             getMeshService = { mesh }
         )
         file = kotlin.io.path.createTempFile("private-media", ".jpg").toFile().apply {
@@ -57,28 +58,112 @@ class MediaSendingManagerMigrationTest {
     }
 
     @Test
-    fun `preflight rejection creates no local echo mapping or send`() {
+    fun `preflight rejection creates only a visible failure and no file echo or send`() {
         whenever(mesh.prepareFilePrivate(eq(peerID), any(), any(), eq(false)))
             .thenReturn(PrivateMediaPreparation.Rejected("too many fragments"))
 
         manager.sendImageNote(peerID, null, file.absolutePath)
 
-        assertTrue(state.privateChats.value[peerID].isNullOrEmpty())
+        val messages = state.privateChats.value[peerID].orEmpty()
+        assertEquals(1, messages.size)
+        assertTrue(messages.single().content.contains("too many fragments"))
+        assertTrue(messages.none { it.type == com.bitchat.android.model.BitchatMessageType.Image })
         assertEquals(null, manager.legacyPrivateMediaConsent.value)
         verify(mesh, never()).sendFilePrivate(any(), any())
     }
 
     @Test
-    fun `missing Noise session initiates one handshake without echo prompt or media send`() {
+    fun `pinned downgrade rejection is visible without a file echo or send`() {
+        whenever(mesh.prepareFilePrivate(eq(peerID), any(), any(), eq(false)))
+            .thenReturn(
+                PrivateMediaPreparation.Rejected(
+                    "Encrypted private media was previously pinned, but this session proved no support; send blocked"
+                )
+            )
+
+        manager.sendImageNote(peerID, null, file.absolutePath)
+
+        val messages = state.privateChats.value[peerID].orEmpty()
+        assertEquals(1, messages.size)
+        assertTrue(messages.single().content.contains("previously pinned"))
+        assertTrue(messages.none { it.type == com.bitchat.android.model.BitchatMessageType.Image })
+        verify(mesh, never()).sendFilePrivate(any(), any())
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `missing Noise session retains first send and commits after proof resolution`() {
+        val commits = AtomicInteger(0)
         whenever(mesh.prepareFilePrivate(eq(peerID), any(), any(), eq(false)))
             .thenReturn(PrivateMediaPreparation.NeedsHandshake)
+            .thenAnswer { invocation ->
+                PrivateMediaPreparation.Ready(
+                    PreparedPrivateMediaTransfer(
+                        transferId = invocation.getArgument<String>(2),
+                        wireMode = PrivateMediaWireMode.ENCRYPTED_NOISE_0X20
+                    ) {
+                        commits.incrementAndGet()
+                        true
+                    }
+                )
+            }
 
         manager.sendImageNote(peerID, null, file.absolutePath)
 
         verify(mesh, times(1)).initiateNoiseHandshake(peerID)
-        verify(mesh, never()).sendFilePrivate(any(), any())
         assertTrue(state.privateChats.value[peerID].isNullOrEmpty())
         assertEquals(null, manager.legacyPrivateMediaConsent.value)
+
+        manager.retryPendingPrivateMedia(peerID)
+
+        assertEquals(1, commits.get())
+        assertEquals(1, state.privateChats.value[peerID]?.size)
+        verify(mesh, times(2)).prepareFilePrivate(eq(peerID), any(), any(), eq(false))
+        verify(mesh, never()).sendFilePrivate(any(), any())
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `awaiting peer state retains send and watchdog resolution offers legacy consent`() {
+        whenever(mesh.prepareFilePrivate(eq(peerID), any(), any(), eq(false)))
+            .thenReturn(PrivateMediaPreparation.AwaitingPeerState)
+            .thenReturn(PrivateMediaPreparation.RequiresLegacyConsent("relay-visible warning"))
+
+        manager.sendImageNote(peerID, null, file.absolutePath)
+
+        verify(mesh, never()).initiateNoiseHandshake(peerID)
+        assertTrue(state.privateChats.value[peerID].isNullOrEmpty())
+        assertEquals(null, manager.legacyPrivateMediaConsent.value)
+
+        manager.retryPendingPrivateMedia(peerID)
+
+        assertNotNull(manager.legacyPrivateMediaConsent.value)
+        assertTrue(state.privateChats.value[peerID].isNullOrEmpty())
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `reentrant proof resolution during preparation cannot lose first send intent`() {
+        val commits = AtomicInteger(0)
+        whenever(mesh.prepareFilePrivate(eq(peerID), any(), any(), eq(false)))
+            .thenAnswer {
+                manager.retryPendingPrivateMedia(peerID)
+                PrivateMediaPreparation.AwaitingPeerState
+            }
+            .thenAnswer { invocation ->
+                PrivateMediaPreparation.Ready(
+                    PreparedPrivateMediaTransfer(
+                        transferId = invocation.getArgument<String>(2),
+                        wireMode = PrivateMediaWireMode.ENCRYPTED_NOISE_0X20
+                    ) {
+                        commits.incrementAndGet()
+                        true
+                    }
+                )
+            }
+
+        manager.sendImageNote(peerID, null, file.absolutePath)
+
+        assertEquals(1, commits.get())
+        assertEquals(1, state.privateChats.value[peerID]?.size)
+        verify(mesh, times(2)).prepareFilePrivate(eq(peerID), any(), any(), eq(false))
     }
 
