Merge branch 'codex/bind-noise-peer-identities' into codex/advertise-private-media-capability

# Conflicts:
#	app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/BluetoothMeshService.kt
#	app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/MeshCore.kt
#	app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/MessageHandler.kt
#	app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/model/RoutedPacket.kt
#	app/src/test/kotlin/com/bitchat/android/mesh/MessageHandlerTest.kt

docs/NOISE_PEER_ID_BINDING.md

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+# Noise peer-ID binding
+
+Mesh wire peer IDs are exactly 16 lowercase hexadecimal characters derived as
+`hex(SHA-256(noiseStaticPublicKey)[0..<8])`. Android enforces that binding at
+both identity entry points:
+
+- A verified announcement must carry a 32-byte Noise static key whose derived
+  ID matches both the packet sender and routed sender.
+- A Noise XX initiator or responder must authenticate a remote static key whose
+  derived ID matches the claimed session key before transport ciphers are
+  exposed or an authentication callback runs.
+
+Inbound rehandshakes use a separate responder candidate. An established
+session remains active until the candidate completes and passes the binding;
+failure or mismatch destroys only the candidate. BLE mappings, Wi-Fi socket
+rebinds, gossip, sync, and peer-last-seen effects run only after announcement
+validation succeeds. A Wi-Fi discovery identity is not destructively rebound
+from a self-signed announce. A direct announce may start the canonical
+handshake, but the alias is promoted only when the exact, still-active socket
+delivers the Noise frame that completes bound authentication. A peer-ID-only
+or stale-socket callback cannot authorize that rebind; the final
+expected-socket comparison and alias mutation are atomic with socket replacement.
+Promotion also refuses to displace a different live socket already authenticated
+under the canonical peer ID.
+
+Leave packets use the existing signed wire format and are accepted only when
+the signature matches the key learned from a verified announcement. Invalid or
+unsigned leaves therefore cannot evict the claimed peer or be relayed. A valid
+leave removes the peer through the normal peer-manager path, which also clears
+its active Noise session.
+
+Announcements no longer write fingerprint mappings. Those mappings are created
+only by the authenticated Noise-session callback. A known peer's signing key
+also cannot change based on an announcement or merely because some session for
+that peer ID is active. Rotation requires an authenticated peer-state proof
+tied to the exact Noise channel; ambient session presence is not enough.
+The same authenticated callback restores any existing Noise-key-to-Nostr
+relationship under the canonical 16-hex mesh ID; unproven announcements never
+write that routing index.
+
+## Remaining TOFU boundary
+
+The first public announcement is still self-signed trust-on-first-use. An
+attacker can copy a public Noise key and self-sign an announcement, but cannot
+complete the bound Noise handshake for that ID. Public-mesh identity admission
+is intentionally not gated behind an automatic handshake in this change; doing
+so is a separate availability/protocol decision.
+
+Consequently, discovery metadata or capability bits in an announcement are
+hints, not proof of Noise-key possession. Security-sensitive capabilities must
+be confirmed inside the authenticated Noise channel before they are pinned or
+used to authorize a downgrade-sensitive behavior.