     @Test

docs/NOISE_PEER_ID_BINDING.md

@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ The same authenticated callback restores any existing Noise-key-to-Nostr
 relationship under the canonical 16-hex mesh ID; unproven announcements never
 write that routing index.
 
+Generation-sensitive consumers use the 32-byte Noise handshake hash as a local
+session token. The hash is cloned before handshake-state zeroization, and
+session lookup, decrypt, expected-token encrypt, and leased identity mutation
+share the Noise manager lock. A same-static replacement therefore cannot reuse
+the previous generation's proof or destroy a session while a bound mutation is
+in progress.
+
 ## Remaining TOFU boundary
 
 The first public announcement is still self-signed trust-on-first-use. An

docs/PRIVATE_MEDIA_V1.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ build that emitted it has expired and the project's minimum-supported-client
 policy excludes those builds. Track that release criterion explicitly; do not
 remove the alias on an arbitrary calendar date.
 
-## Capability announcement
+## Discovery hint
 
 Identity announcement TLV `0x05` is a minimal little-endian bitfield. Bit 8
 means the peer implements private-media v1, so its exact encoding is:
@@ -35,41 +35,82 @@ means the peer implements private-media v1, so its exact encoding is:
 
 Current Android builds include this TLV in broadcast and peer-directed
 announcements over both BLE and Wi-Fi Aware. Older clients safely skip the
-unknown TLV. Its absence, or a present TLV with bit 8 clear, describes a legacy
+unknown TLV. Its absence, or a present TLV with bit 8 clear, does not invalidate
-client and does not invalidate the announcement.
+the announcement.
 
 Decoders retain unknown low-64-bit capability bits and unknown announcement
 TLVs so a decode/re-encode cycle does not erase newer extensions.
 
-## Authenticated capability pinning
+The announcement bit is discovery metadata only. A self-signed announcement
+does not prove possession of its public Noise key, so it never authorizes
+encrypted media, creates a capability pin, or satisfies a pending send.
 
-The capability bit is security-sensitive and is not trusted just because an
+## Authenticated peer state (`0x21`)
-announcement is self-signed. A client may promote bit 8 only after both of
-these checks succeed, in either arrival order:
 
-1. The announcement has a valid Ed25519 signature using its advertised
+Every newly authenticated Noise generation, including a rekey with the same
-   signing key.
+static key, exchanges a fresh peer-state proof. Its decrypted Noise payload
-2. Its advertised Noise static key exactly matches the remote static key
+type is `0x21`, followed by this canonical byte sequence:
-   authenticated by the live Noise handshake.
 
-After promotion, store an HSTS-style pin keyed by the SHA-256 fingerprint of
+```text
-that authenticated Noise static key. The pin is persistent, encrypted at rest,
+01                         version
-and cleared by panic wipe. Never derive it from a peer-ID cache,
+01 <len 1...8> <value>     capabilities, minimal little-endian
-`PeerFingerprintManager`, an unverified announcement, or a Noise key that does
+02 20 <32 bytes>           Ed25519 signing public key
-not match the signed announcement.
+```
 
-A pin prevents a later missing or cleared capability bit from downgrading the
+Both known TLVs are required exactly once. Decoders reject an unknown version,
-same authenticated identity. It never substitutes for a live authenticated
+truncated TLV, duplicate known TLV, a capability length outside `1...8`, a
-Noise session when sending.
+non-minimal capability value, or an Ed25519 key whose length is not 32. Unknown
+TLVs are skipped for forward compatibility, and the two known TLVs may arrive
+in either order.
+
+Each endpoint sends `0x21` when the generation authenticates and echoes its
+local state at most once after accepting the peer's first valid proof for that
+generation. Repeated identical proofs are idempotent; a different second proof
+cannot replace the first within that generation. A five-second generation
+watchdog distinguishes an older client that ignores `0x21` from a new client
+that supplied a proof. Persisted state from a previous connection never
+satisfies the fresh-generation watchdog.
+
+Locally, the Noise handshake hash is the generation token. Decryption returns
+that token with the plaintext, coordinator mutations hold a lease on that exact
+session, and private-media encryption accepts the policy decision only while
+the same token remains active. A same-static rekey therefore cannot reuse an
+older proof or race policy into encrypting on an unproved generation.
+
+The proof is bound by the Noise channel to the exact authenticated 32-byte
+remote static key and canonical peer ID. Store its capabilities and 32-byte
+Ed25519 key under the SHA-256 fingerprint of that static key in encrypted
+identity state. A proof with bit 8 creates an HSTS-style private-media pin; a
+later no-bit proof does not erase that history. Panic wipe clears both records
+and prevents an in-flight pre-wipe controller from restoring them.
+
+The persisted Ed25519 key is consulted before accepting later announcements.
+This lets a valid proof recover from a copied-static, wrong-Ed preannouncement,
+while preventing that preannouncement from winning again after restart. A
+fresh proof in a later Noise generation may intentionally rotate the Ed25519
+key; an announcement by itself cannot.
 
 ## Mixed-client send policy
 
-- No live authenticated Noise remote-static key: emit no media or local echo,
+- No live authenticated Noise remote-static key: retain the first send intent,
-  initiate one Noise handshake, and require the user to retry after it completes.
+  emit no media or local echo, and initiate one Noise handshake.
-- Authenticated and pinned, or authenticated with a matching verified bit-8
+- Live generation waiting for `0x21`: retain that same intent while the
-  announcement: send encrypted `0x11` / `0x20`.
+  five-second peer-state watchdog runs.
-- Authenticated with a matching verified legacy announcement (TLV absent or bit
+- Fresh proof with bit 8: automatically retry the retained intent and send
-  clear): ask for explicit one-shot consent before sending this file.
+  encrypted `0x11` / `0x20` after final-packet admission.
+- Fresh proof without bit 8, or a five-second no-proof timeout for an unpinned
+  old client: retry the retained intent by showing the existing explicit
+  one-shot legacy consent prompt.
+- A previously pinned identity that proves no bit, or fails to prove state in
+  the current generation, is visibly blocked. It cannot silently fall back.
+
+The exact automatic intent is reserved before its first policy evaluation, so a
+proof or timeout callback racing that evaluation cannot be lost. It is bounded
+and singular, and expires after 15 seconds with a visible system message.
+Retries are serialized and always re-run current policy and exact packet
+admission. No waiting, rejected, expired, or cancelled attempt creates a local
+file echo or transmits raw media; terminal rejection is shown as a system
+message rather than failing silently.
 
 The legacy consent path sends a recipient-directed raw
 `MessageType.FILE_TRANSFER` (`0x22`) packet. Its contents are visible to relays,
@@ -79,9 +120,9 @@ failure aborts the send. Receivers reject unsigned or invalid signed directed
 raw files.
 
 Consent is consumed at most once. On approval the sender re-runs the policy and
-packet admission checks. If the capability became authenticated while the
+packet admission checks. If a bit-8 proof arrived while the dialog was open,
-dialog was open, the send upgrades to encrypted mode. Cancellation, duplicate
+the send upgrades to encrypted mode. Cancellation, duplicate approval, panic
-approval, panic wipe, and changed security state cannot cause a later send.
+wipe, and changed security state cannot cause a later send.
 
 ## Final-packet admission
 
@@ -102,16 +143,26 @@ capability and bounded streaming design.
 
 ## Compatibility summary
 
-- New Android to new iOS/Android: encrypted Noise `0x20` after authenticated
+- New Android to new iOS/Android: generation-scoped authenticated `0x21`
-  capability promotion.
+  exchange, then encrypted Noise `0x20`.
 - Prerelease iOS to new Android: encrypted Noise `0x09` is decoded,
   canonicalized to `0x20`, and delivered during the migration window.
-- New Android to a verified older client: blocked until the user explicitly
+- New Android to an older client: the unknown `0x21` is ignored; after the
-  accepts one relay-visible signed raw `0x22` transfer.
+  five-second watchdog, an unpinned identity may use one explicitly consented,
+  relay-visible signed raw `0x22` transfer.
 - Old clients receiving a new announcement: ignore TLV `0x05` and continue
-  operating normally.
+  operating normally. Old clients receiving `0x21` drop the unknown inner type
+  without affecting their existing Noise session or private messages.
 - A previously capable authenticated identity cannot force a silent downgrade
-  by later omitting the bit.
+  by omitting `0x21`, clearing the bit, or changing only its announcement.
+
+Do not remove the `0x21` watchdog/legacy-consent migration path until the
+minimum-supported Android and iOS versions both emit an authenticated bit-8
+`0x21` proof on every Noise generation, and the released legacy population has
+aged out under the project's explicit support policy. Merely observing an
+announcement bit or waiting for an arbitrary date is not sufficient. The HSTS
+pin remains necessary after that point; removing old-client consent must not
+re-enable a raw automatic fallback.
 
 Public media remains signed broadcast `MessageType.FILE_TRANSFER` (`0x22`) and
 is outside this private-media capability.